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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview of this thesis
This thesis consists of three papers which are assigned to two parts. Part I focuses on
the for-profit sector, analysing how offshoring affects the productivity of firms (chapter
2) and the labour market inequalities between differently skilled workers (chapter 3). Part
II (chapter 4) focuses on the non-profit sector, analysing the determinants of the survival
or exit of internationally active non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The two parts
are largely independent from each other. Still, as I will illustrate in the research summary
below, there are some analogies between the market for firms and the “market” for NGOs,
on which we build in the second chapter. In the following I list the papers included in this
thesis and provide some background context:
Part I: Offshoring
Chapter 2: Schwörer, Tillmann, “Offshoring, Domestic Outsourcing, and Productivity -
Evidence for a Number of European Countries”.
This chapter is based on a paper published in Review of World Economics, 2013, 149
(1), pp. 131–149, and includes a few additional results published in Kiel Working Paper
1786, Institute for the World Economy, 2012. My work on this paper was financially
supported through the framework 7 project SERVICEGAP of the European Commission.
The project aimed at assessing the impact of service innovation and internationalisation
on growth and productivity. Thus, a particular focus of this paper is laid on the impact of
service offshoring.
Chapter 3: Schwörer, Tillmann, “Offshoring and Labour Market Inequalities”. This is an
unpublished manuscript.
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Part II: NGOs
Chapter 4: Nunnenkamp, Peter, Hannes Öhler, and Tillmann Schwörer, “US based NGOs
in International Development: Financial and Economic Determinants of Survival”.
This chapter is based on a paper published in World Development, 2013, 46, pp. 45–
65, and includes a few additional results published in “US based NGOs in International
Development Cooperation: Survival of the Fittest?”, Kiel Working Paper 1716, Institute
for the World Economy, 2011. The work involved in this paper was distributed between
my coauthors and me as follows. Peter Nunnenkamp provided the basic idea of applying
methods well-known to the firm survival literature to a data set on internationally active
NGOs, and he did most of the writing of the literature background. The empirical analysis
and the writing of the empirical part was mainly done by Hannes Öhler and myself. The
editing was roughly equally shared between the three of us.
1.2 Research summary
Part I: Offshoring
Offshoring, or the sourcing of inputs from abroad, is a salient feature of economic glob-
alisation. Ongoing reductions in transportation and communication costs and reductions
in politically set trade barriers allow firms to slice up their value chains into ever smaller
fragments and to shift activities, which were previously done inhouse, abroad. Though
offshoring is not a new phenomenon, recent developments in information and commu-
nication technologies have substantially widened the set of “offshorable” activities, in
particular towards services.
In the public perception and the political debates, offshoring is a source of job destruction
and of a race-to-the-bottom in wages and social standards. Many politicians in Europe
feel tempted to shield their citizens from foreign low-wage competition through the im-
position of minimum wages, though the effective power of such national policies is weak
under free trade. By contrast, many economists have expressed more benign views on
offshoring. Gregory Mankiw, in his role as chairman of the Council of Economic Ad-
visers under US president George W. Bush, once famously stated that offshoring is “the
latest manifestation of the gains from trade that economists have talked about at least
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since Adam Smith” (Mankiw and Swagel, 2006). Part I of this thesis is motivated by the
apparent gap in perceptions on offshoring and aims at bridging this gap. It analyses the
consequences of offshoring in terms of efficiency and equity from the perspective of a
developed European economy.
Chapter 2 sheds light on the efficiency aspect. It provides a detailed overview of the ex-
tent and the nature of offshoring and domestic outsourcing in the manufacturing sector
of Western Europe since the mid-1990s, and traces the effects of offshoring and domes-
tic outsourcing on firm productivity. The econometric analysis is based on combined
industry-level data on offshoring and firm-level data on productivities, and builds on an
econometric model similar to Amiti and Wei (2009). In addition, by allowing offshoring
to interact with firm-level characteristics we identify heterogeneous effects of multina-
tional firms vis-à-vis non-multinational firms, in the spirit of recent firm-level studies
(e.g. Görg et al., 2008).
Beside the broad country coverage this study has two main contributions. First, this study
is able to isolate the effects of offshoring from two confounding factors, which are domes-
tic outsourcing and the replacement of domestic suppliers by foreign ones. Second, this
study allows for heterogeneous effects for offshoring of core activities and non-core activ-
ities, where the latter group is further split into non-core material offshoring and service
offshoring. We find positive productivity effects due to offshoring of non-core activities,
but no significant effects due to offshoring of core activities and domestic outsourcing.
The productivity effects of offshoring are driven in particular by offshoring to low-wage
countries and by the gains of multinational firms.
Chapter 3 sheds light on the equity aspect. It provides evidence on changes in the relative
demand for high, medium, and low skilled workers in the manufacturing and service
sector of Germany since the mid-1990s, and assesses the explanatory power of offshoring.
In the econometric analysis we use industry-level data and estimate systems of wage
bill share equations, following Berman et al. (1994). The empirical model incorporates
our insights on the measurement of offshoring and domestic outsourcing from chapter 2
and accounts for different types of offshored inputs (materials and services) and different
offshoring destinations (e.g. Central and Eastern Europe, and China).
The paper extends the existing empirical evidence in two main directions. First, our em-
pirical model allows for heterogeneous effects in the manufacturing sector and the service
sector. Thus, we can test the hypothesis that low skilled workers in the service sector are
less exposed to offshoring than in the manufacturing sector (Blinder, 2006, 2009), and
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the hypothesis that offshoring and technological change in the service sector lead to po-
larisation in labour demand in disfavour of medium-skilled labour (Acemoglu and Autor,
2011). Second, we analyse whether offshoring affects labour market inequalities through
changes in relative wages or through changes in relative employment, thus indirectly shed-
ding light on the rigidity of wage structures and the role of labour market institutions in
Germany.
The paper confirms previous evidence that offshoring is on average biased in favour of
high skilled and in disfavour of low skilled workers, an effect that is primarily driven by
the manufacturing sector, by material offshoring, and by offshoring to Central and Eastern
Europe. Notably, we find that the direction of bias is converse in the service sector, in line
with the Blinder (2006, 2009) hypothesis. Contrary to widely held believes we find that
the labour market adjusts to offshoring mainly through changes in relative wages and
less so through changes in relative employment. This result contradicts the perception
that German labour market institutions prevent relative wages to adjust and, thus, cause
unemployment among low skilled workers.
Finally, we may try to learn something from the combination of the findings in chapters
2 and 3: Recent theoretical work by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) shows that
the partial equilibrium effects of offshoring on productivity and on the demand for low
skilled workers may interact in general equilibrium in such a way that low skilled workers
are in the end better off. Following the main argument of their model, there is a positive
feedback effect on the demand for low skilled workers because the low-skill intensive
sector achieves greater productivity gains than the high-skill intensive sector and, thus, is
able to expand. Hence, in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) the overall wage effects
for low skilled workers may be even positive.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to test this econometrically, because the two chapters
of part I feature partial equilibrium settings. Still, we can derive some insights on this
aspect from descriptive evidence (see also section 3.2.2). We observe that the manufac-
turing sector, which is more engaged in offshoring than the service sector, is characterised
by high shares of high skilled workers. Hence, if offshoring induces productivity gains
and an expansion of the manufacturing sector, this further increases rather than decreases
the aggregate relative demand for high skilled workers. This suggests that the feedback
effect on the demand for low skilled workers may be, in fact, negative.
From the results we derive the following policy recommendations: First, to dampen the
vivid critics to globalization and in particular offshoring, policy makers should try to bet-
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ter explain the trade-off between efficiency and equity arising from offshoring, and they
may consider stronger redistributive policies which could be financed through achieved
efficiency gains. Second, the results for the service sector suggest that offshoring has
complex effects on labour demand, which partly relate to the nature of work rather than
to skills. Policy makers should foster research on the long-term changes of the global
division of labour and the nature of work, and they should align the educational system in
such a way that citizens are up to this future.
Part II: NGOs
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) play a major role in international development
assistance of the United States, accounting for about 40% of total foreign aid funds (Mc-
Cleary and Barro, 2008). Foreign aid by NGOs is often regarded as superior to state aid,
because NGOs are thought to be more efficient and better informed about local needs
(Hulme and Michael, 1997). NGOs widely receive high levels of public trust because of
the altruistic motives underlying their work and because NGOs do not distribute profits to
their owners (“non-distribution constraint”).
However, the “market” in which NGOs operate is inherently characterised by a particular
type of market failure. Different from goods markets, the donors of foreign aid receive
no products and, thus, cannot directly assess the impact of their donations. Also, donors
are likely to make little efforts on ex-post evaluations once they have received utility from
the act of giving (“warm glow”). As a consequence of these information asymmetries
and difficulties in monitoring, NGO staff may feel invited to divert part of the funds
away from aid projects to headquarter facilities, travel, or other perks. In fact, previous
research has shown that there is a large heterogeneity between NGOs in terms of resource
use. According to Nunnenkamp and Öhler (2012) the expenses for administration and
management of a sample of US NGOs ranges from zero to about half of their budgets.
This invites the question whether or not inefficient NGOs are sanctioned by donors and
forced to exit the market.
Part II (chapter 4) takes up the role of market failures in the market of internationally
active NGOs, by analysing the economic and financial determinants of NGO survival
or exit. Our analysis is based on a data set of 900 NGOs in the period 1984 to 2005
and uses an empirical model which closely follows the literature on firm survival or exit
(see e.g. Zingales, 1998; Görg and Spaliara, in press). In particular, we estimate probit
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models to assess whether NGOs with high administrative and fundraising costs are more
likely to discontinue their international development activities than more efficient peers.
Furthermore, we assess whether the link between cost efficiency and survival/exit depends
on the funding structure, thus indirectly shedding light on the monitoring and sanctioning
behaviour of private and official donors. To our knowledge, this study is the first to
provide an empirical assessment of the links between the efficiency, official funding and
the survival of NGOs in international development.
We find evidence that an increase in administrative inefficiency is associated with an in-
crease in the exit probability. Notably, this effect only applies for NGOs receiving official
funding, which suggests that official bodies perform stricter monitoring of NGOs com-
pared to private donors. Yet, we also find that the link between inefficiency and exit
disappears at high levels of official funding. We conjecture that this may be due to a
“too big to fail” policy, or due to the fact that these NGOs face softer budget constraints
because they are independent of private donations.
An inherent difficulty in the evaluation of NGO performance is that the quality of foreign
aid programmes is difficult to measure and widely unobserved. By contrast, the analysis
in this chapter is based on measurable and objective, though rather narrow, aspects of
efficiency. We advise against making administrative cost efficiency the only criteria for
NGO evaluations, since the relationship between administrative costs and program impact
is likely to be non-linear. Still, we believe that our analysis captures some important as-
pects and allows for some concrete suggestions: Our findings suggest that monitoring and
sanctioning of NGOs should be improved to ensure the “survival of the fittest”. Arguably,
the predominance of private donations in the US casts doubt on the effective monitoring
of NGOs. Also, the monitoring of NGOs through official bodies, in particular of large
NGOs with high levels of public funding, should be improved. Moreover, NGOs should
foster the formation of accountability clubs with self-imposed efficiency and quality stan-
dards to reduce information asymmetries and to signal quality and reliability to potential
donors.
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Part I
OFFSHORING
2. OFFSHORING, DOMESTIC OUTSOURCING, AND
PRODUCTIVITY - EVIDENCE FOR A NUMBER OF EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES
2.1 Introduction
Offshoring, or the sourcing of inputs from abroad, is one of the most debated features
of economic globalisation. Firms split up their value chains and relocate those activities
which they perform with less efficiency to foreign affiliates or to external foreign sup-
pliers. Numerous studies have documented the rapid growth in offshoring over the last
decades (see e.g. Hummels et al., 2001; Amiti and Wei, 2005). While offshoring has for
a long time been limited to material inputs, the last decade has also witnessed an increase
in offshoring of services, a trend that has been triggered by the revolution in information
and communication technologies (Blinder, 2006).
In the public perception offshoring is often associated with layoffs, wage reductions, and
a rise in wage inequality. These fears have even led Germany to elect outsourcing in
1996 as “faux-pas word of the year”. Indeed, there is evidence of at least some adverse
labour market effects. In particular, offshoring is blamed to penalise low skilled workers
since their jobs often involve routine activities which are more easily offshorable than
the activities of high skilled workers (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996; Geishecker and Görg,
2008). Blinder (2006, 2009) has caused alarm with estimates of about 25% of American
jobs that are potentially exposed to offshoring.
In light of the anxiety about job losses and wage reductions, research has been mostly fo-
cused on the labour market effects of offshoring, while there is only a small literature on
the productivity effects of offshoring. This study argues that the importance of this aspect
has been overlooked. First, productivity is an important driver of economic growth and
hence interesting in its own right. Second, recent theoretical studies show that there are
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positive feedback effects on the labour markets provided that offshoring raises productiv-
ity. According to Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) the wages of unskilled workers
may rise despite their vulnerability to offshoring if the productivity effect induced by off-
shoring is sufficiently large; Mitra and Ranjan (2010) show that due to the presence of
productivity effects offshoring may decrease unemployment and increase wages; Kohler
and Wrona (2010) identify conditions under which job creation dominates job destruction
in the presence of productivity effects. Hence, analysing the offshoring-productivity link
is important to better understand feedback effects on the labour markets.
The existing literature on this topic provides some evidence that offshoring can increase
productivity, but the identified effects are quite heterogeneous depending on the analysed
country, the type of firms (e.g. exporters versus non-exporters) or the type of offshored
inputs (materials or services):1 Görg and Hanley (2005) find that material offshoring has
contributed to an increase in the productivity of firms with low export intensities in the
Irish electronics sector. Egger and Egger (2006) find that offshoring lowers the produc-
tivity of low skilled workers in the short run, but raises their productivity in the long
run. Görg et al. (2008) find that service offshoring enhances the productivity of exporting
firms in the Irish manufacturing sector. Hijzen et al. (2010) show for Japanese firms that
offshoring to foreign affiliates raises productivity, while offshoring to external suppliers
has no such effect. Amiti and Wei (2009) find that offshoring increases productivity, with
service offshoring accounting for 10% and material offshoring accounting for 5% of the
productivity growth in the United States. Winkler (2010) finds that service offshoring
increases the productivity of German manufacturing industries, when controlling for do-
mestic outsourcing. Wagner (2011) finds some evidence for positive productivity effects
for German firms using a matching approach.
A criticism which applies for most studies in this literature is that the interpretation of
the central offshoring measure is ambiguous. Offshoring is widely defined as the share of
imported inputs in total inputs and is measured at the industry level through a combina-
tion of input-output tables and import data (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996). The offshoring
measure per se does not allow distinguishing whether internal production is moved out to
foreign suppliers (offshoring) or to domestic suppliers (domestic outsourcing), or whether
domestic suppliers are replaced by foreign suppliers (supplier change). See Castellani et
al. (2013) for a detailed analysis of this problem.
The present study provides stylized facts on offshoring in Europe between 1995 and 2008
1 See Olsen (2006) for an early survey of the offshoring-productivity literature.
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taking into account this distinction. This study shows that many services which were pre-
viously provided internally have systematically been offshored and outsourced domesti-
cally. For material inputs, by contrast, there is also evidence of systematic replacements
of domestic by foreign suppliers. Overall the share of internal production has gone down
by 4.5 percentage points, which raises the question whether firms have achieved produc-
tivity gains through this specialisation effort. This question is addressed by combining
industry data on offshoring and domestic outsourcing with a firm panel. Using fixed ef-
fects regressions and an instrumental variable approach I find that offshoring of non-core
activities has led to productivity gains, whereas offshoring of core activities and domestic
outsourcing have had no such effects. The estimated productivity gains are in particular
driven by offshoring to low-wage countries and by the gains of multinational firms.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2.2 discusses possible chan-
nels for productivity effects, section 2.3 illustrates how offshoring is measured and pro-
vides stylized facts on offshoring in Europe, section 2.4 describes the empirical model,
section 2.5 presents the regression results, and section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Channels for productivity effects
To motivate the analysis of productivity effects, different channels through which off-
shoring may affect productivity are discussed:2 First, a static efficiency gain may arise
when firms focus on their core competencies and offshore their less productive activities to
foreign suppliers. Offshoring may therefore be all the more beneficial the less productive
the activity is done internally. For instance, one may expect that offshoring of business
services by a manufacturer bears a greater potential for productivity gains than offshoring
of its core production activities. Second, offshoring may also come along with restruc-
turing measures which reduce inefficiencies. For instance, offshoring may induce firms
to reorganize the way in which tasks are bundled or to improve the communication and
reporting system between departments. Third, offshoring firms may benefit from learning
externalities which arise due to the interaction with foreign suppliers. For instance, work-
ers may learn about new software packages or gain knowledge about technologies used
by the foreign supplier. Fourth, offshoring may raise productivity if the imported input
varieties are of higher quality or better match with the specific needs of the firm. Fifth, in
Glass and Saggi (2001) offshoring to low-wage countries lowers the marginal production
2 See Amiti and Wei (2009) for a similar summary of channels for productivity effects.
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costs and raises profits, which creates resources for additional R&D investments. Thus,
offshoring may indirectly raise productivities through an increase in innovation activities.
Görg and Hanley (2010) provide empirical support for this hypothesis on the basis of
Irish plant-level data. Sixth, offshoring may induce general equilibrium effects if realised
productivity gains spill over to other firms or if offshoring induces tougher competition
and selection effects in their markets.
Note that the relevance of individual productivity channels cannot be evaluated in this
study. In particular, effects for offshoring firms cannot be isolated from general equilib-
rium effects on competitors or upstream and downstream firms, because offshoring is not
observed at the firm level. Yet, this study can provide an indication of heterogeneous
effects for different types of firms by combining the industry-level offshoring data with a
firm panel.
2.3 Offshoring and domestic outsourcing
2.3.1 Measurement and data
In this paper offshoring is defined as the share of imported inputs in output, and domestic
outsourcing is defined as the share of domestic inputs in output. More specific offshoring
and domestic outsourcing variables are defined in the following based on inputs types
and based on groups of supplier countries. All variables on offshoring and domestic
outsourcing capture inputs from affiliates and from external suppliers, and are measured
for an industry j in country c and year t. We can write:
Offshoring jct =
∑k(Imported inputs from industry k by industry j)ct
(Output of industry j)ct
(2.1)
Domestic outsourcing jct =
∑k(Domestic inputs from industry k by industry j)ct
(Output of industry j)ct
(2.2)
In a first step, three offshoring variables are distinguished by restricting the numerator
of equation 2.1 to specific supplier industries k. Offshoring of core activities captures
inputs from the buyer’s own industry (k = j). Offshoring of non-core activities captures
inputs from all manufacturing industries except the buyer’s industry (k 6= j, manufactur-
ing). The two variables can be subsumed under the term material offshoring. Service
offshoring captures inputs from six service industries, including post and telecommunica-
tion services, financial services, computer services, R&D, and other business services, as
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in Amiti and Wei (2009) (k 6= j, services). In the same way, three domestic outsourcing
variables (for core activities, non-core activities and services) are distinguished.3
Note that the material offshoring variables are equivalent to the well-known narrow off-
shoring measure (for core activities) and difference offshoring measure (for non-core ac-
tivities) in Feenstra and Hanson (1999).4 This study prefers the new terms, however,
to better illuminate the economic content of these measures. In the literature the differ-
ence measure is widely treated as a residual that exists only with reference to the broad
and narrow offshoring measure, and it is usually ignored in econometric analyses. Yet,
this study argues that offshoring of non-core activities may have even larger productivity
effects than offshoring of core activities, since the firms should generally be less pro-
ductive in the former type of activities. In a second step, the offshoring variables are
further distinguished according to the countries that are supplying the inputs to country
c. The first group of supplier countries comprises Austria, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Note that these are precisely
the countries which are analysed as receiving (or offshoring) countries in this study. The
second group comprises 14 high-income OECD countries, not including the countries of
the first group.5 The third group comprises the rest of the world.
The data on offshoring are from the World Input Output Database (WIOD), which pro-
vides information on input-output relations between industries in 40 countries between
1995 and 2009.6 Different from standard input-output tables, WIOD contains a break-
down of input-output relations by supplier country. That is, WIOD allows attributing
where the inputs of a specific industry are sourced from. The denominators of the off-
shoring measures – industry output – can be directly taken from WIOD. The numerators
can be calculated on the basis of WIOD by building the column sums over groups of sup-
plier industries k and over groups of supplier countries. Note that the database has several
unique features which help resolving measurement limitations that have been present in
previous studies based on input-output tables:7
3 Henceforth, this study refers only to offshoring, to keep the explanations brief. However, equivalent
arguments apply for domestic outsourcing.
4 The only difference is with respect to the denominator. In Feenstra and Hanson (1999) offshoring is
scaled by non-energy inputs, while in this study offshoring is scaled by output.
5 Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Japan,
the Republic of Korean, Luxembourg, the Slovak Republic, the United States.
6 Downloadable at http://www.wiod.org/database/index.htm. See Timmer et al. (2012) for detailed in-
formation on the methods applied in the construction of the world input-output table. All information on
WIOD presented in the following is taken from this background document.
7 See Winkler and Milberg (2009), Castellani et al. (2013) and Feenstra and Jensen (2012) for detailed
information on measurement problems in offshoring measures.
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First, the world input-output table contains annual data on domestic inputs and on for-
eign inputs, which allows offshoring to be distinguished from domestic outsourcing and
supplier changes. Castellani et al. (2013) show that standard offshoring measures fail to
account for this distinction and as a consequence tend to overestimate the importance of
business service offshoring. In the context of this study, however, this aspect is of par-
ticular relevance because it is likely the case that offshoring, domestic outsourcing and
supplier changes have different effects on productivity. Second, the supply and use tables
underlying the world input-output table are more frequently available than input-output
tables from EUROSTAT or the OECD. For the nine European countries considered in this
study the time coverage is almost complete (Timmer et al., 2012, p.69). This reduces
considerably the measurement bias arising from the imputation of missing data.
A related issue is the choice of the variable in the denominator. The literature has used
non-energy inputs (e.g. Feenstra and Hanson, 1999; Amiti and Wei, 2009), value added
(Hijzen et al., 2005), or output (Geishecker and Görg, 2008). However, offshoring vari-
ables scaled with non-energy inputs or with value added are hard to interpret because
both variables are affected by changes from internal production to domestic outsourcing
(Geishecker, 2007). To resolve these ambiguities output is chosen as the denominator.
Third, the distinction between domestic and foreign inputs is achieved in WIOD through
an imputation method which dispenses with the traditional type of proportionality as-
sumption, which is present in standard input-output tables of imports. According to the
proportionality assumption every industry imports a specific input in the same proportion
as the whole economy. It is well-known that this assumption is quite restrictive (Win-
kler and Milberg, 2009; Feenstra and Jensen, 2012). WIOD is based on a weaker type
of proportionality assumption which allows import shares to differ between the three use
categories intermediates, final consumption and investment.
2.3.2 Patterns of offshoring and domestic outsourcing
The following part provides an overview of offshoring patterns in Europe’s manufacturing
industries between 1995 and 2008.8 To account for differences in the size of industries all
observations are generally weighted by industry output.
8 For brevity, the nine considered European countries are henceforth often labeled as ‘Europe’.
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Tab. 2.1: Output composition - internal production, domestic outsourcing and offshoring
1995 2008 ∆ ppt
Internal production
All activities 33.50 28.97 -4.53
Domestic outsourcing
Core activities 11.23 10.08 -1.15
Non-core activities 10.92 9.62 -1.30
Services 7.36 7.96 0.60
Offshoring
Core activities 6.41 8.94 2.53
Non-core activities 5.27 7.12 1.85
Services 0.64 1.07 0.43
Notes: This table shows the average output composition of manufacturing industries in 1995 and in 2008
(in %), and the corresponding changes (in percentage points). Output is composed of internal production,
domestically outsourced inputs and offshored inputs. All observations are weighted by industry output.
Sources: WIOD, own calculations.
Table 2.1 decomposes output into three components: internal production, domestic out-
sourcing and offshoring.9 The table shows that in 2008 about 29% of the firms’ output
originates from internal production, 28% is due to domestically outsourced inputs and
17% is due to offshored inputs. Domestic outsourcing is further distinguished into core
activities (10.0%), non-core activities (9.6%) and services (7.9%). Offshoring is distin-
guished into core activities (8.9%), non-core activities (7.1%) and services (1.1%). A first
stylized fact is, thus, that material inputs are offshored and domestically outsourced to
a similar degree, whereas services are predominantly outsourced domestically. This can
be regarded as evidence that many services are not yet tradeable over longer distances.
In particular, this may be due to services that require regular face-to-face contact with
customers, or due to services that involve non-routine activities (Blinder, 2009).
Furthermore, table 2.1 shows that between 1995 and 2008 offshoring of core activities
has increased by 2.5 percentage points (ppt) and offshoring of non-core activities has in-
creased by 1.8 ppt. This increase in material offshoring has coincided with a decrease in
internal production, which suggests that internal production of materials has been moved
out to foreign suppliers (genuine offshoring).10 Yet, this has also coincided with a de-
crease in the domestic outsourcing measure, which suggests that domestic suppliers have
9 Note that the shares of these components in output would sum to 100% if inputs from the primary sector
and some remaining service industries (e.g. transport services) were included in the offshoring measures
and the domestic outsourcing measures.
10 Note that the increase in service offshoring and domestic service outsourcing could be also due to
newly created services. It is not possible to verify this possibility with input-output data as the composition
of internal production (i.e. the share of internal services, core activities, and non-core activities) is unknown.
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been partly replaced by foreign suppliers (supplier change). For services, the patterns
are somewhat different. Service offshoring has increased by 0.4 ppt, domestic service
outsourcing has increased by 0.6 ppt, and internal value added has decreased. This sug-
gests that internal services have been moved out to domestic suppliers (genuine domestic
outsourcing) and to foreign suppliers (genuine offshoring).
Tab. 2.2: Output composition by country
Internal Domestic outsourcing Offshoring
All Core Non-core Services Core Non-core Services
Austria -4.38 -1.78 -2.68 -0.35 5.97 2.21 -0.58
Germany -6.19 -0.43 -2.90 -0.04 4.05 2.78 0.36
Spain -3.93 -0.19 -0.33 0.37 1.67 1.01 0.79
Finland -4.23 -2.05 -1.56 0.12 0.95 0.55 2.09
France -3.85 -1.13 -0.15 1.58 1.89 1.81 0.22
United Kingdom 0.06 -4.17 -4.67 0.65 1.31 1.31 0.37
Italy -3.48 -1.20 -1.53 1.59 1.17 0.67 0.29
Netherlands -4.04 -0.55 -0.85 0.67 1.76 0.10 0.37
Sweden -6.24 -2.35 -1.06 1.83 2.33 1.94 1.36
This table shows country-level changes (in percentage points) in the output composition of manufacturing
industries between 1995 and 2008. Output is composed of internal production, domestically outsourced
inputs and offshored inputs. All observations are weighted by industry output. Sources: WIOD, own
calculations.
Table 2.2 shows country-level changes in the composition of output between 1995 and
2008, and table 2.3 shows the corresponding industry-level changes. The numbers are
in percentage points. Overall, one observes that the general offshoring patterns identified
above hold for most of the countries and industries individually. One of the few exceptions
is the United Kingdom, where internal production has remained constant and domestic
material outsourcing has fallen sharply. Here the rise in the material offshoring variables
seems to be predominantly the result of supplier changes rather than genuine offshoring.
Table 2.4 makes a comparison of Europe and the United States. To make the two markets
comparable in terms of economic size, the nine European countries are treated as a single
market. This implies that domestic outsourcing comprises all inputs supplied by either
of these European countries, and offshoring comprises all inputs supplied by countries
outside this region. The table shows that the share of internal production has been similar
for the two markets in 1995 (each about 33%), but has decreased considerably faster
in Europe compared to the United States (-4.5 versus -1.2 ppt). The numbers suggest
that internal services have been moved out in both markets to domestic suppliers and to
foreign suppliers. However, with respect to material inputs, the numbers suggest that
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Tab. 2.3: Output composition by industry
Internal Domestic sourcing Offshoring
All Core Non-core Services Core Non-core Services
15-16 Food & tobacco -1.39 -0.42 -0.33 2.03 0.84 0.68 0.44
17-18 Textiles & clothing -3.23 -3.22 -0.84 1.98 -1.00 1.03 0.39
19 Leather 0.55 -2.37 -1.77 1.11 0.49 0.48 0.31
20 Wood -3.81 -0.46 -0.50 -0.06 0.73 1.84 0.18
21-22 Paper & publishing -3.06 -4.39 -0.55 1.58 -0.12 0.80 0.44
24 Chemicals -5.35 -3.36 -1.28 0.64 3.72 1.43 0.51
25 Rubber, plastics -4.96 -0.28 -4.21 0.84 1.03 3.19 0.37
26 Glass, ceramics -6.20 0.94 -0.84 0.14 0.51 1.19 0.34
27-28 Metals -5.27 -1.98 -1.08 -0.10 5.35 0.92 0.17
29 Machinery -3.74 -0.34 -2.91 0.47 2.08 2.70 0.31
30-33 Electrical & medical -2.48 -3.07 -1.51 0.80 1.71 2.20 1.03
34-35 Transport equipment -7.45 1.55 -4.52 0.36 4.53 2.53 0.37
36-37 Manufacturing, nec -2.88 1.05 -2.89 -0.26 0.38 2.17 0.20
This table shows industry-level changes (in percentage points) in the output composition of manufacturing
industries between 1995 and 2008. Output is composed of internal production, domestically outsourced
inputs and offshored inputs. All observations are weighted by industry output. Sources: WIOD, own
calculations.
Tab. 2.4: United States and Europe
United States Europe
1995 2008 ∆ ppt 1995 2008 ∆ ppt
Internal production
All activities 33.14 31.89 -1.25 33.50 28.97 -4.53
Domestic outsourcing
Core activities 17.90 15.45 -2.45 14.92 14.39 -0.53
Non-core activities 16.47 13.94 -2.53 13.89 13.00 -0.89
Services 8.50 9.80 1.30 7.55 8.29 0.74
Offshoring
Core activities 3.34 4.61 1.27 2.72 4.63 1.91
Non-core activities 2.92 4.20 1.28 2.30 3.74 1.44
Services 0.45 0.60 0.15 0.45 0.74 0.29
This table shows the average output composition of manufacturing industries in the United States and
Europe in 1995 and 2008 (in %) and the corresponding changes (in percentage points). Europe is treated as a
single market. Hence, domestic outsourcing comprises all inputs from European suppliers. All observations
are weighted by industry output. Sources: WIOD, own calculations.
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Europe has systematically moved out internal production to foreign suppliers whereas the
United States have mainly realized supplier changes.
Tab. 2.5: Offshoring by supplier region
Core activities Non-core activities Services
1995 2008 1995 2008 1995 2008
Europe 3.69 4.31 2.96 3.38 0.19 0.33
OECD countries (excl. Europe) 1.55 1.91 1.32 1.59 0.29 0.33
Rest of the world 1.17 2.72 0.99 2.15 0.16 0.41
This table shows average offshoring intensities (in %) in 1995 and 2008, by group of supplier countries.
European countries are excluded from the group of OECD countries. Statistics are weighted by industry
output. Sources: WIOD, own calculations.
Tab. 2.6: Share of supplier regions in total offshoring
Core activities Non-core activities Services
1995 2008 1995 2008 1995 2008
Europe 57.06 47.15 56.55 48.43 31.13 32.65
OECD countries (excl. Europe) 22.83 19.70 24.87 21.76 48.86 32.39
Rest of the world 20.11 33.15 18.58 29.81 20.00 34.96
Sum 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
This table shows the share of single groups of supplier countries in total offshoring (in %) in 1995 and
2008. European countries are excluded from the group of high-income OECD countries. Statistics are
weighted by industry output. Sources: WIOD, own calculations.
The tables 2.5 and 2.6 show offshoring trends in terms of supplier countries. Table 2.5
shows offshoring intensities for three groups of supplier countries: Europe, other high-
income OECD countries and the rest of the world (ROW). Table 2.6 shows the relative
share of each of these groups in total offshoring. A stylized fact is that material and service
offshoring have increased for all three supplier regions. This suggests that offshoring costs
must have generally fallen. Another stylized fact is that offshoring from ROW has gained
relative importance. For instance, service offshoring from ROW represented one-fifth of
total service offshoring in 1995 and already one third of total service offshoring in 2008.
Since ROW comprises predominantly low-wage countries, this indicates that labour cost
differentials may have been an important driver of firms’ offshoring decisions. A final
stylized fact is that the relative importance of Europe as a supplier of services differs
considerably from its relative importance as a supplier of materials. Europe’s share in total
material offshoring has strongly decreased, whereas its share in total service offshoring
has slightly increased.
To sum up, some key stylized facts are highlighted: (i) Offshoring has increased through-
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out virtually all of the considered countries and industries in Europe, and it has increased
with respect to different supplier regions. (ii) The observed increase in material offshoring
reflects genuine offshoring as well as supplier changes. This increase has occurred for
core activities and non-core activities. (iii) With respect to services, both genuine do-
mestic outsourcing and genuine offshoring are observed, while there is no evidence of
systematic supplier changes. (iv) The relative importance of domestic outsourcing vis-à-
vis offshoring is considerably higher for services than for materials, suggesting that many
services are still hard to be traded over longer distances. (v) Overall, the share of inter-
nal production has gone down by 4.5 ppt. This raises the question whether firms have
managed to achieve productivity gains through this specialisation effort.
2.4 Empirical strategy
For the analysis of productivity effects offshoring data at the country-industry-level is
combined with a firm panel spanning the period 1996 to 2008. In this setup an increase
in offshoring captures an aggregate offshoring trend, which does not imply that all firms
within a country-industry cell are involved in offshoring. Hence, the regressions capture
average productivity effects comprising the effects for offshoring firms and the effects for
their competitors. To capture some of the heterogeneity present within country-industry
cells, additional firm-level variables are introduced and interacted with offshoring. In
particular, it is estimated in this way whether there are different productivity effects for
multinational and non-multinational firms.
2.4.1 TFP model
In the first step, Cobb-Douglas production functions are estimated:
VAit = α j +β
j
KKit +β
j
LLit +T FPit (2.3)
where VA, K and L are the logarithms of value added, capital and labour, and where i and
t are indices for firms and years. The parameters βK and βL are capital and labour inten-
sities. To allow for differences in technologies across industries, the production functions
are estimated separately for 98 three-digit manufacturing industries j. The residuals are
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extracted and used in the following as the measure of total factor productivity (TFP). See
table 2.11 in the appendix for the TFP regression results.11
The firm-level data comes from Amadeus, a commercial database provided by Bureau
van Dijk. Amadeus contains information on the balance sheet, profit and loss account,
industrial activity and ownership structure of more than two million firms in 41 European
countries. The data are gathered by different national institutions and finally compiled
and harmonised by Bureau van Dijk. Data is extracted for firms in the manufacturing
sector in Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom between 1996 and 2008. The NACE industries 23 and 37 are dropped
due to insufficient observations. Money values for Sweden and the United Kingdom are
converted into euros based on exchange rates from EUROSTAT. To account for price
changes nominal values are deflated by industry-specific deflators from EU KLEMS and
the STAN database. Labour and capital inputs are given by the number of employees and
tangible fixed assets. The sample is restricted to firms with more than five employees,
value added larger than 100,000 euros, and tangible capital larger than 5,000 euros. To
avoid outlier problems, the 2% of the observations with the largest (absolute) residuals in
the TFP regressions are dropped, and then the TFPs are re-estimated.
Tab. 2.7: Average performance by country
Country L K (th. e ) VA (th. e ) TFP VA/L Obs
Austria 356 21,439 28,145 9.7 82,751 573
Germany 414 16,935 39,059 9.8 68,359 26,674
Spain 57 2,707 2,862 9.0 41,262 205,811
Finland 68 4,633 4,833 9.5 55,475 26,179
France 128 4,416 8,813 9.6 58,051 110,152
United Kingdom 56 2,589 3,169 9.5 53,628 311,267
Italy 137 10,424 12,774 9.7 77,023 5,725
Netherlands 50 2,669 3,333 9.6 55,904 51,635
Sweden 301 18,348 22,213 9.6 64,961 29,687
This table shows the average performance of firms by country. Source: Amadeus, own calculations.
Note that the data set is not representative because reporting requirements vary across
countries, as can be seen in table 2.7.12 Spain and Italy are overrepresented in the data, and
also the average firm characteristics such as the capital stock or the number of employees
11 The TFP estimations were also conducted with the Levinsohn-Petrin method to account for a possible
simultaneity bias. Yet, this caused partly implausible point estimates for some of the industries, such as
negative coefficients for capital. For this reason the following analysis is based on simple ordinary least
square (OLS) estimates of TFP.
12 See table 2.12 in the appendix for a corresponding breakdown of the average firm performance by
industry.
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vary considerably across countries. These are certainly limitations of the data. Yet, the
cross-country differences should play a minor role for the econometric analysis, as the
fixed effects regressions use only the within-firm variation in TFP. Also, robustness checks
are conducted for subsamples of firms, for instance by excluding Spain and Italy.
2.4.2 Offshoring model
In the second step the firm panel is combined at the industry-country-year level with the
offshoring data and the following fixed effects model is estimated:
T FPit =α+βOOffjct+βDDomjct+ γR&D jct +µi+µt + εit (2.4)
Total factor productivity (TFP) is regressed on offshoring (Off) and domestic outsourc-
ing (Dom), where offshoring and domestic outsourcing are captured through the corre-
sponding variables for core activities, non-core activities, and services. The research and
development intensity (R&D) is included as a control variable to account for the fact that
technological change may be correlated with productivity and with offshoring. It is mea-
sured as share of R&D expenditures in output based on industry-country-level data from
ANBERD. The variable µi denotes firm fixed effects that capture all time-invariant char-
acteristics of the firm, including the time-invariant characteristics of the firm’s industry
(µ j) and country (µc). The variable µt denotes year fixed effects that account for busi-
ness cycles common for all countries and industries. The idiosyncratic error εit allows
for clustering at the country-industry level. Correction for clustering is required since the
offshoring variables are measured at a higher level of aggregation than the dependent vari-
able (Moulton, 1990). The coefficient vectors βO and βD represent the marginal effects
of offshoring and domestic outsourcing.
Note that the existing literature has widely used either an offshoring measure for core
activities (narrow offshoring) or a measure for all manufacturing activities (broad off-
shoring) in similar regression models. By contrast, we jointly include offshoring vari-
ables for core and for non-core activities, to allow for different effects of the two types of
activities. The productivity gains are expected to be higher for offshoring of non-core ac-
tivities because this type of offshoring might free up resources in relatively unproductive
activities.
In a third step, to capture some of the heterogeneity present within industry-country cells,
an MNE dummy, which captures whether a firm is part of a multinational enterprise, is
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included and interacted with offshoring. The empirical model then becomes:
T FPit =α+βOOffjct+βMMNEit +βMOMNE_Offit+βDDomjct+ γR&D jct
+µi+µt + εit (2.5)
Note some particular features of the multinationality dummy: MNE is one either if a firm
owns one or more foreign subsidiaries or if the firm itself is owned by a foreign firm.
Ownership is defined in terms of a benchmark of 50% of the firms’ shares, and it includes
direct as well as indirect ownership. Note further that the information on shareholders
and subsidiaries is only observable for the most recent period in the data.13 Therefore, it
is assumed that the MNE status does not change over time, which implies for the fixed
effects regressions that the main effect of multinationality βM is fully cancelled out by the
firm fixed effects (µi). The interaction effects between multinationality and offshoring,
which are of primary interest in this context, are not affected, though. The coefficient
vector βMO thus captures additional productivity effects for multinational firms vis-à-vis
non-multinationals.
Possible endogeneity problems are addressed in the following way: First, this study re-
duces the potential for omitted variable bias by controlling for domestic outsourcing. In
this way the study avoids confounding offshoring with domestic outsourcing or with sup-
plier changes.14 This is important because genuine offshoring may be expected to have
the largest productivity impact. Most of the existing offshoring literature working with
input-output data does not control for domestic outsourcing and may thus suffer from
omitted variable bias.15 Second, in the full specifications of the regression this study ac-
counts for country-specific trends by including country-year interaction dummies rather
than for simple year fixed effects.
Third, potential reverse causality problems are also addressed through an instrumental
variable strategy. A reverse causality bias could arise due to selection effects in offshoring
as suggested by, e.g., Antràs and Helpman (2004) and Wagner (2011). In this strand of
13 In order to trace ownership changes over time, an attempt was made to use ownership information
from past editions of the Amadeus database, where each of these editions would provide the ownership
information at the current point in time. However, this strategy was discarded after careful inspection of the
data, since Amadeus does not regularly update the ownership information and since the coverage for these
variables is small in the earlier editions.
14 An increase in offshoring implies by construction a decrease in the internal production if domestic
outsourcing is held constant.
15 An exception is Winkler (2010) who controls for domestic outsourcing using German input-output
tables.
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the literature highly productive firms have been found to be more likely to engage in
offshoring than less productive firms. In the context of this study the reverse causality
problem is attenuated by the fact that the independent variables are measured at a higher
level of aggregation than the dependent variable, as in Geishecker and Görg (2008). Still,
an instrumental variable strategy is pursued to check the results from the fixed effects
estimations.
As instruments this study uses world offshoring measures for core, non-core, and service
activities, and their interaction with the MNE dummy variable. These world offshoring
measures are constructed as output-weighted averages of offshoring in all countries cov-
ered by WIOD. Changes in world offshoring reflect changes in offshoring costs around
the world. Hence, we expect the instruments to be correlated with offshoring in given
countries. At the same time, world offshoring is unlikely to be related to firm productivity
other than through this cost reduction channel.16
2.5 Regression results
Table 2.8 shows the results from the fixed effects regressions. In the first specification TFP
is regressed only on the offshoring variables and time dummies. The coefficient for off-
shoring of non-core activities is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The
corresponding coefficients for core activities and services are statistically insignificant. In
the second specification, the time dummies are replaced by country-year interaction dum-
mies to account for country-specific productivity trends that are not due to offshoring. The
results remain qualitatively the same as before but the adjusted R-squared is higher than
before. Hence, these country-year dummies are kept included in the further specifications.
In the third specification, domestic outsourcing is additionally controlled for. The coef-
ficient for offshoring of non-core activities remains positive and statistically significant
at the 5% level. Additionally, service offshoring is positive and statistically significant
at the 5% level and domestic outsourcing of services is negative and statistically signif-
icant at the 10% level. Hence, this shows that controlling for domestic outsourcing has
consequences for the way one interprets the productivity effects of offshoring.
16 It is possible, though, that industry specific shocks jointly determine firm productivities and world off-
shoring, in which case the instruments may become invalid. For instance, one may think of a technological
invention which raises firm productivity and offshoring simultaneously. While I cannot address this problem
in a general way, I am able to rule out biases related to technology by controlling for R&D intensities.
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Tab. 2.8: Regression results
Fixed effects regression IV-FE regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OffCore 0.006 0.002 -0.004 -0.004 0.011 0.008
(-0.006) (-0.004) (-0.006) (-0.006) (-0.018) (-0.015)
OffNoncore 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.025** 0.021* 0.070** 0.061**
(-0.011) -0.009) (-0.011) (-0.011) (-0.03) (-0.025)
OffService -0.022 0.034 0.051** 0.046** 0.134 0.173
(-0.069) (-0.035) (-0.020) (-0.021) (-0.229) (-0.227)
DomCore -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 0.002
(-0.004) (-0.004) (-0.012) (-0.009)
DomNoncore -0.009 -0.009 -0.003 -0.007
(-0.009) (-0.008) (-0.013) (-0.013)
DomService -0.024* -0.024* -0.041 -0.035
(-0.012) (-0.012) (-0.053) (-0.066)
MNE_OffCore 0.000 0.013 0.021
(-0.004) (-0.012) (-0.014)
MNE_OffNoncore 0.019*** 0.01 0.012
(-0.005) (-0.013) (-0.012)
MNE_OffService 0.016* 0.231*** 0.123*
(-0.009) (-0.088) (-0.071)
R&D 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.009 0.012
(-0.022) (-0.019) (-0.018) (-0.018) (-0.021) (-0.017)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE – Yes Yes Yes – Yes
Year FE Yes – – – Yes –
Kleibergen-Paap LM test: p-val 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap Wald test: F 60.027 97.97
Hansen J: p-val 0.093 0.095
Observations 783,827 783,827 783,827 595,685 595,685 595,685
Clusters 116 116 116 116 116 116
Adj R2 0.044 0.092 0.093 0.094 0.040 0.075
Standard errors clustered at the country-industry level in parentheses. Instrumental variables are 1) the
weighted average of world offshoring in t and t-1 for each of the offshoring variables and 2) the same
instruments interacted with the dummy for multinational activity. ***, ** and * denote significance at the
1, 5 and 10% level respectively.
In specification four, offshoring is interacted with a dummy variable for multinational
firms. Offshoring of non-core activities and service offshoring remain positive and sta-
tistically significant and the coefficient of domestic service outsourcing remains negative.
Additionally, the coefficients of the interaction terms for non-core activities and services
are positive and statistically significant. This suggests that there is an additional gain for
multinational firms compared to non-multinationals.
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In specification five and six, instrumental variable estimations are performed. Specifi-
cation five includes year fixed effects, and specification six includes country-year fixed
effects. The used instruments are the lagged and contemporaneous values of world off-
shoring (core, non-core, and service offshoring), which are obtained by taking the output-
weighted average of offshoring in all countries covered by the WIOD data. The tests for
underidentification (Kleibergen-Paap LM test: significant at 1%) and weak identification
(Kleibergen-Paap Wald test: F-statistic > 10) are rejected. This confirms that the instru-
ments are sufficiently correlated with offshoring. The test for overidentifying restrictions
(Hansen J statistic) cannot be rejected at the 5% level. As to the results, the instrumental
variable (IV) fixed effects regressions support the previous results in two respects. First,
the coefficient of offshoring of non-core activities is positive and statistically significant.
Second, the interaction term for service offshoring is positive and also statistically signif-
icant (with varying levels of statistical significance in the two specifications).
Overall these results suggest that offshoring of non-core activities and service offshoring
have contributed to an increase in productivity, while there is no productivity effect due to
offshoring of core activities. This result is consistent with the interpretation that produc-
tivity effects arise due to an induced specialisation. Manufacturing firms that move out
services or non-core production activities to foreign suppliers benefit from the termination
of their relatively unproductive activities, which allows them to specialise more on their
relatively productive core activities.
Depending on the specification one also observes additional productivity effects for multi-
national firms. In the IV regressions there is an additional effect from service offshoring
and in the simple fixed effects regressions there is also an additional effect from offshoring
of non-core activities. This may be due to the fact that the MNE dummy is correlated with
(unobserved) firm-level offshoring. Such a correlation is likely to exist because multina-
tionals have more and better information about foreign markets and may therefore face
lower sunk costs of offshoring (see e.g. Görg et al., 2008). In the extreme case that this
correlation was 100% the interaction term would pick up the additional productivity gains
for offshoring firms over non-offshoring firms. Still, there may be alternative explanations
for this effect. For instance, MNEs could have systematically higher management skills,
which allow them to adjust faster to changes in the general sourcing patterns.
In table 2.9, the robustness of the main results against several types of adjustments is
checked: First, when using labour productivity as dependent variable, the results are
shown to be qualitatively similar as before. Second, the fixed effects model is estimated
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Tab. 2.9: Robustness checks
Dependent variable Subsamples Subsamples
Labour Productivity Non-MNEs MNEs Excl. ES, IT 2001-2008
OffCore -0.002 -0.003 -0.009 -0.018* -0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005)
OffNoncore 0.020* 0.024** 0.025** 0.018 0.028**
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012)
OffService 0.044** 0.048** 0.059*** 0.045*** 0.041**
(0.021) (0.023) (0.015) (0.017) (0.020)
DomCore -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.012 -0.009*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
DomNoncore -0.007 -0.009 -0.009 -0.012 -0.014
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.014) (0.011)
DomService -0.021* -0.025* -0.018 -0.027 -0.035***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011)
MNE_OffCore -0.001 0.001 -0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
MNE_OffNoncore 0.017*** 0.013** 0.018***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
MNE_OffService 0.011 0.015 0.015
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
R&D 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.028 -0.001
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.011)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 783,827 650,534 133,293 260,387 626,428
Clusters 116 116 115 90 116
Adj R2 0.091 0.093 0.102 0.188 0.098
Standard errors clustered at the country-industry level in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at
the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.
for different subsamples of firms. Sample split regressions show that the productivity ef-
fects for MNEs and non-MNEs are similar though slightly larger for MNEs. Excluding
Spain and Italy from the sample causes a negative coefficient for offshoring of core activ-
ities, while the remaining coefficients are consistent with previous results. Excluding the
years 1996-2000 from the regressions causes no qualitative changes as compared to the
full sample estimations.
In table 2.10 we split up the offshoring variables with respect to two groups of supplier
countries and re-estimate the main specifications. Motivated by the stylized facts pre-
sented in section 2.3.2 we distinguish between offshoring to high-wage countries and
offshoring to low-wage countries. The group of high-wage countries is given by the nine
Western European countries analysed in this study and additionally by the group of other
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Tab. 2.10: Effects of offshoring conditional on supplier regions
TFP TFP
(1) (2)
Offshoring to high-wage countries Core -0.008 -0.007
(0.007) (0.007)
Noncore 0.003 0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
Service -0.006 -0.010
(0.016) (0.018)
Offshoring to low-wage countries Core 0.018 0.015
(0.011) (0.011)
Noncore 0.061*** 0.060***
(0.023) (0.023)
Service 0.091*** 0.092***
(0.017) (0.018)
Domestic outsourcing Core -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Noncore -0.006 -0.006
(0.009) (0.009)
Service -0.012 -0.011
(0.012) (0.012)
MNE * Off. to high-wage countries Core -0.004
(0.004)
Noncore 0.011**
(0.004)
Service 0.010
(0.010)
MNE * Off. to low-wage countries Core 0.022**
(0.009)
Noncore 0.000
(0.014)
Service -0.013
(0.013)
R&D 0.020 0.019
(0.018) (0.017)
Observations 750,516 750,516
Adj R2 0.095 0.096
Standard errors clustered at the country-industry level in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at
the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. Firm fixed effects and country-year fixed effects are included.
high-wage OECD countries. The results show positive and statistically significant coeffi-
cients for service offshoring and offshoring of non-core activities in the case of low-wage
supplier countries. The coefficients for high-wage supplier countries are statistically in-
significant. This indicates that the the previous findings on positive productivity effects
are in particular driven by offshoring to low-wage countries. A possible explanation for
the differential effect is that offshoring to low-wage countries might be particularly driven
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by cost reduction motives, while offshoring to high-wage countries might be driven by
other factors, such as the location of suitable suppliers or the firms’ market access strate-
gies.
2.6 Conclusion
The inclusion of standard Feenstra and Hanson type offshoring measures in productiv-
ity models have been criticised because, by construction, offshoring cannot be accurately
distinguished from domestic outsourcing and supplier changes (Castellani et al., 2013).
Using data from the World Input Output Database (WIOD) this study analyses these vari-
ables systematically, and provides stylized facts on offshoring and domestic outsourcing
in nine European countries between 1995 and 2008. Furthermore, combining the industry
data on offshoring with a firm panel, this study estimates the productivity effects of ser-
vice and material offshoring, while at the same time controlling for domestic outsourcing
and supplier changes.
The main stylized facts are as follows: Offshoring has increased throughout virtually all
countries and industries in Europe and it has increased with respect to different supplier
regions, though strongest with the group of low-wage countries. The observed increase
in material offshoring reflects genuine offshoring as well as a replacement of domestic by
foreign suppliers. With respect to services there is evidence for domestic outsourcing and
offshoring, but no evidence of systematic supplier changes. Overall, the share of internal
production has gone down by 4.5 percentage points on average, thus evoking the question
whether firms achieved productivity gains through this specialisation effort.
This question has been addressed through estimations based on combined industry and
firm-level data. The main results are as follows: Offshoring of services and non-core
manufacturing activities have contributed to an increase in productivity, while offshoring
of core activities and domestic outsourcing have had no such effects. This suggests that
offshoring raises productivity by allowing firms to further specialise on their core activi-
ties. The estimated productivity gains are in particular driven by offshoring to low-wage
countries, and by the gains of multinational firms. For future research it would be desir-
able to use detailed firm level data on offshoring and domestic outsourcing and analyse
the reasons behind the heterogeneous effects observed in this study.
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2.7 Appendix
Tab. 2.11: Total factor productivity estimations
NACE Industry Labour Capital Obs R2
β SE β SE
151 Production, processing, preserving of meat and meat products 0.801*** (0.003) 0.175*** (0.003) 22,839 0.89
152 Processing and preserving of fish and fish products 0.721*** (0.009) 0.196*** (0.007) 4,143 0.85
153 Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables 0.674*** (0.008) 0.257*** (0.007) 7,755 0.86
154 Vegetable and animal oils and fats 0.878*** (0.012) 0.212*** (0.01) 3,247 0.83
155 Dairy products 0.811*** (0.006) 0.199*** (0.005) 9,062 0.92
156 Grain mill products, starches and starch products 0.812*** (0.009) 0.221*** (0.006) 4,837 0.89
157 Prepared animal feeds 0.861*** (0.008) 0.162*** (0.006) 6,778 0.89
158 Other food products 0.733*** (0.004) 0.253*** (0.003) 30,095 0.88
159 Beverages 0.856*** (0.006) 0.198*** (0.005) 15,245 0.86
160 Tobacco products 0.816*** (0.049) 0.364*** (0.037) 379 0.88
171 Preparation and spinning of textile fibres 0.777*** (0.008) 0.120*** (0.005) 7,063 0.86
172 Textile weaving 0.793*** (0.007) 0.107*** (0.005) 8,393 0.85
173 Finishing of textiles 0.764*** (0.012) 0.146*** (0.006) 5,211 0.83
174 Made-up textile articles, except apparel 0.785*** (0.009) 0.100*** (0.006) 4,202 0.84
175 Other textiles 0.832*** (0.008) 0.147*** (0.005) 6,664 0.86
176 Knitted and crocheted fabrics 0.757*** (0.017) 0.124*** (0.012) 1,475 0.78
177 Knitted and crocheted articles 0.758*** (0.009) 0.124*** (0.006) 4,680 0.85
181 Leather clothes 0.816*** (0.023) 0.098*** (0.016) 661 0.82
182 Other wearing apparel and accessories 0.746*** (0.004) 0.161*** (0.003) 21,617 0.78
183 Dressing and dyeing of fur; articles of fur 0.663*** (0.034) 0.089*** (0.02) 527 0.62
191 Tanning and dressing of leather 0.768*** (0.009) 0.119*** (0.005) 4,888 0.85
192 Luggage, handbags and the like, saddler 0.740*** (0.011) 0.160*** (0.007) 3,098 0.82
193 Footwear 0.736*** (0.006) 0.212*** (0.003) 11,000 0.83
201 Sawmilling and planing of wood; impregnation of wood 0.779*** (0.006) 0.175*** (0.004) 10,843 0.83
202 Veneer sheets; panels and boards 0.843*** (0.011) 0.190*** (0.006) 3,068 0.90
203 Builders, carpentry and joinery 0.874*** (0.006) 0.107*** (0.004) 12,282 0.86
204 Wooden containers 0.862*** (0.01) 0.086*** (0.006) 5,500 0.77
205 Other products of wood, cork, straw and plaiting materials 0.755*** (0.009) 0.163*** (0.006) 5,386 0.83
211 Pulp, paper and paperboard 0.819*** (0.01) 0.231*** (0.007) 4,980 0.93
212 Articles of paper and paperboard 0.846*** (0.005) 0.142*** (0.003) 16,957 0.90
221 Publishing 0.870*** (0.005) 0.101*** (0.003) 19,919 0.83
222 Printing and service activities related to printing 0.863*** (0.004) 0.120*** (0.002) 33,389 0.87
223 Reproduction of recorded media 0.812*** (0.033) 0.117*** (0.022) 470 0.81
241 Basic chemicals 0.833*** (0.007) 0.190*** (0.005) 13,717 0.89
242 Pesticides and other agro-chemical products 1.086*** (0.027) 0.052*** (0.017) 849 0.91
243 Paints, varnishes and similar coatings 0.920*** (0.009) 0.112*** (0.006) 6,495 0.89
244 Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical products 0.999*** (0.008) 0.040*** (0.006) 8,054 0.88
245 Soap and detergents, cleaning, perfumes and toilet preparations 0.899*** (0.009) 0.139*** (0.006) 7,429 0.88
246 Other chemical products 0.841*** (0.008) 0.158*** (0.005) 9,142 0.88
247 Man-made fibers 0.771*** (0.032) 0.189*** (0.023) 659 0.89
251 Rubber products 0.850*** (0.007) 0.132*** (0.005) 7,344 0.91
252 Plastic products 0.843*** (0.003) 0.139*** (0.002) 45,457 0.88
261 Glass and glass products 0.823*** (0.008) 0.206*** (0.005) 7,397 0.92
262 Non-refractory ceramic goods 0.785*** (0.01) 0.192*** (0.007) 4,152 0.89
263 Ceramic tiles and flags 0.800*** (0.017) 0.196*** (0.011) 2,153 0.92
264 Bricks, tiles and construction products, in baked clay 0.808*** (0.012) 0.204*** (0.008) 4,489 0.86
265 Cement, lime and plaster 0.773*** (0.02) 0.334*** (0.012) 2,242 0.90
266 Articles of concrete, plaster and cement 0.763*** (0.005) 0.196*** (0.003) 22,291 0.84
267 Ornamental and building stone 0.716*** (0.008) 0.173*** (0.004) 8,013 0.78
268 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.672*** (0.008) 0.235*** (0.006) 3,528 0.88
271 Basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys 0.782*** (0.012) 0.220*** (0.008) 4,093 0.92
272 Tubes 0.853*** (0.012) 0.131*** (0.008) 2,789 0.91
273 Other first processing of iron and steel 0.836*** (0.01) 0.164*** (0.007) 3,570 0.90
274 Basic precious and non-ferrous metals 0.801*** (0.012) 0.177*** (0.008) 5,151 0.90
275 Casting of metals 0.834*** (0.006) 0.139*** (0.004) 8,117 0.92
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NACE Industry Labour Capital Obs R2
β SE β SE
281 Structural metal products 0.859*** (0.003) 0.138*** (0.002) 47,397 0.83
282 Tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal 0.838*** (0.009) 0.144*** (0.005) 5,078 0.87
283 Steam generators, except central heating hot water boilers 0.979*** (0.03) 0.0268 (0.018) 346 0.93
284 Forging, pressing, stamping and roll forming of metal 0.806*** (0.005) 0.160*** (0.003) 12,777 0.89
285 Treatment metals; general mechanical engineering 0.837*** (0.003) 0.115*** (0.002) 52,991 0.87
286 Cutlery, tools and general hardware 0.860*** (0.006) 0.119*** (0.004) 10,624 0.89
287 Other fabricated metal products 0.848*** (0.004) 0.141*** (0.002) 30,356 0.89
291 Machinery for mechanical power 0.905*** (0.005) 0.094*** (0.003) 16,495 0.92
292 Other general purpose machinery 0.900*** (0.003) 0.0773*** (0.002) 50,723 0.88
293 Agricultural and forestry machinery 0.892*** (0.008) 0.111*** (0.005) 6,464 0.89
294 Machine-tools 0.870*** (0.006) 0.099*** (0.004) 10,165 0.89
295 Other special purpose machinery 0.896*** (0.004) 0.094*** (0.002) 28,363 0.89
296 Weapons and ammunition 0.983*** (0.024) 0.085*** (0.016) 710 0.93
297 Domestic appliances n.e.c. 0.891*** (0.012) 0.097*** (0.008) 3,617 0.91
300 Office machinery and computers 0.947*** (0.012) 0.079*** (0.009) 4,105 0.81
311 Electric motors, generators and transformers 0.876*** (0.01) 0.110*** (0.007) 5,760 0.85
312 Electricity distribution and control apparatus 0.860*** (0.01) 0.107*** (0.007) 5,808 0.85
313 Insulated wire and cable 0.893*** (0.015) 0.105*** (0.011) 2,443 0.87
314 Accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries 0.856*** (0.03) 0.119*** (0.021) 411 0.93
315 Lighting equipment and electric lamps 0.810*** (0.012) 0.131*** (0.008) 4,660 0.82
316 Electrical equipment n.e.c. 0.834*** (0.006) 0.126*** (0.004) 15,548 0.86
321 Electronic valves and tubes; other electronic components 0.917*** (0.01) 0.085*** (0.007) 6,793 0.81
322 Television and radio transmitters; apparatus for telephony 0.934*** (0.013) 0.074*** (0.009) 4,279 0.83
323 Television and radio receivers, sound or video recording 0.971*** (0.025) -0.011 (0.016) 1,354 0.77
331 Medical and surgical equipment 0.831*** (0.008) 0.138*** (0.005) 8,238 0.87
332 Instruments for measuring, checking, testing, navigating 0.934*** (0.006) 0.066*** (0.004) 9,118 0.90
333 Industrial process control equipment 0.890*** (0.015) 0.091*** (0.009) 1,567 0.86
334 Optical instruments and photographic equipment 0.909*** (0.015) 0.064*** (0.011) 2,013 0.88
335 Watches and clocks 0.825*** (0.033) 0.060*** (0.018) 491 0.84
341 Motor vehicles 0.859*** (0.015) 0.150*** (0.011) 2,447 0.96
342 Bodies for motor vehicles; trailers and semi-trailers 0.850*** (0.008) 0.126*** (0.005) 6,810 0.87
343 Parts and accessories for motor vehicles and engines 0.815*** (0.006) 0.152*** (0.005) 9,980 0.91
351 Building and repairing of ships and boats 0.816*** (0.007) 0.156*** (0.005) 6,774 0.87
352 Railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock 0.900*** (0.021) 0.089*** (0.014) 1,313 0.91
353 Aircraft and spacecraft 0.991*** (0.012) 0.061*** (0.009) 2,117 0.94
354 Motorcycles and bicycles 0.816*** (0.015) 0.132*** (0.011) 1,649 0.90
355 Other transport equipment n.e.c. 0.952*** (0.021) 0.076*** (0.013) 845 0.89
361 Furniture 0.827*** (0.004) 0.125*** (0.002) 34,876 0.86
362 Jewellery and related articles 0.832*** (0.01) 0.101*** (0.006) 4,423 0.82
363 Musical instruments 0.811*** (0.041) 0.103*** (0.019) 410 0.81
364 Sports goods 0.837*** (0.017) 0.117*** (0.011) 1,605 0.86
365 Games and toys 0.766*** (0.019) 0.155*** (0.012) 1,529 0.81
366 Miscellaneous manufacturing n.e.c. 0.812*** (0.006) 0.136*** (0.004) 10,612 0.88
Notes: This table shows the results from the TFP regressions, according to equation 2.3. NACE industries
23 and 37 are excluded due to lack of observations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at the 1% level.
Tab. 2.13: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Domestic outsourcing of core activities 1,638 8.3685 6.0138 0 27.5141
Domestic outsourcing of non-core activities 1,638 9.7234 5.9132 1.6447 33.2059
Domestic outsourcing of services 1,638 6.9131 2.4848 1.8647 18.539
Offshoring of core activities 1,638 7.0806 5.2949 0.4293 30.2627
Offshoring of non-core activities 1,638 7.1008 4.3804 1.287 27.8508
Offshoring of services 1,638 1.359 1.3478 0.1547 12.0276
Value added 783,827 14.1159 1.3387 11.5129 24.1152
Employees 783,827 3.4074 1.2369 1.6094 12.4783
Tangible capital 783,827 13.2296 1.8413 8.5171 22.9413
Total factor productivity 783,827 9.3979 0.7324 2.7403 13.3466
MNE dummy 783,827 0.1701 0.3757 0 1
Source: WIOD, Amadeus, own calculations.
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Tab. 2.12: Average performance by industry
Nace Industry L K (th. e ) VA (th. e ) TFP VA / L Obs
15-16 Food & tobacco 88 5,144 5,275 8.4 50,972 87,694
17-18 Textiles & clothing 59 1,566 2,501 9.6 44,705 51,468
19 Leather 42 858 1,559 9.0 38,252 16,887
20 Wood 43 1,979 1,948 9.3 43,927 31,707
21-22 Paper & publishing 80 4,891 5,774 9.6 58,095 63,650
24 Chemicals 152 12,846 16,125 9.5 76,387 38,678
25 Rubber, plastics 83 3,246 4,552 9.4 51,840 44,055
26 Glass, ceramics 75 4,575 4,804 8.7 54,451 48,569
27-28 Metals 63 2,550 3,387 9.4 47,193 154,724
29 Machinery 79 2,050 4,706 10.0 53,811 98,785
30-33 Electrical & medical 139 4,499 12,691 10.0 64,368 61,655
34-35 Transport equipment 346 16,941 24,473 9.5 51,809 27,645
36-37 Manufacturing, n.e.c 48 1,228 1,964 9.5 41,473 42,186
This table shows the average performance of firms by industry. Source: Amadeus, own calculations.
Tab. 2.14: Data sources
Variable Data source
Offshoring World Input Output Database
R&D expenditures ANBERD
Firm-level variables Amadeus
Price deflators EU KLEMS; STAN
Exchange rates EUROSTAT
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3. OFFSHORING AND LABOUR MARKET INEQUALITIES
3.1 Introduction
Labour market inequalities between skilled and less skilled people have widened across
the developed world since the 1980s. The United States and the United Kingdom have ex-
perienced particularly sharp increases in wage inequalities, while continental Europe has
experienced a combination of moderately increasing wage inequalities and/or increasing
unemployment rates among the less skilled (e.g. Freeman and Katz, 1995; Nickell and
Bell, 1996; Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; Machin and van Reenen, 1998; Acemoglu,
2003; OECD, 2011). For the more recent past, several studies have documented a po-
larisation of employment and/or wages to the detriment of medium skilled labour (e.g.
Spitz-Oener, 2006; Goos et al., 2009; Autor and Dorn, 2013).
The forces behind these trends have been subject to extensive research.1 One strand of the
literature has strived to identify the common determinants of the growth in labour mar-
ket inequalities. This literature argues that market forces – such as technological change,
trade, and offshoring – have increased the relative demand for skills, over and above the
increase in relative skill supply. A second strand of the literature has strived to explain
why wage inequalities have grown less in continental Europe than in Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries.2 This literature stresses the role of institutional forces in Europe, such as the broad
coverage of collective bargaining, unemployment benefits or high minimum wages, which
hold wage inequalities low but cause unemployment among the less skilled.3 Thus, it has
been argued that Anglo-Saxon wage inequalities and continental European unemployment
are essentially two sides of the same coin (Krugman, 1994).
The paper contributes mainly to the first strand of the literature. We provide evidence on
changes in the relative demand for skills in 28 manufacturing and service industries in
1 See Katz and Autor (1999) for an overview over the different strands of research in this field.
2 See Acemoglu (2003) for a summary of the main arguments in this literature.
3 See for instance Fitzenberger (1999) for Germany.
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Germany between 1995 and 2007 and analyse the explanatory power of several demand
side factors by estimating systems of wage bill share equations, following Berman et al.
(1994). Our particular focus is on the role of offshoring but we also account for different
aspects of technological change. In addition, we also link our work to the second strand
of the literature by analysing whether the labour market adjusts to offshoring through
changes in relative wages or through changes in relative employment.
Theoretically, the hypothesis that offshoring raises the relative demand for high skilled
labour is grounded on the assumption that firms in the developed “North” are offshoring
their low-skill intensive stages of production (or tasks) to the less-developed “South”.
This assumption can be rationalised in two different ways. First, in a world where factor
price equalisation fails to hold (e.g. because of the presence of non-tradable goods), the
relative wage of low skilled labour is smaller in the South than in the North due to its
relatively abundance in low skilled labour. This allows firms in the North to arbitrage on
factor price differences by offshoring low-skill intensive tasks to the South (e.g. Feenstra
and Hanson, 1996a; Deardorff, 2001; Kohler, 2004).
Second, the level of offshoring costs likely differs depending on the nature of the off-
shored tasks. In particular, researchers have argued that offshoring is relatively cheap if
tasks are routine and codifiable and if they can be carried out without physical presence at
some location or without face-to-face contact with customers (Leamer and Storper, 2001;
Autor et al., 2003; Blinder, 2006, 2009). The criteria of routineness and codifiability are
arguably more often satisfied in case of low skilled labour such that the immediate off-
shoring threat may indeed be larger for this group. Yet, some recent studies have argued
that this simple relation between skills and offshorability does not hold in the service sec-
tor (Blinder, 2006, 2009; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Autor and Dorn, 2013). Jobs of low
skilled labour in the service sector are often physically bound to a location and therefore
cannot be offshored. Instead, these studies argue that the wave of computerization has
exposed medium skilled labour in the service sector to offshoring and automation, thus
contributing to a polarisation in employment and wages.
While it is evident that offshoring causes immediate job losses which may be concen-
trated among particular skill groups, it is less evident how these skill groups are affected
in general equilibrium. According to the seminal work by Feenstra and Hanson (1996a,b,
1999) the effect of offshoring on the relative wages of low skilled labour is unambigu-
ously negative. In Feenstra and Hanson’s theoretical model the US offshores production
stages to Mexico which are perceived as low-skill intensive in the US and as high-skill
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intensive in Mexico, due to differences in their levels of economic development. Under
this assumption offshoring increases the relative demand and, consequently, the relative
wages of high skilled labour in both countries. In this sense outsourcing operates in the
same way as a skill-biased technical change that occurs simultaneously in both countries
(Kohler, 2001).
The theoretical literature that followed Feenstra and Hanson has shown that under less
restrictive assumptions the effects are more ambiguous.4 If one allows for outsourcing
in more than one final good sector then, as Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) put it, “al-
most anything can happen”. In Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) this ambiguity is
pinned down to three partly opposing effects: Low skilled labour suffers from negative
labour-supply and relative-price effects but gains from a positive productivity effect. The
negative labour supply effect results from the initial displacement of low skilled labour
which works like an increase in the supply of low skilled labour. To restore the full em-
ployment equilibrium wages of low skilled labour have to fall. The negative relative-price
effect occurs in large economies because offshoring reduces the relative price of the low-
skill intensive good. Following the Stolper-Samuelson theorem this reduces the relative
wage of low skilled labour. The positive productivity effect follows from the greater cost
savings realised by the low-skill intensive sector. The low-skill intensive sector expands
relative to the high-skill intensive sector and thus increases the relative demand for low
skilled labour.5 The overall effect on the wages of low skilled labour cannot be generally
established in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008).
Empirically, there has been much support on the hypothesis that offshoring is skill bi-
ased.6 Early evidence on the United States (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996b, 1999) and the
United Kingdom (Anderton and Brenton, 1999) shows that offshoring can explain be-
tween 10 and 50% of the increase in the wage bill shares of high skilled labour in the
1970s and 1980s. Later studies extend the analysis to more than two skill-groups. Morri-
son Paul and Siegel (2001) distinguish four skill groups for the US and find that the lowest
two groups are negatively affected and the highest group is positively affected, though off-
shoring has a smaller impact than technological change. Hijzen et al. (2005) distinguish
three skill groups of the UK and find negative effects for low skilled labour but no signif-
4 See for instance Arndt (1997) for positive effects for (low skilled) labour, and Venables (1999), Dear-
dorff (2001), Jones and Kierzkowski (2001), Kohler (2004), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) for
ambiguous effects.
5 Empirically, productivity effects of offshoring have been identified by Görg and Hanley (2005), Egger
and Egger (2006), Görg et al. (2008), Amiti and Wei (2009), and Schwörer (2013).
6 See Crinò (2009) for a survey of the empirical literature.
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icant effects for medium and high skilled labour. Crinò (2010, 2012) and Geishecker and
Görg (2013) show that the skill-bias also applies in case of service offshoring.
In terms of continental Europe there exists similar evidence for France (Strauss-Kahn,
2004), Spain (Minondo and Rubert, 2006), Italy (Helg and Tajoli, 2005), Austria (Eg-
ger and Egger, 2003, 2005; Lorentowicz et al., 2008) and Sweden (Ekholm and Hakkala,
2006). Note however that most of these studies model only the employment effects of
offshoring and neglect potential wage effects, thus potentially underestimating the overall
impact of offshoring. Turning to Germany, early evidence by Falk and Koebel (2002)
shows that offshoring between 1978 and 1990 has negatively affected the demand for low
skilled labour, whereas the effects for medium and high skilled labour are not statisti-
cally significant. Geishecker (2006) finds that offshoring to Central and Eastern Europe
(CEEC) between 1991 and 2000 explains about half of the decline in the wage bill shares
of low skilled labour. Schöller (2007) is the first to analyse the effects of service off-
shoring. She finds a negative impact of service offshoring for low skilled labour. Becker
et al. (2013) analyse effects on the workforce composition in German multinational en-
terprises between 1998 and 2001. They find that offshoring causes a shift in favour of
high skilled labour and in favour of non-routine and interactive tasks, but not in case of
offshoring to CEEC. Baumgarten et al. (2013) analyse individual level data for the period
1991 to 2006 and allow for mobility of workers between industries within occupations.
They find that offshoring has an even larger negative impact on wages of low skilled
workers if such cross industry effects are taken into account.
In this paper we provide evidence on the effects of offshoring on labour market inequal-
ities in Germany of the recent past (1995 - 2007) and explore several new aspects: First,
we distinguish between the manufacturing sector and the service sector, as well as be-
tween three different skill groups. This enables us to address the hypothesis raised by
Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Autor and Dorn (2013) that, in the service sector, off-
shoring and technological change lead to polarisation rather than skill bias. Second, we
explicitly analyse whether offshoring affects the labour market through changes in rela-
tive wages or through changes in relative employment. In this way we indirectly shed
light on the rigidity of wage structures and the role of labour market institutions in Ger-
many. Third, we incorporate several dimensions of offshoring into our estimations that
have only recently entered the literature. In particular we distinguish between different
types of offshored inputs (materials vs. services) and between different offshoring desti-
nations (China, CEEC, OECD countries, and remaining low-wage countries). Fourth, we
reduce problems of omitted variable bias that have been present in many previous studies
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by controlling for domestic outsourcing.
Our findings can be summarised as follows: Offshoring is on average biased in favour of
high skilled labour and in disfavour of low skilled labour. This effect is strongly driven
by material offshoring and offshoring to Central and Eastern Europe, and predominantly
works through adjustments in relative wages. The latter finding suggests that German
wage structures are not as rigid as previous studies suggest. While our main findings
hold for the manufacturing sector, we find the opposite direction of bias for the service
sector. This finding is in line with the hypothesis that low skilled labour in the service
sector is shielded from offshoring by the nature of the tasks they perform. Finally, we
also find patterns of polarisation in favour of both high and low skilled labour. However,
this pattern is not driven by offshoring but by technological change.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data and
presents stylized facts on labour market variables and offshoring, section 3.3 derives the
empirical model and discusses our econometric implementation, section 3.4 presents the
econometric results, and section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data, measurement, and stylized facts
3.2.1 Data and measurement
This paper uses industry-level data for Germany in the period 1995 to 2007. The sample
comprises 14 manufacturing industries (NACE revision 1 codes 15-37) and 14 service
industries (40-74) mainly measured at the 2-digit level.7 From the EUKLEMS database
we retrieve information on wage bills, total hours worked, and number of employees.
The first two of these variables can be decomposed into the shares contributed by high,
medium, and low skilled labour. To obtain a corresponding decomposition for the number
of employees we use additional data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) of the European
Union. Offshoring variables are based on data from the World Input Output Database
(WIOD) as in Schwörer (2013). WIOD contains information on the value of material and
service inputs used by German industries and on the source countries from which these
7 The level of industry aggregation and the sample period are dictated by the main data sources used,
EUKLEMS and WIOD. The sample period ends in 2007 since more recent data for several variables are
only available for the NACE revision 2 industry classification, which cannot accurately be harmonized at
the 2-digit level with NACE revision 1.
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inputs are obtained. This study defines offshoring (OS) of industry j in year t as the share
of imported inputs (M) from all 28 industries (i = 1, . . . , I) and all countries (c = 1, . . . ,C)
in output (Y):
OS jt =
∑Ii=1∑
C
c=1 Mic, jt
Yjt
(3.1)
OS is similar to the well-known broad offshoring measure introduced by Feenstra and
Hanson (1996b) but differs in three ways: 1. OS comprises service offshoring in addition
to material offshoring. 2. Imports are scaled by output rather than non-energy inputs.
This scaling is important for our econometric analysis because it allows us (jointly with
the fact that we control for domestic outsourcing) to identify how offshoring of inhouse
production affects relative skill demand. We thereby avoid confounding offshoring of in-
house production with the substitution of domestic suppliers by foreign suppliers.8 3. We
directly obtain industry-specific imports (Mic, jt) from WIOD, whereas Feenstra and Han-
son derive them from domestic input-output tables based on a restrictive proportionality
assumption for imports.9 But note that WIOD data are themselves based on a similar,
though less restrictive, type of proportionality assumption (Timmer et al., 2012).
We complement this broad offshoring measure with more detailed measures by restrict-
ing the range of imports: First, we distinguish between offshoring to Central and Eastern
European countries (CEEC), China, OECD countries (excluding CEEC), and the rest of
the world (RoW). Second, we distinguish between material offshoring and service off-
shoring.10 Third, we define domestic outsourcing (DO) as the share of domestic inputs in
output, in complete analogy to the broad offshoring measure.
3.2.2 Stylized facts on the labour market and offshoring
At the aggregate level we find that the share of high skilled employment in total employ-
ment has grown by ∆SH = 3.8% between 1995 and 2007. We analyse in the following to
8 See section 3.3.2 as well as Schwörer (2013) and Castellani et al. (2013) for more details.
9 This proportionality assumption has been criticised as highly restrictive by Feenstra and Jensen (2012),
Puzzello (2012), and Winkler and Milberg (2009).
10 For instance, offshoring to China is defined as the share of (material and service) imports from China
in output. Similarly, service offshoring is defined as the share of service imports (from all countries) in
output.
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which extent this growth can be attributed to employment shifts between industries or to
growing skill-intensities within industries, following the decomposition in Berman et al.
(1994):
∆SH =∑
j
∆FjS¯H j +∑
j
∆SH jF¯j (3.2)
where SH j is the employment share of high skilled labour in industry j, Fj is the fraction
of industry j in aggregate employment, ∆ denotes the change in variables between 1995
and 2007, and bars denote time averages. The first term on the right hand side captures
the contribution of between-industry shifts and the second term captures the contribution
of within-industry shifts.11
Our decomposition shows that 31% of the aggregate growth in the share of high skilled
employment is due to between-industry shifts and 69% is due to within-industry shifts.
Similar numbers are obtained when we decompose the employment shares of medium
(34 vs. 66%) or low skilled labour (22 vs. 78%).12 This finding has an important impli-
cation. It suggests that neoclassical trade theory, based on the Stolper-Samuelson theo-
rem, has only limited potential to explain the observed trends. According to the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem the rising demand for high skilled labour in the Germany is due to
growing import competition from low-skill abundant countries. However, this link would
require a large shift in employment towards the high-skill intensive industries (i.e. large
between-industry shifts) and a decline of skill-intensities within sectors. By contrast, this
decomposition suggests that factors which affect skill-intensities within industries, such
as offshoring and skill-biased technological change, may have larger explanatory power.
Before we turn to the analysis of these relationships, we document some stylized facts on
labour market outcomes and offshoring.
Table 3.1 summarizes trends in labour market outcomes by skill group. The numbers
represent aggregate changes between 1995 and 2007 in %. We observe that the wage bill
of high skilled labour has increased by 38%, whereas the wage bill of medium and low
skilled labour has increased by only about 4% each. The wage bill share can be further
11 The first term is the weighted sum of changes in relative industry size, with the average skill-intensity
as weights. The term is positive if skill-intensive industries grow and unskill-intensive industries shrink (in
relative terms), reflecting between-industry shifts in employment towards the skill-intensive industry. The
second term is the weighted sum of changes in industry skill-intensities, with the average industry size as
weights. If this term is positive it reflects within-industry increases in skill-intensities.
12 The results reported here are based on the total number of hours worked by high skilled labour as a
measure of high skilled employment. However, results are similar when we use the number of high skilled
employees.
3. Offshoring and labour market inequalities 43
Tab. 3.1: Aggregate changes in labour market outcomes by skill group (1995-2007; %)
High Medium Low
Wage bill 37.72 3.94 4.34
Number of employees 11.21 1.41 5.33
Hours worked per employee 6.71 -8.39 -13.11
Hourly wage 16.04 11.84 14.04
This table shows the aggregate growth rates between 1995 and 2007 of labour market outcomes by skill
group (in %). For instance, the upper-left element means that the wage bill of high skilled labour has
increased between 1995 and 2007 by 37.72%. Note that by definition the wage bill can be written as the
product of the other three variables.
Tab. 3.2: Changes in labour market outcomes by skill group and main economic sector (1995-
2007;%)
Manufacturing sector Service sector
High Medium Low High Medium Low
Wage bill 37.60 3.46 -17.46 37.78 4.21 24.91
Number of employees -8.68 -8.99 -18.01 21.32 6.12 19.53
Hours worked per employee 12.73 -7.54 -12.65 4.01 -8.79 -13.27
Hourly wage 33.64 22.98 15.28 9.20 7.61 20.50
This table shows the aggregate growth rates between 1995 and 2007 of labour market outcomes by skill
group and by main economic sector (in %). For instance, the upper-left element means that the wage bill of
high skilled labour in the manufacturing sector has increased between 1995 and 2007 by 37.60%. Note that
by definition the wage bill can be written as the product of the other three variables.
decomposed into three components: number of employees, hours worked per employee,
and the hourly wage rate. In terms of employment we observe the largest growth rates for
high skilled labour, the second largest growth rate for low skilled labour, and the smallest
growth rate for medium skilled labour. In terms of the hourly wage a similar though
somewhat weaker pattern applies.13 In terms of the hours worked we observe a clear
linear bias in favour of higher skilled labour. Medium and low skilled labour has even
reduced the average working time.
Table 3.2 replicates the stylized facts of table 3.1 for the manufacturing sector and the
service sector individually. We observe that total employment has fallen in the manufac-
turing sector and has grown in the service sector. Beyond this general pattern there are
some remarkable differences between the two sectors with respect to skill-specific trends.
13 The previous evidence on wage inequalities in Germany is mixed. Several studies have highlighted
the stability of Germany’s wage dispersion (Abraham and Houseman, 1995; Freeman and Schettkat, 2001;
Prasad, 2004). By contrast, recent studies provide evidence of growing wage inequalities since the 1980s
and even an acceleration of this trend in the mid-1990s (Dustmann et al., 2009; OECD, 2011; Card et al.,
2013).
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Tab. 3.3: Aggregate changes in offshoring, domestic outsourcing, and inhouse production (1995-
2007)
Total Manufacturing Services
1995 2007 ∆% 1995 2007 ∆% 1995 2007 ∆%
Inhouse production 49.83 44.90 -10% 36.48 30.95 -15% 59.01 56.27 -5%
Domestic outsourcing 40.17 38.83 -3% 46.96 42.66 -9% 35.50 35.70 1%
Offshoring 7.37 13.10 78% 13.05 22.17 70% 3.46 5.71 65%
. . . of materials 5.34 9.07 70% 10.38 17.16 65% 1.88 2.47 31%
. . . of services 1.40 2.62 87% 1.38 2.31 67% 1.41 2.87 104%
. . . to OECD countries 5.28 7.68 45% 9.35 12.65 35% 2.48 3.63 46%
. . . to CEEC 0.51 1.61 216% 0.87 2.89 232% 0.26 0.56 115%
. . . to China 0.28 1.00 257% 0.44 1.60 264% 0.17 0.50 194%
. . . to RoW 1.30 2.82 172% 2.39 5.03 110% 0.56 1.02 82%
This table shows aggregate changes between 1995 and 2007 in inhouse production, domestic outsourcing,
and offshoring. Variables are scaled by output and written in %. E.g., the upper-left elements mean that the
share of inhouse production in output has changed from 49.83% in 1995 to 44.90% in 2007, which implies a
decline by 10%. Note that the fourth component of total output (taxes, subsidies, and international transport
margins) is not reported. Similarly, offshoring of primary inputs (NACE 1-14) and of some remaining
services (NACE 80-95) are not reported.
In the manufacturing sector there is a clear linear bias in favour of more skilled labour.
The highest growth rates of employment, hours worked, and wages are observed for high
skilled labour and the lowest growth rates are observed for low skilled labour. In the ser-
vice sector there is larger heterogeneity in the evolution of employment, hours worked and
wages, but overall a distinctive pattern of polarisation in favour of high and low skilled
labour. In terms of the number of employees the highest growth rate is observed for high
skilled labour but the growth rate for low skilled labour is only slightly smaller. In terms
of wages we even observe the highest growth rate for low skilled labour. Only in terms
of hours worked we observe a different pattern. Here low skilled labour has the smallest
growth rate.
Next, we document in table 3.3 stylized facts on the evolution of offshoring, domestic
outsourcing, and inhouse production between 1995 and 2007. This is essentially a de-
composition exercise as each variable is scaled by output. Any increase in offshoring is
therefore, by construction, mirrored by a corresponding decrease in inhouse production or
domestic outsourcing. This type of decomposition is useful because it reveals to which ex-
tent offshoring replaces inhouse production (we may call this “genuine offshoring”) and to
which extent offshoring replaces domestic outsourcing (this reflects supplier changes).14
14 The importance of such a broad account of the changes in the organization of production has been
highlighted in Winkler (2010), Castellani et al. (2013), and Schwörer (2013).
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Columns 1-3 show aggregate trends between 1995 and 2007 including both the man-
ufacturing and the service sector: inhouse production declined from about 50 to 45%
of output which implies a decline by 5 percentage points (ppt) or 10%, domestic out-
sourcing declined by 1.3 ppt (-3%), and offshoring increased by 5.7 ppt (+78%). This
suggests that Germany has experienced substantial relocations of inhouse production to
foreign suppliers and – by a smaller scale – substitution of domestic suppliers by foreign
suppliers. Furthermore, we observe that material offshoring accounts for a large part of
total offshoring, though the growth rate is higher for service offshoring. Similarly, we
observe that OECD countries represent the most important group of offshoring destina-
tions, though the growth rates for Central and Eastern European countries, China, and the
mostly low-wage “rest of the world” are considerably higher.
Columns 4-6 and 7-9 prove that the main aggregate pattern – reduced inhouse production
and increased offshoring – applies also for the manufacturing sector and the service sector
individually. However, we observe that the service sector offshores considerably less than
the manufacturing sector (5.7% vs. 22.1% in 2007). During the sample period, offshoring
increased in the service sector by 2.3 ppt and in the manufacturing sector by 9.1 ppt. This
suggests that the scope for distributional effects of offshoring should be larger in the
manufacturing sector.
From the summary statistics and the existing literature we condense several research ques-
tions that shall be addressed in the econometric analysis below: Can the observed increase
in the relative demand for high skilled labour be explained by changes in offshoring or
technologies? Does offshoring or technological change explain the differences in labour
market trends between the manufacturing and the service sector, and in particular the
trend towards polarisation in the service sector? Do offshoring destinations or the type of
offshored inputs matter for these effects? Against the background of German labour mar-
ket institutions: does the labour market adjust to offshoring through changes in relative
wages or through changes in relative employment rates?
3.3 Empirical model
3.3.1 Derivation of the empirical model
We analyse these questions econometrically by estimating a system of three wage bill
share equations, which we derive from an industry cost function augmented by offshoring.
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Similar models have been used in the context of trade and offshoring by a large number of
studies.15 We proceed as follows. First, we briefly describe the most widely used empir-
ical model in the literature. Second, we describe modifications of this benchmark model
which have been used in studies on continental Europe to account for wage rigidities.
Third, we show how variations of the benchmark model can be used to identify whether
offshoring affects the relative demand for skills through changes in relative wages or rel-
ative employment.
We start with an arbitrary industry short-run cost function16
C(W,K,Y,Z) = min
E
(W′E) subject to Y = f (E,K,Z) (3.3)
where W is a vector of wages for high (H), medium (M), and low (L) skilled labour, and
E is the corresponding vector of labour inputs. Industry and time subscripts are omitted
to simplify notation. K denotes capital input, Y denotes output, and Z is a vector of shift
factors that includes offshoring, domestic outsourcing and technological change. These
shift factors may have two different types of effects. First, they can reduce the labour
input requirements for the production of a given output (productivity effect). Second,
they can change the cost efficient skill mix (distributional effect or factor bias effect). In
this study we are interested in the latter type of effect.
The cost function can be approximated using the translog function17
lnC(W,K,Y,Z) =α+∑
s∈S
βs lnWs+
1
2∑s∈S∑t∈S
γst lnWs lnWt +βk lnK+ γKK lnK2
+βY lnY + γYY lnY 2+ ∑
p∈P
βpZp+
1
2 ∑q∈Q
γpqZpZq+∑
s∈S
γsK lnWs lnK
+∑
s∈S
γsY lnWs lnY +∑
s∈S
∑
p∈P
γspZp lnWs+ γKY lnK lnY
+ ∑
p∈P
γK pZp lnK+ ∑
p∈P
γY pZp lnY (3.4)
15 This model was first proposed in the context of trade by Berman et al. (1994) and in the context of
offshoring by Feenstra and Hanson (1996b). See Crinò (2009) for a review of the empirical literature.
16 This cost function is a short-run cost function because we do not observe industry-specific capital prices
and therefore assume that capital is quasi-fixed. The short-run costs are, thus, given by the industry’s wage
bill (W′E∗).
17 The translog function is particularly suited because the functional form is highly flexible. According to
Greene (2002) the translog cost function is the most popular specification in empirical work. Alternatives
that have been used in the literature include the Leontief cost function (Morrison Paul and Siegel, 2001)
and the Box-Cox cost function (Falk and Koebel, 2002).
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where indices s and t represent skill levels and indices p and q represent shift variables.
Differentiating with respect to the log wage of skill group s we obtain
lnC
lnWs
= βs+∑
t∈S
γst lnWt + γsK lnK+ γsY lnY + ∑
p∈P
γspZp (3.5)
Using Shephard’s Lemma18 it follows that the left hand side of equation 3.5 is the wage
bill share (WSH) of skill group s:
lnC
lnWs
=
∂C/C
∂Ws/Ws
=
∂C
∂Ws
Ws
C
=
E∗s Ws
C
≡WSHs (3.6)
We obtain the following system of wage bill share equations:
WSHH = βH +∑
t∈S
γHt lnWt + γHK lnK+ γHY lnY + ∑
p∈P
γH pZpC (3.7)
WSHM = βM +∑
t∈S
γMt lnWt + γMK lnK+ γMY lnY + ∑
p∈P
γMpZpC (3.8)
WSHL = βL+∑
t∈S
γLt lnWt + γLK lnK+ γLY lnY + ∑
p∈P
γLpZpC (3.9)
Variants of this “benchmark model” have been estimated by a large number of studies
(see Crinò 2009 for a survey). In the following we discuss a critical property of this
model, which may likely cause an underestimation of the skill bias induced by offshoring
or technological change: In equations 3.7 - 3.9 the offshoring coefficients capture the
effects on the wage bill share of skill group s conditional on the wages of high, medium,
and low skilled labour (and other covariates). Since the wage bill share is a function of
wages and employment, the effect of offshoring on wages is completely absorbed by the
wage controls and only the effects on relative employment is retained. We argue that this
property is problematic because it entails an underestimation of the skill bias except for
the unlikely case that wages are exogenous to changes in offshoring. In the more likely
case at least some of the laid off workers are reabsorbed by the same industry at a lower
wage. We therefore believe that the narrow focus on relative employment effects implied
by the benchmark model is not well suited to capture the full effects of offshoring. This
argument is of particular relevance for countries characterised by flexible wages, such
as the US and UK. However, in light of the explicit evidence on wage effects due to
offshoring (Geishecker and Görg, 2008; Baumgarten et al., 2013) the argument is also
18 ∂C
∂Ws = E
∗
s , where E
∗
s is the cost efficient labour input of skill group s.
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likely to extend to continental Europe.19
Surprisingly, several studies on continental Europe use the alleged presence of wage
rigidities to justify the choice of a different empirical model, which replaces the wage
bill shares by employment shares.20 Strauss-Kahn (2004), e.g., motivates this approach
in the following way: “Although it could be argued that one should focus on the change
in the relative wages [...], I believe that changes in employment shares is the more appro-
priate variable to analyze in considering the French case. Over the past three decades the
French earnings dispersion between skilled and unskilled workers did not significantly
rise, whereas France’s employment share of skilled workers increased dramatically. This
behavior of relative wages is common to most continental European countries and differs
greatly from the U.K. and U.S. experience.” Again, our major objection to this approach
is that it assumes away rather than tests for potential effects on relative wages. Geishecker
(2006) follows a different strategy. Using a C-Test he shows that wages can be treated as
exogenous variables, which allows him to estimate the benchmark model without bias.
However, given the functional relationship between wage bill shares and wages, the result
of this exogeneity test seems questionable. Ekholm and Hakkala (2006) and Crinò (2012)
use yet another strategy. Estimating wage bill share equations they exclude the wage re-
gressors in a robustness check, and conclude that their previous results are robust to this
exclusion.
In this study we proceed in a similar way as Ekholm and Hakkala (2006) and Crinò
(2012). However, we interpret this not as a robustness check, but as a way to identify
whether offshoring affects the labour market through changes in relative wage or through
changes in relative employment: First, in our main specification we estimate a wage bill
share equation that excludes wage regressors. Thereby we aim to capture the total effect of
offshoring on the wage bill shares, capturing both the wage channel and the employment
channel.21 Second, we estimate a wage bill share equation that includes wage regressors.
Thereby we aim to capture the effects of offshoring on the wage bill shares which operate
through the employment channel.
19 Recall also that this strand of the offshoring literature has emerged precisely because traditional trade
theory failed to explain the growing wage inequalities. Thus, it seems inappropriate to estimate models
which, by construction, cannot explain these effects either.
20 See, for instance, Egger and Egger (2003), Strauss-Kahn (2004), Helg and Tajoli (2005), and in a
robustness check Lorentowicz et al. (2008).
21 See Feenstra and Hanson (1996b, 1999) on offshoring and Machin and van Reenen (1998) on techno-
logical change for similar estimations that exclude wage controls.
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3.3.2 Econometric implementation
Several remarks on the econometric implementation are indicated at this point. First, we
specify the variables in the estimation model as follows:
• Wage bill shares (WSH), logged wages by skill group (WH , WM, WL), and logged
output (Y) are directly obtained from the EUKLEMS database. Capital is measured
as logged share of capital stock in output (KInt).
• Technological change is captured through two different variables: the share of re-
search and development expenditures in total expenditures (R&D) and the share
of investments in information and communication technologies in total investment
(ICT).
• In the baseline specifications we use a broad offshoring measure (OS) that captures
imports of all inputs (i.e. from NACE industries 15-74) and all countries. In later
specifications we include separate measures for offshoring to Central and Eastern
Europe, China, OECD, and the rest of the World; or separate measure for offshoring
of material inputs and service inputs (see also section 3.2.1). All specifications also
use a broad measure for domestic outsourcing (DO).
• Year fixed effects are included to account for changes in the relative supply of skills
and other time-varying macroeconomic factors.
Second, to account for unobserved industry-specific time-variant factors that may be cor-
related with offshoring we use a fixed effects estimator. This implies that our inference
is based on the variation of variables within sectors. Also, we account for clustering of
standard errors within industries.
Third, endogeneity problems may arise either if variables, which are correlated with off-
shoring, are omitted from the regression (omitted variable bias) or if offshoring is en-
dogenous due to simultaneity of the offshoring decision and the skill demand decision
(simultaneity bias). We deal with the first issue by jointly controlling for two measures
of technological change and by controlling for domestic outsourcing. Winkler (2010),
Schwörer (2013), and Castellani et al. (2013) have shown that the latter is important in
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order to avoid mixing up offshoring of inhouse production with changes in supplier struc-
tures.22
To deal with a possible simultaneity bias we apply instrumental variable estimations us-
ing current and lagged offshoring intensities of Austria and France as instruments for
offshoring in Germany. We expect these instruments to be correlated with the endoge-
nous regressor since trade and communication costs declined in all three countries in a
similar way and also since their geographical location provides the countries with access
to the same offshoring destinations. At the same time our instruments should be valid
instruments if offshoring in Austria and France is unrelated to the relative demand for
skills in Germany (other than through the correlation in offshoring). Arguably, there are
factors which jointly affect offshoring in Austria and France and the demand for skills in
Germany. For instance, it is reasonable to believe that the invention of the internet has
increased the scope for offshoring around the globe and at the same time increased the
relative demand for skilled labour in Germany. Thus, in order for our instruments to be
valid we need to control for such factors. We believe that through the inclusion of two
proxies for technological change and the inclusion of year fixed effects we are able to
control for the most important sources of bias. We test for the reliability and validity of
our instruments, as detailed in the section 3.4.
Four, we estimate the system of equations using seemingly unrelated regression (SUREG),
which is a generalized least squares estimator. SUREG has been used in the same context
by e.g. Hijzen et al. (2005), Ekholm and Hakkala (2006), and Crinò (2012). Different
from equation-by-equation OLS, SUREG allows for correlation of the error terms across
equations. According to Greene (2002) the coefficient estimates and standard errors from
SUREG and equation-by-equation OLS are identical except a) if the equations have dif-
ferent sets of regressors or b) if parameter constraints are imposed. In our model the
regressors are identical in the equations for high, medium, and low skilled labour. Still,
SUREG is useful for our purposes because it allows us to test for differences in parameters
across equations. Moreover, specific parameter constraints may be warranted in the model
with wage controls to ensure that the estimated model satisfies the properties of the un-
derlying cost function. For instance, symmetry requires γst = γts for all t,s = [H,M,L].23
22 Note that the following identity holds: offshoring + domestic outsourcing + inhouse production =
100%. Hence, if domestic outsourcing is controlled for in the regression, any increase in offshoring is mir-
rored by a decrease in inhouse production. In this way one can unambiguously identify whether offshoring
of inhouse production changes the relative skill mix.
23 This means, e.g., that an increase in the wage of high skilled labour affects the wage bill share of low
skilled labour (γHL) in the same way as an increase in the wage of low skilled labour affects the wage bill
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In robustness checks we impose these constraints on the wage coefficients (see section
3.4.3).
Note that only two of the three equations are linearly independent because the wage bill
shares of high, medium, and low skilled labour sum to 1. Since SUREG is only feasible
for linearly independent equations we have to drop one equation. The results are invari-
ant to our choice of the equation to be dropped, precisely because in our case SUREG
is equivalent to equation-by-equation OLS. This fact allows us to easily obtain the co-
efficients of all equations and to perform all cross-equation tests on differences in co-
efficients, by separately estimating SUREG for each pair of equations (i.e. we estimate
SUREG three times).24 Different than many previous studies we estimate SUREG by
maximum likelihood rather than iterating Zellner’s method, which allows us to estimate
cluster-robust standard errors.25 Maximum likelihood estimation is also helpful for the
robustness check with imposed symmetry constraints, because it ensures that results are
invariant to the choice of the equation to be dropped (Berndt, 1991, p. 473).
3.4 Econometric results
3.4.1 Baseline results
This section reports and discusses the econometric results. Table 3.4 shows the baseline
results obtained from fixed effects (FE) seemingly unrelated regressions (SUREG) of the
system of equations described in section 3.3.1. Dependent variables of the three equations
are the wage bill shares of high, medium, and low skilled labour. The number of observa-
tions (364) is given by the number of industries (28) times the number of years (13). Time
dummies are included but coefficients are not reported to save on space. Cluster-robust
standard errors are reported in parantheses.
In specification (1) the system is estimated without wage controls. As discussed in sec-
tion 3.3.1 we thereby aim to capture the total effect of offshoring on the wage bill shares,
share of high skilled labour (γLH ).
24 Alternatively, the coefficients and standard errors of the dropped equation could be calculated as a linear
combination of the coefficients and standard errors of the directly estimated equations (Berndt, 1991).
25 Maximum likelihood SUREG is estimated using the STATA ado file mysureg, downloadable from
http://www.stata-press.com/data/ml2.html as part of the ml_ado package, and described in Gould et al.
(2003).
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capturing both the wage and employment channel. We observe that industry size, mea-
sured by industry output, is negatively linked with the wage bill share of high skilled
workers and positively linked with the wage bill share of low skilled workers (statistically
significant at the p=5% level). Capital intensity is not statistically significant in all three
equations. This means that systematic complementarities between capital and particular
skill groups are not observed.
Turning to the shift variables we observe that investment in information and communi-
cation technologies (ICT) is negatively associated with medium skilled labour (p=1%)
and positively, though statistically insignificantly, associated with high and low skilled
labour. The second proxy for technological change, research and development expen-
ditures (R&D), is also negative for medium skilled labour (p=5%) and positive for low
skilled labour (p=10%). If we consider the two technology variables jointly, then the es-
timates suggest that technological change contributes to a polarisation of labour demand
in disfavour of medium skilled labour.
The coefficient of offshoring is positive but statistically insignificant for high skilled
labour, positive but smaller for medium skilled labour (p=5%), and negative for low
skilled labour (p=10%). Though the level of statistical significance is relatively low, these
results are in line with the hypothesis that offshoring is biased in favour of higher skilled
labour. Since the coefficient size increases in the skill level one may, at first sight, con-
clude that the skill bias applies for all parts of the skill distribution. We evaluate this
aspect further below.
In specification (2) of table 3.4 wage bill shares are additionally regressed on wages. As
discussed in section 3.3.1 we thereby aim to identify the effects of offshoring on the em-
ployment shares of single skill groups. In the following we highlight the main qualitative
differences and similarities between the results from specifications (1) and (2). First, we
observe that most of the wage regressors are highly significant. This is not surprising,
given that the wage bill shares are by definition a function of wages. Second, we observe
patterns of polarisation in labour demand as a consequence of technological change, sim-
ilar to before. Third, the coefficient of offshoring is still negative for low skilled labour
and positive for medium and high skilled labour. However, the coefficients are now much
smaller and not statistically significant.
This is a remarkable fact which suggests that the skill bias induced by offshoring operates
predominantly through changes in relative wages and less so through changes in relative
employment. This is a novel finding which runs counter to the classical argument that,
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Tab. 3.4: Baseline estimations (SUREG fixed effects model)
(1) (2)
High Medium Low High Medium Low
Y -0.0289*** 0.0005 0.0284*** -0.0209*** 0.0026 0.0183***
(0.0085) (0.0035) (0.0079) (0.0067) (0.0047) (0.0062)
KInt -0.0127 -0.0009 0.0137 -0.0043 0.0049 -0.0006
(0.0129) (0.0072) (0.0147) (0.0102) (0.0075) (0.0126)
ICT 0.0622 -0.1227*** 0.0605 0.0236 -0.1173*** 0.0937***
(0.0471) (0.0410) (0.0499) (0.0424) (0.0388) (0.0325)
R&D -0.5483 -0.4263** 0.9746* 0.6109 -0.8828*** 0.2719
(0.4246) (0.2070) (0.5143) (0.3592) (0.3151) (0.3612)
OS 0.1360 0.0582** -0.1942* 0.0543 0.0335 -0.0878
(0.0842) (0.0270) (0.1031) (0.0487) (0.0296) (0.0606)
DO 0.0136 0.0126 -0.0262 0.0047 0.0209 -0.0256
(0.0554) (0.0218) (0.0607) (0.0428) (0.0220) (0.0479)
WH 0.1363*** -0.0630*** -0.0733***
(0.0233) (0.0210) (0.0148)
WM -0.0930** 0.1265*** -0.0335
(0.0376) (0.0311) (0.0277)
WL -0.0477** -0.0615*** 0.1092***
(0.0222) (0.0154) (0.0229)
Observations 364 364 364 364 364 364
R-squared 0.8404 0.8813 0.4215 0.9032 0.9028 0.6843
SUREG fixed effects model. Dependent variable: wage bill shares of high, medium, and low skilled
labour. Independent variables: log output (Y), log capital intensity (KInt), share of ICT investment in
total investment (ICT), share of R&D expenditures in total expenditures (R&D), offshoring (OS), domestic
outsourcing (DO), and log wages by skill group (WH, WM, WL). Year dummies are included but coefficients
not shown. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. *** (**; *) denote significance at the one
(five; ten) per cent level.
in Germany, wage rigidities imposed by labour unions prevent relative wages to adjust
and thus cause unemployment among low skilled labour. Also, this finding suggests that
previous studies may have underestimated the skill bias induced by offshoring. Many of
the existing studies estimate either versions of specification (2) or employment share re-
gressions, thus effectively only capturing the employment channel. In light of our results
this seems to be too restrictive. Particularly in the Anglo-Saxon countries, where wages
are allegedly more flexible than in Germany, such a narrow focus on employment effects
seems hard to defend.
In table 3.5 we report results from t-tests on differences in parameters across skill groups
based on the estimations from specification (1). The t-tests support the view that ICT
investment is associated with a polarisation of labour demand. The difference in the co-
efficients of high and medium skilled labour is positive (coefficient=0.18, p=1%), the
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difference in the coefficients of medium and low skilled labour is negative (coefficient=-
0.18, p=5%), and the difference in the coefficient of high and low skilled labour is sta-
tistically insignificant. In terms of R&D expenditures we observe a statistically signif-
icant bias against medium skilled and in favour of low skilled labour. Jointly with the
ICT coefficients this reinforces our interpretation that technological change is associated
with polarisation in labour demand. In terms of offshoring we observe statistically sig-
nificant differences between high and low skilled labour (coefficient=0.33, p=10%) and
between medium and low skilled labour (coefficient=0.25, p=5%), but not between high
and medium skilled labour (coefficient=0.07, insignificant). Hence, while offshoring is
biased against low skilled labour we find no clear evidence of a bias against medium
skilled labour, contrary to our first impression.
Tab. 3.5: T-tests of differences in coefficients across equations
High - Low High - Medium Medium - Low
ICT 0.0017 0.1849*** -0.1832**
(0.9841) (0.0093) (0.0163)
R&D -1.5229* -0.1220 -1.4009**
(0.0896) (0.7693) (0.0292)
OS 0.3302* 0.0778 0.2524**
(0.0689) (0.2587) (0.0383)
DO -0.0398 0.0010 0.0388
(0.7206) (0.9852) (0.5830)
T-tests of differences in coefficients across the three equations in table 3.4, specification (1). For instance,
the upper left field shows that the ICT coefficient in the equation for high skilled labour is by 0.0017 larger
than the same coefficient in the equation for low skilled labour. The corresponding p-value (in parenthesis)
is 0.9841. Hence, we can reject the hypothesis that the two coefficients are different from each other at
conventional levels of statistical significance.
In table 3.6 we show that our previous findings are qualitatively robust to the use of instru-
mental variable (IV) estimations. We use two stage least squares estimations and instru-
ment for offshoring in the first stage using as instruments the current and past offshoring
intensities for Austria and France. To establish whether instruments are reliable we con-
duct tests for underidentification and weak identification.26 Underidentification is in all
specifications rejected at the 10% level based on the Kleinbergen-Paap LM test. Weak
identification is rejected based on the Kleinbergen-Paap Wald test. To establish whether
instruments are valid we test whether overidentified instruments are uncorrelated with the
26 Based on these tests we chose the current value and the first lag of offshoring in Austria as instruments
for specification (3) and the current and first lag of offshoring in Austria and France as instruments in
specification (4). The results also hold qualitatively if we use lagged German offshoring and domestic
outsourcing as instruments for current German offshoring and domestic outsourcing. We prefer our main
instruments, however, since uncorrelatedness with the error term is more likely to be satisfied.
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Tab. 3.6: Instrumental variables estimations
(3) (4)
High Medium Low High Medium Low
Y -0.0229*** -0.0038 0.0266*** -0.0136** -0.0016 0.0152**
(0.0073) (0.0028) (0.0072) (0.0056) (0.0044) (0.0061)
KInt 0.0014 -0.0096 0.0082 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0005
(0.0161) (0.0087) (0.0153) (0.0116) (0.0087) (0.0128)
ICT 0.0782* -0.1140*** 0.0358 0.0283 -0.1101*** 0.0818***
(0.0440) (0.0387) (0.0421) (0.0381) (0.0358) (0.0266)
R&D -0.4971 -0.5134** 1.0104* 0.7726** -0.9429*** 0.1703
(0.5154) (0.2345) (0.5617) (0.3875) (0.3317) (0.3537)
OS 0.2367** -0.0212 -0.2155** 0.0581 -0.0061 -0.0520
(0.1184) (0.0568) (0.1063) (0.0704) (0.0434) (0.0629)
DO 0.0475 -0.0121 -0.0354 0.0061 0.0062 -0.0123
(0.0553) (0.0264) (0.0564) (0.0407) (0.0246) (0.0430)
WH 0.1367*** -0.0647*** -0.0720***
(0.0222) (0.0200) (0.0124)
WM -0.0951*** 0.1285*** -0.0334
(0.0346) (0.0300) (0.0247)
WL -0.0464** -0.0612*** 0.1076***
(0.0188) (0.0142) (0.0203)
KP LM pval 0.0505 0.0505 0.0505 0.0531 0.0531 0.0531
KP Wald Fstat 10.71 10.71 10.71 21.26 21.26 21.26
Hansen J pval 0.708 0.387 0.702 0.266 0.294 0.975
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336
R-squared 0.8325 0.8739 0.4213 0.9086 0.8974 0.7038
Instrumental variable fixed effects model. Instruments are the current and past offshoring intensities for
Austria (specification 3) and for Austria and France (specification 4). Dependent variable: wage bill shares
of high, medium, and low skilled labour. Independent variables: log output (Y), log capital intensity (KInt),
share of ICT investment in total investment (ICT), share of R&D expenditures in total expenditures (R&D),
offshoring (OS), domestic outsourcing (DO), and log wages by skill group (WH, WM, WL). Year dummies
are included but coefficients not shown. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. *** (**; *)
denote significance at the one (five; ten) per cent level.
error term using a Hansen J test. We cannot reject the hypothesis of valid instruments at
the 10% level.
Notably, the IV estimations confirm that offshoring is skill-biased. Offshoring decreases
the wage bill shares of low skilled labour and increases the wage bill shares of high skilled
labour. The coefficient size and the statistical significance are even larger than before. An
increase in offshoring by 1 percentage point is associated with a 0.24% increase in the
wage bill share of high skilled labour and a a 0.22% decrease in the wage bill share of low
skilled labour. Hence, according to simple back-of-the-envelope calculations, offshoring
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accounts for 29% (or +1.4ppt) of the observed increase in the wage bill share of high
skilled labour between 1995 and 2007 and for 135% (or -1.3ppt) of the observed decrease
in the wage bill share of low skilled labour.27 Yet, the coefficient of offshoring is small
and statistically insignificant for medium skilled labour. By contrast, ICT investment and
R&D expenditures can jointly explain 20% (or -0.8ppt) of the observed decline in the
wage bill share of medium skilled labour, thus adding to the evidence that technological
change causes a polarisation of labour demand.
3.4.2 Effects by offshoring destination, input type, and sector
In table 3.7 we analyse whether the previously identified effects depend on the desti-
nations of offshoring or the type of offshored inputs, using SUREG estimations.28 In
specification (5) we distinguish between offshoring to OECD countries, Cental and East-
ern European countries (CEEC), China, and the “rest of the world” (RoW) consisting
predominantly of low-wage countries. The coefficients for CEEC and ROW are highly
statistically significant and show clear patterns of skill biases. For the OECD and, sur-
prisingly, China coefficients are not statistically significant. The coefficients for CEEC
are particularly large, which suggests that the economic integration of CEEC into the Eu-
ropean Union since the 1990s has entailed major distributional effects in Germany. An
increase in offshoring to CEEC by 1 percentage point is associated with a 1.04% increase
in the wage bill share of high skilled labour, a 0.39% increase for medium skilled labour,
and a 1.44% decrease for low skilled labour.
In specification (6) we distinguish between two different types of inputs. Offshoring of
material inputs (material offshoring) shows a pattern of skill bias which is qualitatively
similar to the estimate for the broad offshoring measure and quantitatively larger. Off-
shoring of service inputs (service offshoring), by contrast, is not statistically significant.
We note, however, that the size of the coefficients is reversed. This finding is in line with
the hypothesis that high skilled labour is not shielded from offshoring when it comes to
service activities such as accounting or IT services.
27 The first number (+1.4) is obtained by multiplying the estimated coefficient (0.2367) by the observed
average change in offshoring (+0.0598) and then dividing by the observed average change in the wage bill
share of high skilled labour (+0.0487).
28 We also estimated IV versions of these models. Using the first and second lag of offshoring and do-
mestic outsourcing as instruments, results are similar to the reported SUREG estimates. Note however that
our preferred instruments (offshoring in Austria and France) are not sufficiently correlated with offshoring
in Germany in these specifications.
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Tab. 3.7: Offshoring by destinations and types of inputs (SUREG fixed effects model)
(5) (6)
High Medium Low High Medium Low
Y -0.0218** 0.0031 0.0187** -0.0234** 0.0034 0.0201**
(0.0098) (0.0039) (0.0090) (0.0093) (0.0039) (0.0089)
KInt -0.0092 -0.0003 0.0095 -0.0232** -0.0051 0.0282**
(0.0131) (0.0068) (0.0139) (0.0111) (0.0050) (0.0112)
ICT 0.0501 -0.1291*** 0.0790* 0.0546 -0.1257*** 0.0711
(0.0408) (0.0425) (0.0444) (0.0532) (0.0387) (0.0507)
R&D 0.4139 -0.0890 -0.3249 -0.0737 -0.1977 0.2714
(0.4985) (0.2253) (0.5542) (0.4213) (0.1905) (0.4716)
OS to OECD 0.1173 0.0150 -0.1323
(0.1122) (0.0504) (0.1217)
. . . to CEEC 1.0490*** 0.3919** -1.4408***
(0.3111) (0.1557) (0.3557)
. . . to China 0.2007 -0.0117 -0.1890
(0.2225) (0.0899) (0.2297)
. . . to RoW 0.1305 0.0865*** -0.2170*
(0.1052) (0.0262) (0.1102)
. . . of materials 0.2005* 0.0982** -0.2987**
(0.1144) (0.0373) (0.1321)
. . . of services -0.2060 -0.1082 0.3142
(0.2189) (0.1144) (0.2841)
DO 0.0090 0.0133 -0.0223 -0.0113 0.0033 0.0080
(0.0525) (0.0211) (0.0513) (0.0456) (0.0205) (0.0507)
Observations 364 364 364 364 364 364
R-squared 0.8567 0.8843 0.5602 0.8448 0.8834 0.4740
SUREG fixed effects model. Dependent variable: wage bill shares of high, medium, and low skilled
labour. Independent variables: log output (Y), log capital intensity (KInt), share of ICT investment in total
investment (ICT), share of R&D expenditures in total expenditures (R&D), domestic outsourcing (DO),
and offshoring (OS) by destination or type of input. Year dummies are included but coefficients not shown.
Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. *** (**; *) denote significance at the one (five; ten) per
cent level.
We further explore the differences between materials and services in table 3.8. Here we
allow for heterogeneous effects of offshoring and technological change in the manufac-
turing sector vis-à-vis the service sector by multiplying each shift variable with a service
sector dummy. Note that, different from the previous estimations, this is not a distinc-
tion by type of offshored input but rather a distinction of offshoring effects by economic
sectors.
Notably, we find that offshoring and ICT investment exert heterogeneous effects in the two
sectors, where the effects for low skilled workers are always more benign in the service
sector. First, we focus on offshoring. We observe a pattern consistent with skill bias
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Tab. 3.8: Manufacturing and service sector (SUREG fixed effects model)
(7)
VARIABLES High Medium Low
Y -0.0242*** 0.0060 0.0181***
(0.0068) (0.0040) (0.0063)
KInt -0.0138 0.0009 0.0129
(0.0103) (0.0071) (0.0125)
ICT 0.0374 0.1419 -0.1793
(0.1339) (0.0976) (0.1249)
R&D -0.4165 -0.2481 0.6645*
(0.3035) (0.1788) (0.3522)
OS 0.1061** 0.0651* -0.1712***
(0.0470) (0.0362) (0.0560)
DO 0.2020** 0.0920** -0.2940**
(0.0851) (0.0437) (0.1122)
SER * ICT 0.0511 -0.2712*** 0.2200*
(0.1349) (0.0818) (0.1282)
SER * R&D 2.8596* -1.3637 -1.4959
(1.4021) (0.8148) (1.2526)
SER * OS -0.4506*** -0.1196** 0.5702***
(0.0895) (0.0556) (0.1036)
SER * DO -0.0510 -0.0461 0.0970
(0.0794) (0.0505) (0.0759)
T-tests for the service sector
Null hypotheses: p-values
ICT + SER * ICT = 0 0.0694* 0.0078*** 0.3200
R&D + R&D * ICT = 0 0.0849* 0.0584* 0.4940
OS + SER * OS = 0 0.0546* 0.6530 0.0589*
DO + SER * DO = 0 0.4000 0.5150 0.2610
Observations 364 364 364
R-squared 0.8697 0.8904 0.6276
SUREG fixed effects model. Dependent variable: wage bill shares of high, medium, and low skilled
labour. Independent variables: log output (Y), log capital intensity (KInt), share of ICT investment in total
investment (ICT), share of R&D expenditures in total expenditures (R&D), domestic outsourcing (DO),
and offshoring (OS). Shift variables are interacted with service sector dummy (SER). Year dummies are
included but coefficients not shown. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. *** (**; *) denote
significance at the one (five; ten) per cent level.
in the manufacturing sector and the converse bias in the service sector. The total effect
for the service sector (i.e. main effect + interaction effect) is positive for low skilled
labour and negative for high and medium skilled labour. The t-tests at the bottom of the
table show that the coefficients are statistically significant for high and low skiled labour
(p=10%). Second, we focus on ICT investment. We observe an imprecisely estimated bias
against low skilled labour in the manufacturing sector and a pattern broadly consistent
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with polarisation in the service sector. In the service sector, ICT investment is negatively
linked with the wage bill share for medium skilled labour (p=1%) and positively for high
skilled labour (p=5%).
What is driving these sector differences? To answer this question we should first of all
recall the results from specification (6) in table 3.7 which revealed a clear skill bias in
material offshoring and the converse (though insignificant) bias in service offshoring.
This aspect complements our findings on sector differences, suggesting that differences
in the type of offshored inputs or activities matter. As highlighted in Blinder (2006, 2009)
many skilled service sector jobs are easily “offshorable” due to the nature of the tasks that
characterise these jobs. Blinder argues that offshorability in the service sector depends
crucially on the requirement of physical presence (e.g. janitorial services) or face-to-
face contact (e.g. taxi driving) and not primarily on skills. Moreover, Blinder and other
authors have highlighted the close link between innovations in ICT and offshoring. ICT
innovations dramatically expand the scope of offshorable activities. At the same time,
ICT innovations often allow for an automation of tasks that were previously performed by,
mostly, medium skilled labour. Several studies have therefore argued that technological
change related to ICT may contribute to a polarisation in labour demand (Spitz-Oener,
2006; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Autor and Dorn, 2013). Our findings are consistent
with these arguments.
3.4.3 Robustness checks
First, we check the robustness of one of our main results from section 3.4.1, where we
found that offshoring affects the wage bill shares of high, medium, and low skilled labour
mainly through changes in relative wages and less so through changes in relative em-
ployment. Recall that this finding runs counter to the widespread perception that German
wage structures were rigid and largely exogenous to changes in offshoring.
To reassess this issue we estimate “employment share equations” using the shares of high,
medium, and low skilled labour in total hours worked as dependent variables. In the liter-
ature similar models have been estimated either with excluded wage regressors (Strauss-
Kahn, 2004; Helg and Tajoli, 2005; Lorentowicz et al., 2008), included wage regressors
(Anderton and Brenton, 1999; Egger and Egger, 2003; Hijzen et al., 2005), or with both
types of specifications (Machin and van Reenen, 1998; Ekholm and Hakkala, 2006). We
note that the model with excluded wage regressors is not fully suitable to differentiate
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Tab. 3.9: Employment share regressions (IV fixed effects model)
(8) (9)
High Medium Low High Medium Low
Y -0.0101* -0.0160*** 0.0262*** -0.0090* -0.0129*** 0.0219***
(0.0053) (0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0052) (0.0049) (0.0068)
KInt -0.0039 -0.0003 0.0042 0.0013 -0.0085 0.0072
(0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0141) (0.0116) (0.0077) (0.0129)
ICT -0.0048 -0.0776** 0.0824* 0.0082 -0.1137*** 0.1055***
(0.0379) (0.0395) (0.0439) (0.0364) (0.0315) (0.0386)
R&D 1.1820*** -2.0259*** 0.8440* 0.8133** -1.1410*** 0.3277
(0.3161) (0.5203) (0.5106) (0.3740) (0.3548) (0.4110)
OS -0.0052 0.1449* -0.1397 0.0419 -0.0081 -0.0338
(0.0779) (0.0857) (0.0861) (0.0676) (0.0381) (0.0611)
DO -0.0152 0.0411 -0.0259 0.0052 -0.0044 -0.0008
(0.0350) (0.0365) (0.0454) (0.0390) (0.0208) (0.0395)
WH -0.0389** 0.0899*** -0.0510***
(0.0193) (0.0200) (0.0149)
WM 0.0417 -0.0682** 0.0264
(0.0280) (0.0308) (0.0262)
WL -0.0073 -0.0200 0.0273
(0.0161) (0.0133) (0.0204)
KP LM pval 0.0505 0.0505 0.0505 0.0531 0.0531 0.0531
KP Wald Fstat 10.71 10.71 10.71 21.26 21.26 21.26
Hansen J pval 0.218 0.405 0.958 0.284 0.109 0.942
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336
R-squared 0.8322 0.7482 0.4498 0.8460 0.8217 0.5162
Instrumental variable fixed effects model. Instruments are the current and past offshoring intensities for
Austria (specification 3) and for Austria and France (specification 4). Dependent variable: employment
shares of high, medium, and low skilled labour, measured in terms of hours worked. Independent variables:
log output (Y), log capital intensity (KInt), share of ICT investment in total investment (ICT), share of R&D
expenditures in total expenditures (R&D), offshoring (OS), domestic outsourcing (DO), and log wages by
skill group (WH, WM, WL). Year dummies are included but coefficients not shown. Standard errors are
clustered at the industry level. *** (**; *) denote significance at the one (five; ten) per cent level.
between wage and employment effects, because if offshoring actually affects wages then
this model suffers from omitted variable bias. Still, we estimate both types of specifi-
cations, to make our results comparable with other studies. The results of our IV fixed
effects estimations are display in table 3.9.29
In specification (8) of table 3.9 we observe that offshoring has no statistically significant
effects on the employment shares of high skilled and low skilled labour, contrary to the
29 Note that the first stage regressions of the employment share model are identical to the first stage
regressions of the wage bill share model, reported in table 3.6. Hence, the tests for underidentification and
weak identification are also identical.
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Tab. 3.10: Constrained SUREG model
(10)
High Medium Low
Y -0.0217*** 0.0029 0.0188***
(0.0064) (0.0039) (0.0064)
KInt -0.0044 0.005 -0.0006
(0.0106) (0.0071) (0.0124)
ICT 0.0210 -0.1147*** 0.0937***
(0.0394) (0.037) (0.0312)
R&D 0.5716** -0.9135*** 0.3419
(0.2837) (0.2861) (0.3146)
OS 0.0423 0.0408 -0.0831
(0.0452) (0.0272) (0.0582)
DO 0.0007 0.0235 -0.0242
(0.0418) (0.0213) (0.0458)
WH 0.1264*** -0.0643*** -0.0621***
(0.0179) (0.0200) (0.0125)
WM -0.0643*** 0.1198*** -0.0555***
(0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0143)
WL -0.0621*** -0.0555*** 0.1176***
(0.0125) (0.0143) (0.0181)
Constant 0.5565*** 0.5820*** -0.1385
(0.0891) (0.0735) (0.0861)
εss -0.2752 -0.1931 0.074
Obs 364 364 364
Constrained SUREG fixed effects model. Imposes symmetry and homogeneity of degree 1 in wages.
Invariance to dropping of one equation is achieved through maximum likelihood estimation. Wage De-
pendent variable: wage bill shares of high, medium, and low skilled labour, measured in terms of hours
worked. Independent variables: log output (Y), log capital intensity (KInt), share of ICT investment in total
investment (ICT), share of R&D expenditures in total expenditures (R&D), offshoring (OS), domestic out-
sourcing (DO), and log wages by skill group (WH, WM, WL). Year dummies are included but coefficients
not shown. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. *** (**; *) denote significance at the one
(five; ten) per cent level. εss is the own-wage elasticity of the demand for skill group s.
evidence from the wage bill share estimations (see table 3.6). Offshoring is positive and
weakly statistically significant for medium skilled labour. Adding wage controls in spec-
ification (9) we observe that the sign of the offshoring coefficients is in line with skill
bias, but all coefficients are small compared to the corresponding coefficients of the wage
bill share regressions, and statistically insignificant. This supports our previous finding
that offshoring affects the relative labour market outcomes of high, medium, and low
skill labour predominantly through the wage channel and less so through the employment
channel.
Second, economic theory implies certain restrictions on the wage parameters in order
for the cost function to be well behaved (see Berndt, 1991, pp. 469ff). In particular,
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symmetry implies: γst = γts ∀s, t ∈ S = [H,M,L]. Moreover, homogeneity of degree 1 in
wages implies: ∑s∈Sβs = 1 and ∑s γst =∑s γts =∑s γsY = 0. As a robustness check we test
for several of these restrictions using the baseline estimations in specification (2) of table
3.4. It turns out that the adding up conditions ∑s γst = 0 hold in all equations, whereas
symmetry only holds in two of three equations. We must reject the null hypothesis γML =
γLM at the 10% level.
Too rule out that this affects our results, we re-estimate this model with imposed param-
eter restrictions. As pointed out in section 3.3.2 we estimate the SUREG model using
maximum likelihood to ensure that our results are invariant to the choice of the equation
to be dropped. The constrained estimations, displayed in table 3.10, qualitatively confirm
our main results. The only notable change is that the coefficient of R&D in the equation
for high skilled labour turns from insignificant to significant at the 5% level. We also cal-
culate the own-price elasticities of factor demand at the mean of wage bill shares, which
are given for the translog cost function by εss = γssWSHs +WSHs−1 (Berndt, 1991, p. 475).
The own-price elasticities for high and medium skilled labour are negative, as expected.
The own-price elasticities for low skilled labour is positive, violating economic theory.
Thus, we note that the estimations with included wage regressors have to be interpreted
with some caution.
3.5 Conclusion
The paper analyses the effects of offshoring on labour market inequalities between skill
groups. Different from previous studies we address the question whether offshoring af-
fects the labour market outcomes through changes in relative wages or through changes
in relative employment. Also, we analyse whether offshoring can explain the diverging
trends in the manufacturing and the service sector. Our analysis is based on data for 28
industries and three skill groups in Germany between 1995 and 2007. We derive our em-
pirical model from an industry short-run cost function with three types of labour inputs
(high, medium, and low skilled workers) which is augmented by offshoring, domestic
outsourcing, and technological change. We estimate the resulting system of three wage
bill share equations using seemingly unrelated regression and instrumental variable re-
gressions.
Our main results are the following: We find that offshoring is on average over all in-
dustries biased in favour of high skilled labour and in disfavour of low skilled labour.
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Offshoring can explain about 30% of the observed increase in the share of high skilled
workers in the total wage bill and 135% of the observed decline in the share of low skilled
workers, based on our instrumental variable estimates. These effects are mostly driven by
offshoring to Central and Eastern European countries and by material offshoring.
Contrary to widely held believes we find that offshoring affects the labour market out-
comes of the three skill groups mostly through changes in relative wages. This result
runs counter to the argument that German labour market institutions (such as collective
bargaining and unemployment benefits) prevent relative wages to adjust and thus cause
unemployment among low skilled labour. Also, this finding suggests that previous studies
may have underestimated the skill bias induced by offshoring.
While we find that offshoring is skill-biased in the manufacturing sector, we find the
opposite direction of bias in the service sector. This finding is in line with the hypothesis
that low skilled service workers are shielded from offshoring since their tasks are often
physically bound to a domestic location (Blinder, 2006, 2009), but it is not in line with
the hypothesis that offshoring causes polarisation in labour demand. However, unlike
offshoring, technological change is associated with a polarisation in labour demand.
From our results we derive the following policy conclusions: First, to reduce the oppo-
sition to globalisation among parts of the society, policy makers should try to better ex-
plain the trade-off between welfare gains and distributional consequences of offshoring,
and they should consider stronger redistributive policies which can be financed through
achieved welfare gains. Second, our results for the service sector suggest that the con-
sequences of offshoring are not only a matter of skills but also a matter of jobs or tasks.
That calls for more research to identify how globalisation will in the long term affect the
global division of labour and the nature of work in Germany. Policy makers should foster
this process and adjust the education policies in order to best prepare the citizens for this
future.
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Part II
NGOS
4. US BASED NGOS IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT:
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF SURVIVAL
4.1 Introduction
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a major role in international development
activities, particularly for foreign aid from the United States (McCleary and Barro, 2008).
NGOs are widely regarded as the preferred channel of aid delivery, at least partly sub-
stituting for the state (e.g., Hulme and Michael, 1997; McCoskey, 2009). Nevertheless,
NGOs cannot take it for granted that they survive in the foreign aid “market”. Claims
that NGO aid is superior to official aid “are often inaccurate” (Edwards and Hulme, 1996,
p. 693). The reputation of NGOs has suffered from scandals and declining public trust
(Ebrahim, 2003; Gugerty, 2009; Prakash and Gugerty, 2010a). Their legitimacy and ac-
countability is questioned, not least because of the considerable funding of NGOs by
official donors (Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Prakash and Gugerty, 2010b). As stressed by
Moulton and Eckerd (2012, p. 664), NGOs are dependent on their external environment,
notably the resource environment, for legitimacy and survival.
In public opinion polls, about half of American respondents state that they focus on how
much NGOs spend on administration and fundraising when deciding on donations (Non-
profit Overhead Cost Project, 2004b). By contrast, NGO managers and staff appear to
be confident that reputation, mission and impact on the ground are much more important
than financial ratings (Szper and Prakash, 2011). This invites the question of whether
NGO survival depends mainly on efficiency in financial terms or effectiveness in terms
of impact. Resource dependency can be expected to have a major say in this context.
External resources, including public funding, are likely to shape the behavior and strat-
egy of NGOs (Moulton and Eckerd, 2012), while the adoption of particular performance
evaluations may differ depending on the perceptions of major external financiers (Eckerd
and Moulton, 2011).
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As noted by Brakman Reiser (2010, p. 48), effectiveness or accountability related to the
NGOs’ mission is “very difficult to measure or track”. Hence, our empirical estimations
are restricted to financial and economic factors that can be quantified for a large sample
of NGOs.1 We focus on the impact of administrative overheads, public funding and the
interaction between these two factors on the survival probability of NGOs. We control for
more standard determinants such as the size and experience of NGOs. When developing
our hypotheses (section 4.2) and interpreting our empirical results (section 4.4), we also
take into account that the survival probability of NGOs is likely to depend on a broader set
of factors which are difficult to quantify. Public perceptions, commonly accepted norms
in the development community and self-regulation among NGOs may weaken, or even
reverse the impact of narrowly defined financial and economic factors.
It is thus open to question whether less efficient NGOs are more likely to exit the foreign
aid market than their more efficient peers.2 The efficiency price of aid – i.e., the rela-
tive importance of expenses that are not directly associated with charitable activity and
overseas aid projects – varies widely among NGOs. For instance, the share of expenses
for administration and management ranges from zero to about half of the overall budget
within the sample of US based NGOs used by Nunnenkamp and Öhler (2012a).
Assessing the role of efficiency for NGO survival is relevant for the NGOs themselves,
the aid receiving countries, and the private and official financiers of NGOs – even though
more efficient NGOs are not necessarily superior in terms of impact and other aspects of
accountability may overrule financial criteria. The exit threat is clearly relevant for the
NGO themselves as it might reduce or even prevent so-called perquisite consumption. Un-
less NGO staff is purely altruistic, it may be tempted to divert part of the funds away from
overseas aid projects to headquarter facilities, travel and similar perks. The exit threat
could strengthen the so-called non-distribution constraint according to which NGOs are
not allowed to generate profits and disburse them to owners, managers and staff (Hans-
mann, 1980).3 The aid recipients are interested in higher and sustained project-related
spending on the ground. The predictable amount of project financing could be higher if
1 Using the terminology referred to by Ebrahim (2003, p. 815), we focus on important aspects of NGOs’
functional accountability (notably, accounting for the use of resources), rather than strategic accountability
(with regard to the impact NGOs have on other organizations and the wider environment).
2 Note that we use the term ‘efficiency’ throughout the paper in the narrow economic sense of the effi-
ciency price of NGO aid, which is commonly defined as “reciprocal of the share of service expenditures
(total expenditures less fund-raising and administrative expenses) in total expenditures” (Ribar and Wil-
helm, 2002, p. 400). See also Khanna and Sandler (2000) who use the term “price of giving.”
3 See section 4.2.1 below for a detailed discussion of the non-distribution constraint.
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more efficient NGOs survived, while less efficient NGOs left the market.4
For private donors who dislike NGOs spending heavily on administration and fundraising
it would be reassuring to know that relatively inefficient NGOs were squeezed out of the
market even if individual donors do not engage in systematic screening of various NGOs.5
Compared to private donors, official aid agencies should find it easier to screen the NGOs
and allocate funding accordingly. Hence, we hypothesize that efficiency becomes more
important for the survival of NGOs once they accept public funding and scrutiny. It cannot
be ruled out, however, that public funding weakens the link between NGO efficiency
and market exit by relaxing budget constraints if NGOs anticipate that waste will not be
effectively sanctioned by state authorities due to bureaucratic slack.
Data on the expenditure and revenue patterns of NGOs engaged in international develop-
ment cooperation are notoriously scarce. This applies all the more so when sufficiently
long time series are required to assess the sustainability of NGO operations. The database
on US NGOs compiled by Rachel McCleary provides a major exception, however. This
database covers almost 900 NGOs for the 1984-2005 period under consideration here.
Moreover, we updated this database for more recent years in order to test for the ro-
bustness of our baseline estimations (see section 4.4.2 for details). We employ these
data in probit estimations to assess whether NGOs with a higher efficiency price of aid
are more likely to discontinue international development cooperation than more efficient
peers. Furthermore, by interacting the efficiency price of aid with funding from official
sources we address the question of whether the survival probability of inefficient NGOs
depends on public funding. We control for several aspects of NGO heterogeneity, in-
cluding the size and age as well as the main activity and religious affiliation of NGOs.
In addition to NGO-specific characteristics, we consider “market” characteristics such as
the density and concentration of NGO operations.
Section 4.2 portrays the analytical background and specifies the hypotheses. In section
4.3, we describe the data and introduce our estimation strategy. Empirical results are
presented in section 4.4. We conclude in section 4.5.
4 Arguably, aid recipients may prefer the survival of both efficient and inefficient NGOs. Overall re-
sources for development may decline if surviving NGOs do not attract the private donations and public
funding previously absorbed by exiting NGOs. While we do not capture the redirection of funding to sur-
viving NGOs in the present paper, we show in section 4.3 that exit probabilities reach 8-11 per cent in some
subgroups of NGOs.
5 Nunnenkamp and Öhler (2012b) find that donors hardly make use of publicly available information
on NGO characteristics, notably the ‘price of giving’ and the degree of specialization, when deciding on
donations.
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4.2 Analytical background and hypotheses
4.2.1 Different mechanisms of NGO accountability
NGO accountability can be defined as the means by which NGOs “report to a recognized
authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for their actions” (Edwards and Hulme,
1996, p.967). According to Ebrahim (2005, p.59), the concept should be broadened to
include both being held responsible by external principals (the external dimension of ac-
countability) and taking responsibility for oneself (the internal dimension of accountabil-
ity).6 Fowler (1995) argues that growing external and internal pressures reveal serious
inadequacies in past attempts to assess NGO performance and accountability. In con-
trast to governments and businesses which can be assessed in terms of political support
and financial returns, there is no universally accepted “bottom line” for assessing NGOs
(Fowler, 1995) .
Our subsequent empirical analysis clearly falls short of capturing broad concepts of NGO
accountability. Public funding represents an important element of the external resource
environment that shapes the NGOs’ behavior (Moulton and Eckerd, 2012) and creates
pressure for conformity in terms of accountability and evaluation practices (Eckerd and
Moulton, 2011). But our empirical analysis misses various other elements of the exter-
nal environment: “Viewing the environment as solely consisting of funders is limiting.
Neo-institutional theory suggests that there are strong mimetic pressures on organiza-
tions to follow similar processes to other organizations in their environment” (Eckerd and
Moulton, 2011, p. 104). Furthermore, given the diversity of NGOs, Eckerd and Moulton
(2011) question the usefulness of “across the board” evaluation tools. They show that in-
stitutional perceptions prevailing in the external environment, including among financiers,
tend to predict the adoption of particular performance evaluations, while heterogeneous
roles of NGOs tend to predict the actual uses of evaluations.7 Keeping these limitations
in mind, various arguments advanced in the relevant literature may prove useful in devel-
oping and qualifying our central hypotheses and may also help interpret our estimation
6 In a similar vein, Edwards and Hulme (1996) distinguish between upward accountability to trustees,
donors and host governments and downward accountability to partners, beneficiaries, staff and supporters.
See also Jordan (2005), Jordan and van Tuijl (2007), and Ebrahim (2010) on the question of “acountability
to whom.”
7 We tentatively account for heterogeneity within our sample of internationally active NGOs by including
NGO-type-specific fixed effects in our estimations (see section 4.3.4 for details). However, this clearly falls
short of distinguishing between major role models as suggested by Eckerd and Moulton (2011) and Moulton
and Eckerd (2012)
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results.
Jordan and van Tuijl (2007) portray major shifts in the perception of NGO accountability
over time. The earlier literature often referred to the so-called non-distribution constraint
as the central common trait of NGOs that might help contain information asymmetries
and related concerns about NGO accountability.8 Hansmann (1980) introduced the non-
distribution constraint as an institutional feature that could create public trust in NGOs.
By prohibiting NGOs to distribute any profits to owners, managers and staff exercis-
ing control over the organization, the donors and “consumers” of NGO output would be
assured about the NGOs’ good intensions and protected against opportunistic behavior,
e.g., in terms of exploiting information asymmetries and lowering the quality of out-
put. However, subsequent research has increasingly questioned the effectiveness of the
non-distribution constraint in preventing opportunistic NGO behavior and creating public
trust. For instance, this institutional feature alone does not rule out opportunistic behavior
as NGO insiders may benefit from “perquisites” such as lower effort, higher pay, better
offices, or generous travel allowances (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001).9 Gugerty (2009, p.
246) concludes that the disciplining power of the non-distribution constraint is “poten-
tially weak.”
Compared to the specific concept of the non-distribution constraint, the literature on the
“new institutionalism” has suggested a broader set of both formal and informal mecha-
nisms that may constrain NGO behavior and improve accountability.10 DiMaggio (1998)
distinguishes between different strands of this literature, stressing (i) rational behavior
and formal rules of the game (notably laws), (ii) state intervention and mediation, or (iii)
informal, socially constructed and normative factors. Most interestingly in the present
context, proponents of strand (iii) emphasize that pressures to appear legitimate, accepted
normative schemes as well as commonly applied standards in a profession could result in
organizational behavior that is “less efficient than rejected alternatives” (DiMaggio, 1998,
p. 697). In a similar vein, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that normatively sanctioned
strategies tend to be adopted even if they may not be rational when adopted by large num-
bers of organizations.11 More recently, Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire (2011) observes
8 Agency and monitoring problems are rooted in the nature of NGOs’ output the quality of which is
difficult to verify for principals and beneficiaries (Prakash and Gugerty, 2010a).
9 For an overview on arguments against the binding character of non-distribution constraints, see Prakash
and Gugerty (2010b, pp. 283-286). See also Prakash and Gugerty (2010a).
10 For an earlier overview of the new institutionalism in organizational analysis, see the contributions in
Powell and DiMaggio (1991).
11 See also Strang and Meyer (1993, p. 491) who argue that organizational behavior diffuses via per-
ceptions built into the actors involved: “The individual or organization’s cognitive map identifies reference
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that NGOs may be increasingly constrained by social norms to which they must abide
in order to be seen as legitimate, even though this behavior is not necessarily the most
efficient one. According to Bloodgood and Clough (2010), conforming to social norms
may be as important as organizational efficiency to guarantee NGO survival.12
However, social expectations and normative pressure per se may involve only weak con-
straints on NGO behavior unless “the nonprofit sector is sufficiently institutionalized for
such pressures to operate” (Gugerty, 2009, p. 250). The design of institutions for tight-
ening behavioral constraints and strengthening accountability has received a lot of atten-
tion recently, notably with regard to self-regulation among NGOs.13 Collective action
by forming voluntary accountability clubs can help address information asymmetries be-
tween NGOs and their stakeholders. Club membership is expected to signal the quality
and reliability of NGOs (Gugerty, 2009; Prakash and Gugerty, 2010b,a). Clearly, the
effectiveness of self-regulation depends on the strength of standards agreed among club
members as well as the mechanisms to enforce compliance within the club. As noted by
Ebrahim (2003, 2010), self-regulation among NGO is a fairly recent phenomenon and the
content of codes and standards varies considerably. For instance, InterAction, a member-
ship organization of US based NGOs engaged in international development, developed a
set of standards in 1993; InterAction’s Self-Certification Plus, an initiative of 2001, has
been rated as medium strict in terms of the content of standards, while verification is
missing (Gugerty, 2009, p. 268).14
Self-regulation is often meant to preempt stricter government regulation (Gugerty, 2009,
p. 245; Ebrahim, 2010, p. 15). Drawing on DiMaggio and Powell’s 1983 terminology,
normative pressure within the NGO community may be preferred over coercive pressure
from outside the community as a mechanism to achieve compliant organizational behav-
ior. The actual role of government regulation as an alternative mechanism to constrain
NGO behavior is open to debate. Bloodgood et al. (2010) find that governments in plu-
ralist countries typically have a permissive regulatory style with regard to NGOs. This
applies to the United States, for example, which imposes “relatively few restraints” on
groups that bound social comparison processes.”
12 Ebrahim (2005, p. 64) differentiates between organizations whose output is relatively easy to measure
and organizations whose goals are more process oriented. In particular the latter type “may be better
assessed by an institutional-theory model, that is, by measuring their conformity to what society expects of
them.”
13 For a recent overview on self-regulation among NGOs, see the contributions to the volume edited by
Gugerty and Prakash (2010).
14 See Gugerty (2009) for a detailed assessment of compliance standards and verification mechanisms for
a sample of 32 nonprofit accountability programs.
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NGOs (page 23).15 On the other hand, Edwards and Hulme (1996) argue that accepting
increasing amounts of public funding implies “upward accountability” in the sense that
NGOs have to comply with government regulation on what is done and how it is to be
accounted for. Jordan and van Tuijl (2007) discuss various tactics used by governments
to interfere with NGO activities.
The dependence of various NGOs on public funding implies that the relationships among
NGOs are often characterized by competition rather than cooperation (Gugerty, 2009, p.
250). Cooley and Ron (2002) provide detailed case studies of the scramble among NGOs
for renewable and, typically, short-term contracts offered by official financiers. The “mar-
ketization of aid funding” pushes NGOs towards greater competition. Cooley and Ron are
concerned about the disincentive effects of the marketization on the development orien-
tation of NGOs and their willingness to cooperate. Likewise, Edwards and Hulme (1996,
p. 966) argue that the competition among NGOs for public funding bodes ill for collab-
oration and successful policy alliances. At the same time, the reasoning of Edwards and
Hulme (1996) and Cooley and Ron (2002) is clearly relevant in the context of our analysis
which focuses on the possible interrelations between public funding, NGOs’ administra-
tive overhead and NGO survival probability. More specifically, these interrelations might
be expected to determine primarily the survival of competing NGOs with relatively strong
“upward” and “functional” accountability (Ebrahim, 2003). It is mainly for these NGOs
that “unit costs, quantifiable outputs, logical frameworks and detailed specifications of
what ‘partners’ are to do, [might] become organizational norms” (Hulme and Michael,
1997, p. 8). According to Cooley and Ron (2002, p. 11f), official financiers “seek to
fund projects, not administrative overhead, hoping that this will push INGO contractors
to rationalize procedures, demonstrate effectiveness, and slash overhead.”
In particular US authorities “focus their enforcement efforts squarely on financial account-
ability concerns” (Brakman Reiser, 2010, p. 43). Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue
Code (IRC) is the primary source of national NGO regulation in the United States (Blood-
good et al., 2010). To be exempted from federal taxes NGOs have to provide detailed
information, notably on finances and program, in so-called Form 990 (Ebrahim, 2003, p.
816). NGOs that register with USAID may “not expend more than 40 per cent of total
expenses on supporting services.”16 However, not only state authorities focus on financial
15 Moreover, Bloodgood (2011) find that the War on Terror has not resulted in considerably stricter regu-
lations. For a more skeptical assessment, see Jordan and van Tuijl (2007).
16 For USAID conditions of registration, see: http://idea.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/
conditions_us_organizations.pdf (accessed: July 2012).
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accountability of NGOs. Traditionally, the same applied to the rating of US-based NGOs
by watchdogs such as Charity Navigator (Szper and Prakash, 2011, appendix 1).17
The focus on financial accountability has been criticized on conceptual and practical
grounds. Critics, including Ebrahim (2003, 2010) and Szper and Prakash (2011) argue
that financial indicators provide at best limited information on the quality of NGO op-
erations on the ground. Specifically, the pressure to reduce overhead expenditure below
a threshold may be counterproductive, with the optimum being difficult to determine.18
However, the critique of narrow concepts of NGO accountability does not necessarily im-
ply that NGO efficiency and its interrelation with public funding are no longer relevant
for the survival of NGOs, which is the issue addressed in the following.
4.2.2 Central hypotheses and control variables
To the best of our knowledge, the present study is the first to provide an empirical as-
sessment of the links between the efficiency price of aid, public funding and the survival
of NGOs in international development. However, our analysis clearly relates to well-
developed strands of the literature. While our empirical analysis cannot capture broad
concepts of accountability, we develop our central hypotheses by drawing on the litera-
ture summarized in the previous section. At the same time, we draw on the theoretical
and empirical insights from the rich literature on the determinants of exit and survival in
industries dominated by profit-oriented firms.
As concerns the latter strand of the literature, the model of industry dynamics presented by
Jovanovic (1982) provides an important theoretical foundation by generating patterns of
growth and failure for profit-oriented firms. Firms are assumed to be heterogeneous with
respect to efficiency and cost levels. Firms do not know about their ‘true’ efficiency when
starting operations, but collect relevant information over the course of time: “Efficient
firms grow and survive; inefficient firms decline and fail” (Jovanovic, 1982, p. 649).19
17 See Charity Navigator’s website for details: http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.
view&cpid=33 (accessed: July 2012). Charity Navigator has announced to further enhance its methodology
and include also qualitative assessments and outcome measures in the future. It is interesting to note that
Szper and Prakash (2011) find for a small sample of NGOs in the state of Washington that changes in ratings
by Charity Navigator hardly affected donor support in the past. For recent moves towards multidimensional
assessments by watchdogs, see also Lecy et al. (2012, p. 446).
18 As noted by the Nonprofit Overhead Cost Project (2004a) and also by Szper and Prakash (2011),
overhead expenditure is necessary for successful program outcomes, at least up to a degree. See also
Nonprofit Overhead Cost Project (2004b) for a short account of the pros and cons of financial standards.
19 See also Zingales (1998) on why size may be a proxy for efficiency.
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Harrison and Laincz (2008) present a modified version of Jovanovic’s model of industry
dynamics for non-profits. These authors incorporate two defining features of non-profits
into the selection model: the non-distribution constraint and altruism.20 Both features
have the effect that the exit rates of non-profits are systematically lower than the exit
rates of profit maximizers. Altruism acts like a subsidy on output; i.e., an altruistic NGO
manager decides on output as if the NGO had lower effective costs. Conversely, for any
given level of cost or efficiency, a profit maximizing firm is more likely to exit the market
than the altruistic NGO. This is all the more so when the non-distribution constraint is
taken into account. The non-distribution constraint implies a lower liquidation value of
NGOs, compared to profit-oriented firms whose assets could be sold and distributed upon
exit. Consequently, non-profits tend to incur higher costs than profit maximizers until the
outside option becomes more favorable than continuing operations.
The comparison of non-profits and profit maximizers is of principal interest in studies of
‘mixed’ industries such as Deily et al.’s (2000) analysis of different types of ownership
of hospitals (non-profits, for-profits and government-run) in the United States. By con-
trast, our focus is on the heterogeneity among NGOs in international development.21 As
stressed by Lakdawalla and Philipson (2006) as well as Harrison and Laincz (2008), the
survival and exit of non-profits can be modeled as by Jovanovic (1982) for profit-oriented
firms. Specifically, the above noted reinterpretation of NGOs’ effective costs does not
invalidate the reasoning that more efficient market participants are less likely to exit than
their peers.
Refined measures of efficiency go beyond indirect proxies such as the size and age of
firms and non-profits, which we introduce as control variables further below. Industry
studies such as Zingales (1998) employ return on sales or assets, per-unit costs and tech-
nical efficiency (i.e., the estimated distance from the production possibility frontier) as
measures of firm-level efficiency. Deily et al. (2000) assess the relative efficiency of spe-
cific ownership types of hospitals by using the residuals from estimations of a stochastic
frontier cost function. Data limitations prevent us from employing such measures in the
present context. Nevertheless, the database on NGOs in international development offers
sufficient information to capture the efficiency price of NGO aid. As noted before, this
frequently used concept considers NGO expenses for administration and fundraising to be
20 Altruism weakens or removes the profit motive of NGO staff and managers. Hence, NGOs may be
regarded as “profit-deviators” in the jargon of Lakdawalla and Philipson (2006).
21 It would be interesting to compare survival and exit between NGOs and profit-oriented contractors of
official donor agencies as alternative aid channels. However, comparable data for profit-oriented contractors
of USAID, for example, are not available to the best of our knowledge.
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unproductive in the sense that they are not (directly) related to the charitable activities of
the NGO (e.g., Ribar and Wilhelm, 2002; Castaneda et al., 2008; Aldashev and Verdier,
2010). The higher the share of these expenses in total expenditures, the less efficient the
NGO is supposed to be from a purely financial or economic perspective. We follow this
literature and hypothesize that NGOs with higher unproductive expenses are more likely
to exit international development activities (hypothesis 1).
However, hypothesis 1 has to be qualified in several respects. First, as noted before, head-
quarter services are needed to a certain degree for NGO effectiveness in delivering results
in the field (Szper and Prakash, 2011). The Nonprofit Overhead Cost Project (2004a, p.
3) of the Urban Institute and Indiana University concludes from nine detailed case stud-
ies that “nonprofits that spend too little on infrastructure have more limited effectiveness
than those that spend more reasonably. Thus, in addition to the ceilings on these cost
ratios that many watchdogs set, floors should perhaps be introduced as well.” Second,
administrative costs and fundraising do not necessarily resemble each other in reducing
the probability of survival. In particular, the effect of fundraising is ambiguous to the
extent that it helps mobilize additional financing. Third, the distinction between mech-
anistic and organic NGO structures may qualify the expected effects of administrative
costs, too. The reasoning of Wollebaek (2009, p. 272) implies that organic structures
tend to be associated with less administrative costs due to low levels of formalization.22
Fourth, the relevance of hypothesis 1 can be questioned even more fundamentally recall-
ing from section 4.2.2 that non-financial norms and expectations may be as important for
NGO survival as organizational efficiency.
Even in the economics literature, the emphasis of recent studies often extends beyond nar-
row concepts of the efficiency of firms and NGOs. Firm characteristics such as domestic
versus foreign ownership and export orientation have received considerable attention as
additional determinants of firm survival and market exit.23 The role of financing has been
addressed for the survival of firms as well as non-profits. In a theoretical model, Clementi
and Hopenhayn (2006) analyze the role of financing constraints on firm dynamics. These
authors extend models such as Jovanovic (1982) by stressing the relevance of the structure
of financing (i.e., by relaxing the Modigliani-Miller proposition). The model of Clementi
and Hopenhayn (2006) predicts that the conditional probability of firm survival increases
22 All the same, this author expects that “a strongly organic structure is generally a liability for the survival
of local voluntary associations.”
23 See, for instance, Mata and Portugal (2002), Görg and Strobl (2003), Bernard and Jensen (2007), Görg
and Spaliara (in press), Holmes et al. (2010), and Bandick (2010).
4. Determinants of NGO survival 81
with equity financing. Likewise, Musso and Schiavo (2008) argue that it is more diffi-
cult for financially constrained firms to grow and to survive. Zingales (1998, p. 935)
finds in an empirical study of the US trucking industry that “sometimes natural selection
leads to the survival of relatively inefficient firms, which happen (or choose) to have deep
pockets.” According to Görg and Spaliara (in press), financial health – proxied, inter alia,
by a high ratio of equity to total assets and a low ratio of short-term debt to assets – is
associated with better survival prospects for French and UK firms.
The dichotomy between equity and debt may play a minor role for non-profits compared
to profit-oriented firms. Nevertheless, deep financial pockets and financial health may be
related to the structure of financing in the case of NGOs in international development, too.
Specifically, Harrison and Laincz (2008, p. 35) conclude that it demands further study to
assess whether low exit rates of NGOs could be attributed to “government grants keeping
inefficient charities alive”. Fernandez (2008) expects reliable and predictable government
funding to improve the chances of NGO survival, even though it may erode the legitimacy
of NGOs among private donors (hypothesis 2).24
However, the relationship between public funding and NGO survival is fairly complex. It
cannot be ruled out that more efficient NGOs prefer not to draw on public funds in order
to prevent government meddling into their operations. Moreover, public funding may
weaken the link between NGO efficiency and market exit by relaxing budget constraints
if NGOs anticipate that waste will not be effectively sanctioned by the state authorities
due to bureaucratic slack. Government regulations may be insufficiently strict to have
an impact on NGO behavior, or the enforcement of regulations may be in doubt (section
4.2.2).
On the other hand, official aid agencies should find it easier than private donors to screen
the NGOs and allocate funding accordingly. Monitoring by watchdogs like Charity Navi-
gator appears to have become more common recently. Throughout the period of observa-
tion, however, it is most reasonable to assume that mainly the official financiers engaged
in monitoring of NGOs. Note also that purely financial criteria of NGO behavior tend to
play a larger role when it comes to ‘upward accountability’ of NGOs to state authorities.
Inefficiency as defined here is thus more likely to be exposed in case of NGOs with pub-
lic funding. In other words, we hypothesize that efficiency becomes more important for
24 However, private donors may react positively if government funding is regarded as a signal of official
approval of the NGO and the urgency of its social cause. Indeed, empirical evidence on government fund-
ing of NGOs having negative effects on private donations (crowding out) is weak at best (e.g., Ribar and
Wilhelm, 2002).
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the survival of NGOs once they accept public funding and scrutiny (hypothesis 3). The
interrelations between public funding, NGO efficiency and survival have received scant
attention in the empirical literature on internationally active NGOs.As noted above, Eck-
erd and Moulton (2011) as well as Moulton and Eckerd (2012) consider public funding as
an important element of the external environment, which tends to be associated with the
adoption of particular types of performance evaluation (Eckerd and Moulton, 2011) and
particular NGO roles (Moulton and Eckerd, 2012).
In addition, we account for several NGO-specific characteristics that are fairly standard in
the relevant literature. Importantly, we control for the size and age of NGOs. The selection
model of Jovanovic (1982) predicts that larger and more experienced firms are less likely
to exit the market. Such firms have received favorable cost information in the past (which
allowed them to grow) and gained a more precise view of their ‘true’ efficiency so that
additional cost information in the future is less likely to be unfavorable enough to trigger
exit (Dunne et al., 1989, p. 679). The theoretical predictions of Jovanovic’s model on the
role of firm size and age for the probability of market exit are also relevant for non-profits.
In research on organizational ecology, sociologists and political scientists have coined the
notions of ‘liability of newness’ and ‘liability of smallness’ to stress the role of age and
size for survival in different populations of organizations, including NGOs (Freeman et
al., 1983; Twombly, 2003; Wollebaek, 2009, e.g.,).
The important role of firm size and age has been supported in empirical industry studies.
Earlier analyses finding these firm characteristics to be positively associated with firm
survival focus on manufacturing industries in the United States (Evans, 1987; Dunne et
al., 1989; Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995, e.g.). Similar results are reported for other
countries, including Ireland (Görg and Strobl, 2003), Portugal (Mata and Portugal, 1994,
2002), and the United Kingdom (Disney et al., 2003).25 Likewise, size and age figure as
key determinants of exit and survival in empirical studies on non-profits. Most of these
studies analyze NGOs with local activities such as social services; examples include:
Twombly (2003); Fernandez (2008); Harrison and Laincz (2008); and Wollebaek (2009).
While NGOs engaged in international development have received only scant attention,
we expect that the probability of exit decreases with the size and age of this type of NGO,
too.
Finally, market exit may depend not only on firm-specific or NGO-specific characteristics
25 However, some empirical studies find more ambiguous effects of firm size on survival and exit; exam-
ples include Holmes et al. (2010) on micro-enterprises in the United Kingdom and Wagner (1994) on small
German firms.
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but also on the competitive environment in which firms and NGOs operate. Hence, we
control for the density of organizations in a particular market and the concentration of
resources in the largest organizations. Twombly (2003, p. 217f) argues that “a central
tenet of the population ecology theory is the degree of competition among groups that
exists within systems,” and he expects that available “resources may be insufficient to
sustain organizations when faced with many competitors.”26 All the same, exits may be
relatively frequent in the early stages of market development as long as the legitimacy of
the still small population of organizations is rather weak (Fernandez, 2008; Wollebaek,
2009). In other words, the probability of exit may fall from a relatively high level before
rising again when the population of organizations has become sufficiently large so that
competition effects are likely to dominate the process of building legitimacy. Consider-
ing that most areas of international development are unlikely to suffer from insufficient
legitimacy, we expect exits to be positively associated with the density of NGOs.27 The
density measure should be lower when market consolidation has taken place already. At
the same time, resource concentration could be higher in consolidated markets. Exits
might therefore become less likely with increasing resource concentration.
4.3 Data and method
4.3.1 Sample and variables
We make use of the extensive database compiled by Rachel McCleary on US based NGOs
with activities in international development in order to assess the hypotheses introduced
in the previous section. The database offers annual information of major revenue and
expenditures items that the NGOs are required to report when they register with the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID).28 In the present context, the most
26 A similar line of reasoning can be found in studies on firm survival (e.g., Bandick, 2010).
27 By contrast, Wollebaek (2009, p. 271) expects “legitimation effects to be more prevalent than compe-
tition effects” with respect to the survival of local NGOs in Norway.
28 We carefully checked alternative data sources offering more recent information and covering a larger
selection of NGOs with international activities, notably the Urban Institute’s National Center for Charitable
Statistics (NCCS). However, it proved impossible to use NCCS data for our estimations below. Our analysis
focusses on the impact of administrative costs and the structure of NGO financing on exit probabilities.
While the relevant variables appear on (the current version of) the original (tax) Form 990, administrative
costs as well as public funding are not given in the so-called NCCS Core Files; see also Lecy (2011) on the
limitations of the Core Files. Other NCCS files could not be used either for our purposes. For example, the
so-called IRS Statistics of Income Sample (SOI) Files include more detailed financial data, but only for a
sample of mainly large NGOs. Other files such as the NCCS / GuideStar National Nonprofit Database cover
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relevant items include:
• total expenditures as a measure of NGO size, including both international and do-
mestic activities;29
• the year in which the NGO registered with USAID, serving as our proxy of its
experience in international development;30
• the costs for administration and management as well as the expenses for fundrais-
ing: higher shares of these two expenditure items in total expenditures are supposed
to reveal relatively inefficient NGOs in terms of higher non-charitable spending;
• the financing structure of NGOs, notably the availability of public funds (from US-
AID, other US government sources, foreign governments and international organi-
zations) and private donations.31
The subsequent analysis covers 887 NGOs based on data for the 1984-2005 period.32 We
chose 1984 as the starting point as the database offers uninterrupted time series since then,
while some earlier years are completely missing. While the database extends to 2005, we
consider 2003 as the final year to identify exits within our NGO sample. Note that NGOs
are not necessarily active from the very beginning of the period of observation. As a
result of exits and later entries, the average ‘stay’ of an NGO in the database amounts to
almost eight years so that we could theoretically make use of close to 7,000 observations
in the most basic specification of our probit model in table 4.4 below. However, due to
missing observations in the explanatory variables the estimation comprises only about
6,000 observations. During the period of observation, we observe 293 exits of NGOs (see
below for details).
We define entry, exit and experience (age) of NGOs in international development based on
their appearance and disappearance in the database. This is in line with Zingales (1998,
just a few years. Furthermore, as noted by Reid and Kerlin (2006, p. 51), separating program expenditures
for international and domestic programs is not feasible using information from the NCCS / GuideStar
National Nonprofit Database. However as explained in more detail below, we draw on more recent data
from the so-called VOLAG reports of USAID in order to test whether our results also hold for an extended
period of observation.
29 The share of international activities is reported, too. We use this share as a control variable below.
30 Alternatively, we consider the founding year of the NGO.
31 Note that we consider the sum of public funds from all sources listed in parentheses. The NGOs’ own
resources raised, for example, through commercial activities (sales, fees, etc.) represent the third major
source of revenues.
32 However, we use more recent data in section 4.4.2.
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p. 913) who assumes that a (trucking) firm exits when it disappears from the files of the
American Trucking Association. Specifically, we define exits from international devel-
opment as previously active NGOs that are no longer listed in the database in the current
year and do not re-appear in the files throughout the remaining period of observation.33
We take into account that an NGO may fail to report the required balance-sheet informa-
tion to USAID in a particular year, though still being active in international development.
If an NGO re-appears in the database after just one missing year, we keep the NGO in
the sample treating as missing only the year without reporting.34 By contrast, we drop
those NGOs from the sample which re-appear in the database after more than one year.
While the database provides detailed information on a broad spectrum of NGOs, it does
not cover the universe of relevant NGOs. Sample selection bias cannot be ruled out, even
though the bias is probably smaller than in previous studies on foreign aid granted by a
limited set of NGOs.35 NGOs have to meet several conditions when they register with
USAID.36 They have to be US based, solicit cash contributions from the US general pub-
lic, and conduct overseas program activities that are consistent with the general purposes
of the US Foreign Assistance Act and/ or Public Law 480. As noted before, ‘supporting
services’ shall not account for more than 40 per cent of total expenditure. Furthermore,
registered NGOs must be exempt from federal income taxes under section 501(C)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code. They must be incorporated for not less than 18 months and
provide financial statements to the public upon request, in line with generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP).
NGOs have to register in order to become eligible to compete for specific types of funding,
e.g., development and humanitarian assistance grants. Apart from general USAID con-
ditions of registration as noted above, specific groups of NGOs were effectively banned
at least temporarily from entering into the competition for public funds. NGOs engaged
in counseling on family planning and abortions provide a case in point during the Bush
administration. On the other hand, NGOs such as Oxfam may decide deliberately not to
33 As discussed in more detail below, we cannot rule out that NGOs leave the USAID registry while
continuing international operations. We address the risk of ‘classification error’ in different ways, including
various robustness tests.
34 This applies to about four per cent of the overall sample of NGOs. Results are robust to a different
treatment of these NGOs (see the appendix for details).
35 For instance, Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) use a sample of 125 US based NGOs. Koch et al. (2009)
assess aid allocation based on a sample of 61 NGOs based in different countries. The sample of about 300
Swiss NGOs used by Dreher et al. (2012) is relatively large, though still much smaller than the sample in
the present paper.
36 For more details, see: http://idea.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/conditions_us_
organizations.pdf (accessed: August 2013).
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accept public funds in order to operate independently. We miss this group of NGOs in
the estimations reported below as they are most unlikely to be registered with USAID.
Hence, NGOs relying exclusively on private donations and own resources are likely to be
underrepresented in the registry.
4.3.2 Sample characteristics
Nevertheless, we do not rely exclusively on NGOs for which public funding plays a ma-
jor role. Our sample includes various NGO-year combinations with public funding equal
to zero (about 30 per cent of all observations). Furthermore, table 4.1 suggests that our
sample is fairly representative in terms of the average share of public funds in total rev-
enues. In the table, we compare important characteristics between of our sample of NGOs
with USAID registration and all NGOs included in category Q (i.e., NGOs with interna-
tional/ foreign activities) of the Urban Institute’s National Center for Charitable Statistics
(NCCS). We draw on the relevant statistics for selected years presented in a recent study
of the international NGO subsector by the Urban Institute (Reid and Kerlin, 2006). This
comparison, though possible for only a few years, should reveal possible biases given that
the statistics presented by Reid and Kerlin are based on a much larger number of NGOs
most of which are not registered with USAID. As can be seen, public funding is more
important for the sample underlying our estimations than for all NGOs classified in cate-
gory Q by NCCS. However, the difference is smaller than one might have expected (3-6
percentage points).
We also compare average administrative cost shares in table 4.1. This may indicate
whether more or less efficient NGOs (in terms of administrative costs) self-select into
the USAID registry. On the one hand, inefficient NGOs may not register anticipating that
they may be unable to comply with USAID’s threshold concerning ‘supporting services’.
On the other hand, more efficient NGOs may choose not to register to avoid USAID in-
terference into their financing and program decisions.37 Table 4.1 indicates that NGOs
in our sample tend to be less efficient in terms of administrative cost shares, compared
to all NGOs covered in NCCS. However, the difference is relatively small (about three
percentage points). It may also be noted that administrative cost shares exceed USAID’s
threshold of 40 per cent for about 1.5 per cent of all observations in our sample, possibly
implying that the threshold is not rigorously enforced.
37 We are particularly grateful to the anonymous reviewers who alerted us to the possibilities of self-
selection working in different directions.
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Tab. 4.1: Major characteristics of USAID sample and international nonprofit subsector
USAID Reid and Kerlin (2006)
2001 2003 ca. 2001 ca. 2003
Number of NGOs 471 529 3,653 4,199
Size (average expenditures, million US $) 29.3 28 — 4.1
Fundraising 5 4 5 4
Administrative costs 10 10 7 7
Public funding 24 23 18 20
Fundraising and administrative costs in per cent of total expenditures; public funding in per cent of total
revenues
As concerns the average fundraising effort, our sample does not differ from all NGOs
with international activities included in NCCS. Taken together, these observations make
us confident that our sample is not seriously biased against NGOs with a considerably
higher or lower efficiency price of aid, as defined in section 4.2. We do observe a strong
bias of our sample towards comparatively large NGOs, however. This could imply that the
exit rates in our sample are biased downwards, recalling the hypothesis on the ‘liability
of smallness’ from section 4.2.
Figure 4.1 and table 4.2 present some stylized facts about the frequency of exits and
unconditional exit probabilities. The annual exit probability is about 4.8 per cent, on av-
erage, in figure 4.1. This compares to the somewhat lower exit rates of 2.9 per cent in the
pre-1999 period and 4.1 per cent in the post-1999 period reported by Lecy (2011). Table
4.2 provides some preliminary indications on unconditional exit and survival probabili-
ties for subgroups of NGOs in a specific year. The overall NGO sample is classified into
sub-groups in terms of major characteristics such as size, age, non-charitable (‘unproduc-
tive’) expenditures, and financing structure. Some interesting patterns emerge that will be
analyzed more systematically below. For instance, the exit probability appears to be rel-
atively low for larger and older NGOs. The exit probability of NGOs with a particularly
high share of administrative costs in total expenditures is almost 9 per cent, compared to
3-3.5 per cent for NGOs which keep administrative costs in check. Public funding seems
to be associated with better chances of survival, though this effect may level off once
a certain degree of public funding is available. Exits are more common among secular
NGOs than among religious NGOs.
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Tab. 4.2: Annual exit and survival probabilities for various NGO subsamples
NGO characteristic Range Survival
probability
Exit
probability
Size (total expenditures) Smallest 89.6 10.4
Lower-middle 94.9 5.1
Upper-middle 97.0 3.0
Largest 98.4 1.6
Age (since entry in USAID registry) Youngest 93.1 7.0
Young 92.0 8.1
Middle 95.8 4.2
Old 96.5 3.5
Oldest 97.9 2.2
Administrative costs (share in total expenditures) Lowest 96.5 3.6
Low 97.1 2.9
Middle 94.9 5.1
High 95.6 4.4
Highest 91.4 8.7
Fundraising expenses (share in total expenditures) Lowest 95.8 4.2
Low 95.4 4.7
Middle 95.8 4.2
High 96.3 3.7
Highest 95.0 5.0
Public funding (share in total revenue) Lowest 92.3 7.7
Lower-middle 96.5 3.5
Upper-middle 96.2 3.8
Highest 96.0 4.0
Type Secular 94.7 5.3
Religious 96.0 4.0
The probabilities refer to the 5,949 observations covered by the baseline regression in table 4.4.
4.3.3 Identification of exits
The overall number of 293 exits in figure 4.1 may overstate the number of NGOs truly
exiting from international development activities. This would happen if NGOs no longer
registered with USAID, possibly because they were no longer interested in public fund-
ing, while they continued operating without USAID funding. We attempted to assess the
severity of possible bias due to ‘classification error’ by searching two well-known sources
listing internationally active NGOs for the NGOs with exits from the USAID registry: the
Yearbook of International Organizations published by the Union of International Associ-
ations and the so-called Core Files of the Urban Institute’s National Center for Charitable
Statistics (NCCS).38
38 Both databases can be accessed online after registration and paying subscription fees; for details
see: http://www.uia.be/yearbook-international-organizations-online and http://nccs.urban.org/database/
overview.cfm.
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Fig. 4.1: Annual exits and unconditional exit probabilities in per cent
The Yearbook of International Organizations offers an online database of international
non-profits (including NGOs) worldwide. Searching this database we identified just 30
per cent of the NGOs with exits from the USAID registry. Classification error cannot
be ruled out for those NGOs not listed in the Yearbook. However, the risk of mis-
classification appears to be minor for this large group of NGOs at closer inspection of
the Yearbook’s guidelines for inclusion. The Yearbook attempts to cover all ‘interna-
tional organizations’ by sending out questionnaires and relying primarily on information
received from the responding organizations themselves. National organizations (in our
case US-based NGOs) “with international programmes (e.g. aid programmes) may be
included,” but “organizations which are obviously bilateral are excluded.” Moreover, “the
aims must be genuinely international in character, with the intention to cover operations
in at least three countries.”39 The selection criteria imply that we are most likely to miss
NGOs in the Yearbook whose international activities are quantitatively small and/or re-
stricted to one or two recipient countries. At the same time, the reasoning in section 4.2
39 The quotes are from the Appendix of the 2012-2013 edition of volume 2 of the Yearbook.
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suggests that ‘true exits’, in the sense of discontinuing international activities, are most
likely for these NGOs.
About one third of the NGOs identified in the Yearbook did not only exit the USAID
registry but are also coded explicitly as inactive, dormant or dissolved in the Yearbook,
though the year since when they appear in these categories in the Yearbook often deviates
from the year of exits from the USAID registry. On the other hand, we identified 62
NGOs with exits from the USAID registry which remained active even after various years
according to the Yearbook. Classification error is most likely for this group.40 The NCCS
Core Files list US based NGOs whose primary purpose or mission is international in
scope under category Q, while US based NGOs with mainly domestic activities are listed
in various other categories. More than half of the 265 NGOs with exits in the 1989-
2003 period (according to figure 4.1) did not appear in category Q of the Core Files.41
The risk of ‘classification error’ appears to be minor for this group. Not being listed in
category Q suggests that these NGOs were no relevant (or sufficiently large) actors in
international development and, thus, more likely to discontinue international activities.
It cannot be ruled out that we failed to identify some NGOs because of differences in
spelling, however. It should also be noted that various NGOs could not even be identified
in Core File categories other than Q. In other words, they did not file Form 990 throughout
the period of observation. Two sub-groups of NGOs are not required to file Form 990:
small NGOs not exceeding the filing exemption threshold and religious NGOs with filing
exemptions. The assumption of ‘true exits’ appears to be reasonable for the first sub-group
(see section 4.2). ‘Classification error’ may be more likely for the second sub-group so
that we split the sample into religious and secular NGOs in the estimations reported in
table 4.11 in the appendix.
We identified 207 of the 265 NGOs with exits in the 1989-2003 period (according to figure
4.1) in the NCCS Core Files. 47 of these 207 NGOs can be assumed to be ‘true exits’
in the sense that they are most likely to have discontinued international activities when
they left the USAID registry. These NGOs also disappeared permanently from the Core
Files at about the same time. In addition, some NGOs disappeared from the Core Files
for various years (temporary exits). 140 of the cases in figure 4.1 continued to be listed in
the Core Files after they had left the USAID registry. The risk of mis-classifying NGOs
in this group as exits is relatively small when international program expenditures were
40 See table 4.10 in the appendix for a robustness test related to the above discussion.
41 Note that the Core Files are available only since 1989. This group includes some cases where NGOs
with the same name appeared in the Core Files, but completely different revenue numbers suggest that they
were not the same NGO as in the USAID registry.
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steeply declining or even zero in the years preceding the exit from the USAID registry.42
This applied to 28 NGOs. For the remaining 112 it is most likely that they continued to
be active internationally even though they left the USAID registry. Again, we perform a
robustness test by excluding these NGOs from our list of exits (table 4.10 in the appendix).
4.3.4 Estimation approach
Our estimation approach follows various studies on firm survival and market exit, includ-
ing Zingales (1998) and Görg and Spaliara (in press). We start with a probit model to
estimate the probability that US based NGOs discontinue international development ac-
tivities in a particular year, conditional on a set of possible determinants observed in the
previous year. In other words, we assume that the probability of exit, Pr(Exiti,t = 1), is a
function of the vector of determinants, Xi,t−1:
Pr(Exiti,t = 1) = F(β′Xi,t−1+δ j + γt + εi,t) (4.1)
with slope parameters β, NGO type-specific fixed effects δ j, year fixed effects γt , and a
normally distributed error term εi,t .
In line with the reasoning in section 4.2.2, the vector of determinants includes the age
of the NGO (logged: Age) as well as major expenditure and revenue items. Total ex-
penditures (logged) reflect the size of NGOs (Size). The effect of both Age and Size
on Pr(Exiti,t = 1) should be negative if more experienced and larger NGOs have better
chances to survive. We also enter NGO size in squared terms (Size*2) to account for
non-linear effects on Pr(Exiti,t = 1) . The shares of administrative expenses and fundrais-
ing expenses in total expenditures, Adminsh and Fundsh, should have negative effects on
Pr(Exiti,t = 1) if NGO efficiency in terms of containing non-charitable expenses improves
the chances of survival. The impact of NGO financing is captured by the shares of public
funding, Publicsh, and private donations, Donationsh, in total revenue – with the NGOs’
own resources from commercial activity serving as the base (revenue) category. We con-
trol for the share of international activities, Intfrac, expecting that NGOs are less likely
42 It is important to recall in this context that an NGO which discontinues international operations, while
continuing operations within the United States, represents a ‘true exit’ for our analysis. A steep decline is
defined to involve a reduction in international program expenditures by more than 50 per cent so that the
NGO belonged to the lowest quintile in terms of international program expenditures in the year preceding
the exit from the USAID registry.
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Tab. 4.3: Summary statistics
Variables Observations Mean Standard
deviation
Minimum Maximum
Size 5,949 14.9 2.2 5.2 21.4
Age 5,949 2.0 1.0 0.0 4.2
Fundsh 4,377 5.4 5.5 0.0 27.0
Adminsh 5,750 11.4 9.4 0.0 54.9
Donationsh 5,945 61.1 34.7 0.0 240.1
Publicsh 5,945 25.2 30.7 0.0 118.9
Intfrac 5,949 77.1 34.4 0.0 100.0
NGOdensity 5,949 27.8 18.4 1.0 83.0
Herfin 5,949 26.3 18.2 6.6 100.0
PublicVol 5,909 88.1 2579.8 0.0 198038.5
DonationsVol 4,928 6.3 15.6 0.0 260.5
The summary statistics refer to the 5,949 observations covered by the baseline regression in table 4.4. In a
few cases the share of donations or public funds in total revenues exceeds 100 per cent due to losses from
commercial activities, i.e., negative entries for the third source of NGO revenues.
to discontinue international development activities when it accounts for a larger share in
their program expenditures. Summary statistics are provided in table 4.3.43
In addition, we account for the competitive environment in which NGOs operate. The
density of NGOs in a particular ‘market’ is proxied by the number of NGOs of a spe-
cific type (NGOdensity). The classification of NGOs into religious and secular types
is also available from McCleary’s database. Religious NGOs are subdivided into sev-
eral faith-based groups such as Evangelical, Catholic and Jewish. Secular NGOs are dif-
ferentiated further into 16 subgroups: agricultural development, communications, com-
munity/capacity building, culture and society, education/ higher learning, engineering/
infrastructure/ technology, environment, ethnic unity, foundations/ individuals, human
rights/ international law, medicine and health, peace groups, professional associations,
relief and development, gender issues/ family planning, and private enterprise/ small en-
terprise.44 The concentration of resources – in terms of revenues – within these sub-
groups is measured by Herfindahl indices (Herfin). The regressors are measured at year
43 Detailed definitions can be found in the appendix. It should be noted that we excluded some outliers
(the highest percentile of NGO-year combinations) with extremely high shares of administrative costs and
expenses for fundraising in total expenditures. After careful inspection of the data, it appears that these
outliers are concentrated in the first year when NGOs register with USAID; charitable expenses are often
still minor (or even zero) in the first year, resulting in exceptionally high values of Adminsh and Fundsh.
44 Note that the classification of secular NGOs is according to their main line of activity. Additional lines
of (minor) activities are not given in the source. We combined some very small sub-groups (with specific
religious affiliations and areas of activity) when no exit was observed for a particular sub-group. In this
way, we avoided the loss of observations.
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t−1 to mitigate endogeneity concerns.45 Finally, we account for NGO type-specific fixed
effects, δ j, based on the above classification, as well as year fixed effects, γt .
In subsequent steps of the analysis, the baseline probit model is modified in several ways
(see section 4.4 for details). First, we perform various robustness tests and replicate the
estimations for major sub-groups of the overall NGO sample (see also the appendix).
Second, we draw on more recent data to evaluate whether financial and economic factors
have lost importance over time. Third, we extend the specification by interaction terms.
In particular, we evaluate in this way whether the effects of NGO efficiency in terms of
Adminsh depend on the NGO’s reliance on public funding (Publicsh) as well as its size.
The interaction with Publicsh could reveal whether the relationship between NGO inef-
ficiency and the probability of exit weakens when NGOs have easier recourse to official
financiers, or whether monitoring of NGOs by official financiers even strengthens this
link.46
4.4 Empirical results
4.4.1 Basic probit estimations
Table 4.4 presents the coefficients of the baseline estimations of our probit model. All
estimations reported here and in the subsequent tables include year fixed effects as well
as fixed effects for specific sub-groups of NGOs (for details, see section 4.3.4). Standard
errors are clustered at the NGO level. In column (1) of table 4.4, we consider only the
size and age of the US based NGOs, i.e., the two proxies that the earlier literature on
firm survival widely used to capture cost efficiency and experience. Both measures enter
with a significantly negative coefficient, at the one per cent level of significance.47 This
45 See also the appendix for IV probit model results.
46 In the appendix, we also employ complementary log-log (cloglog) estimations in order to test for
the robustness of our results to methodological choices. The cloglog model is the discrete time version
of the Cox proportional hazard model. We prefer the probit model as a benchmark, however, since the
assumption of proportional hazards has been shown to be restrictive and empirically questionable (Hess
and Persson, 2012). In the appendix, we also take into account that some of our explanatory variables may
be endogenous. Hence, we follow Wooldridge (2002) and use the instrumental variable technique for probit
models (see also Görg and Spaliara, in press).
47 By contrast, the coefficient of Age turns out to be insignificant when the founding year, instead of the
year of registration with USAID, is considered. This result also holds for the subsequent specifications.
Throughout our analysis, however, the signs and significance levels of other coefficients are not affected by
the applied definition of Age.
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Tab. 4.4: Baseline probit estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables probit probit probit probit probit
Size -0.1404*** -0.1421*** -0.1343*** -0.4143** -0.4291**
(0.0139) (0.0224) (0.0153) (0.1807) (0.1887)
Size*2 0.0087 0.0092
(0.0063) (0.0066)
Age -0.0990*** -0.1226*** -0.1160*** -0.0709 -0.0605
(0.0335) (0.0431) (0.0348) (0.0442) (0.0444)
Fundsh -0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0076 -0.0081
(0.0072) (0.0062) (0.0073) (0.0073)
Adminsh 0.0122*** 0.0090*** 0.0101** 0.0107**
(0.0041) (0.0031) (0.0042) (0.0042)
Donationsh -0.0010 -0.0009
(0.0018) (0.0018)
Publicsh -0.0051** -0.0051**
(0.0022) (0.0022)
Intfrac -0.0055*** -0.0055***
(0.0013) (0.0012)
NGOdensity 0.0062
(0.0050)
Herfin -0.0097**
(0.0042)
Constant 0.2142 -0.0723 0.0600 2.5181* 3.0703**
(0.3362) (0.5550) (0.3573) (1.3698) (1.4118)
Observations 5,949 4,319 5,673 4,316 4,316
Reports the coefficients. All estimations include year fixed effects as well as NGO-type fixed effects that
are not shown. Standard errors are clustered at the NGO level. *** (**; *) denote significance at the one
(five; ten) per cent level.
implies that larger and more experienced NGOs in our sample are more likely to survive
with international development activities than smaller and younger NGOs. Quantitatively
speaking, the marginal effects at the mean of the variables suggest that the exit probability
decreases by 1.1 (0.8) per cent with an increase of size (age) by one per cent (table 4.5).
In columns (2) and (3) of table 4.4, we consider our two measures of unproductive ex-
penses in addition to the size and age of NGOs in order to assess hypothesis 1 that NGOs
with a higher efficiency price of NGO aid – i.e., spending relatively less on charitable
activities – are more likely to exit international development. In line with this hypothesis,
the coefficient of Adminsh proves to be significantly positive at the one per cent level. The
marginal effect shown in column (2) of table 4.5 suggests that an increase in the share of
administrative expenses in total expenditures by one standard deviation leads to an in-
crease in the exit probability by 0.6 per cent. In contrast to Adminsh, Fundsh turns out
to be insignificant at conventional levels of statistical significance. While both variables
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Tab. 4.5: Marginal effects based on the baseline probit estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables probit probit probit probit probit
Size -0.0108*** -0.0090*** -0.0100*** -0.0080*** -0.0079***
(0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Age -0.0076*** -0.0078*** -0.0086*** -0.0038 -0.0032
(0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0023)
Fundsh -0.00001 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Adminsh 0.0008*** 0.0007*** 0.0005** 0.0006**
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Donationsh -0.0001 -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Publicsh -0.0003** -0.0003**
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Intfrac -0.0003*** -0.0003***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
NGOdensity 0.0003
(0.0003)
Herfin -0.0512**
(0.0226)
Observations 5,949 4,319 5,673 4,316 4,316
Reports the marginal effects at the mean of the explanatory variables. All estimations include year fixed
effects as well as NGO-type fixed effects that are not shown. Standard errors are clustered at the NGO level.
*** (**; *) denote significance at the one (five; ten) per cent level.
reveal unproductive expenses in the sense of not being directly related to charitable ac-
tivities, the effect of fundraising could be expected to have ambiguous effects on exit and
survival (see section 4.2). Even though private donors may dislike NGOs engaging in ‘ex-
cessive’ fundraising (Rose-Ackerman, 1982), fundraising has often been found to result
in higher donations which, in turn, may render exit less likely.48 The control variables
Size and Age keep their significantly negative coefficients, indicating that the extended
specification compared to column (1) offers additional explanatory power with regard to
NGO efficiency and the probability of exit.
Note that Fundsh is insignificant in columns (2) and (3) of table 4.4, i.e., independently of
how we deal with missing entries for fundraising. One option is to assume that fundrais-
ing expenses are zero whenever the costs for administration and management and the
program-related expenditures add up to total expenditures of NGO i in year t. This as-
sumption is underlying the estimation reported in column (3). Alternatively, we drop those
48 For a more detailed discussion and review of the relevant literature, see Nunnenkamp and Öhler
(2012b).
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NGO-year combinations (column 2). The latter option runs the risk of losing ‘true’ zero
observations when an NGO did not undertake any fundraising. Careful inspection of the
data suggests, however, that fundraising is sometimes not reported. The zero assumption
would then clearly be unwarranted. Fortunately, the choice between these two options
hardly affects our results. The significance levels as well as the size of the coefficients
for all variables are very similar in columns (2) and (3). In all subsequent estimations, we
proceed with the more cautious option used in column (2).49
In column (4) of table 4.4 we refine the specification of the probit model in three respects:
We account for non-linear effects of the size of NGOs on exit and survival by adding the
variable in squared terms (Size*2); we include Donationsh and Publicsh to assess the role
of NGO financing; and we control for the international share of NGO activity (Intfrac).
Age loses its significance in the extended specification in column (4).50 The (positive)
coefficient of Size*2 also fails to pass conventional significance levels. However, Ai and
Norton (2003) show that the significance levels of the coefficients of any kind of interac-
tion terms (including squared terms) cannot be interpreted in non-linear models such as
the present probit model. Indeed, there is clear evidence for non-linear effects once the
marginal effects are calculated conditional on the level of the variable Size itself. Figure
4.2a reveals that the exit probability decreases considerably when NGOs at the lower end
of the size distribution grow larger. This effect diminishes and eventually approaches zero
when NGOs move up in the size distribution. Quantitatively, an increase by one per cent
in size leads to a decrease in the exit probability by 5.7 per cent at the lower end of the
distribution (1st percentile), to a decrease by 0.8 per cent at the median, and to a decrease
by 0.1 per cent at the upper end of the distribution (99th percentile).
The evidence on the role of financing is mixed. A larger share of private donations in
the NGOs’ total revenues does not affect the probability of exit in a significant way.51
In contrast, a higher share of public funding is associated with a lower exit probability
49 As Fundsh turns out to be insignificant, we also performed estimations in which we dropped Fundsh
completely. While these results are not shown in detail, we note the most relevant findings and differences
in the subsequent text.
50 In unreported additional estimations, we entered the funding variables (Donationsh, Publicsh), Intfrac,
and Size*2 separately to see the reason why Age loses its significance in column (4). Adding only Size*2
does not affect the significance of Age. Age also remains significant when entering either the funding
variables or Intfrac. Age becomes insignificant at conventional levels only when entering the funding vari-
ables together with Intfrac. Note also that Age remains significant at the five per cent level when dropping
Fundsh. On the other hand, Publicsh turns out to be insignificant at conventional levels in the unreported
results without Fundsh.
51 As mentioned in section 4.3, a higher share of private donations corresponds to a lower share the NGOs’
own resources from commercial activity which represent the reference (revenue) category.
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Fig. 4.2: Conditional exit probabilities
at the five per cent level of significance. The latter result is in line with hypothesis 2
according to which public funding improves the chances of NGO survival by relaxing
budget constraints. Quantitatively, an increase by one standard deviation in the share of
public funding would reduce the exit probability by 0.8 per cent. This is not to ignore that
the negative coefficient on public funding could be due to the fact that NGOs must register
with USAID to be eligible for public funding. We consider this to be unlikely, however,
recalling two observations from section 4.3: public funding was zero for about 30 per
cent of all observations in our sample of NGOs with USAID registration; and the average
share of public funding was only modestly higher in our sample, compared to all NGOs
with international activities covered by NCCS (table 4.1).52 Hence, our finding appears
to be more in line with Fernandez (2008, p.131) who concludes from his analysis of
41 dissolved Spanish NGOs that “state funding helps nonprofit associations to survive.”
However, it can not necessarily be inferred from this result that public funding helps
inefficient NGOs to survive. We return to this issue below. The estimation in column (4)
also shows – as expected – that NGOs are less likely to discontinue international activities
if they figure more prominently in their portfolio (Intfrac).
We further extend the specification by controlling for two indicators on the competitive
environment in which NGOs operate. The density of NGOs in a particular sub-group
enters with a positive coefficient in column (5) of table 4.4 – as one would expect when
a larger number of market participants is associated with fiercer competition. However,
52 It may also be noted in this context that Publish remains significantly negative when possible endo-
geneity is accounted for in the IV probit estimations reported in table 4.12 of the appendix.
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NGOdensity does not pass conventional significance levels.53 The concentration of re-
sources turns out to be significantly negative at the five per cent level. As noted in section
4.2.2, resources may be concentrated more strongly when market structures are consoli-
dated so that further exits become less likely. Importantly, the inclusion of NGOdensity
and Herfin does not affect previous results on our variables of major interest (Adminsh and
Publicsh). The size and significance of their coefficients are essentially the same when
comparing columns (4) and (5).
To account for possible endogeneity we also estimate an instrumental variable probit
model. As instruments we use the level of Size, Size*2, Fundsh, Adminsh, Donationsh,
Publicsh and Intfrac, all lagged by two and three periods. We test for the validity and
relevance of our instruments based on a linear version of the IV model, as in Görg and
Spaliara (in press). The tests confirm that our instruments are valid and relevant. A no-
table difference to the baseline probit model is that the coefficients of Adminsh are now
no longer significant, though their signs are as before. Yet, this does not imply that NGO
efficiency becomes irrelevant for the probability of exit. Size effects are hardly affected
by employing IV probit estimations. Furthermore, it appears that the second traditional
proxy of efficiency, Age, now captures part of the effect previously attributed to Adminsh.
Most importantly perhaps, there appears to be little reason to be concerned about the en-
dogeneity of our regressors. Wald tests indicate that exogeneity of the regressors cannot
be rejected. Consequently we tend to prefer the simple probit results, while it is reassur-
ing to find them to be broadly robust to instrumental variable estimations (see table 4.12
in the appendix).
4.4.2 Accounting for recent developments
The estimations reported so far are based on data from Rachel McCleary for the 1984-
2005 period. The major advantage of this dataset is that it is particularly rich: in addition
to financial accounting items, it offers information on important NGO characteristics such
as their age and area of activity. Moreover, the dataset covers more than 20 years of NGO
activity in a fully consistent way. Exclusively relying on this dataset implies, however,
that one cannot account for more recent developments with regard to NGO accountabil-
ity. As discussed in section 4.2.1, the relevance of financial and economic factors may
be questioned to the extent that NGO behavior is shaped increasingly by donor expec-
tations and self-regulation among peers. Stricter monitoring by watchdogs is a recent
53 NGOdensity proves to be significant at the ten per cent level, however, when dropping Fundsh.
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phenomenon, and the conditions attached to public funding may also have become more
binding over time. All this may affect the determinants of the probability of NGO exits so
that it is clearly desirable to extend the period of observation and cover more recent data.
We approach this issue in several ways. First, we replicate the estimations reported in
table 4.4 for the 1990-2009 period by drawing on data for US based NGOs with inter-
national activities from the so-called VolAg reports of USAID.54 Second, we combine
the McCleary database with data from the VolAg reports which enables us to cover an
extended period of observation, 1984-2009. Third, we introduce period dummies and in-
teract them with Adminsh to investigate whether stricter monitoring of NGOs, notably by
watchdogs, has strengthened the link between administrative costs and the probability of
exit in the most recent past. Arguably, the increasing monitoring over time might have
effects not only on the efficiency and exit probability of NGOs actually monitored at one
particular point in time, but also on all other NGOs witnessing the trend toward broader
coverage and anticipating that watchdogs might include them in their future monitoring.
In all three steps, the data from the VolAg reports have to be matched with information
included only in McCleary’s database. While the VolAg reports contain expenditure and
revenue variables consistent with the master file received from Rachel McCleary, informa-
tion on the year of foundation, the religious affiliation and the type of activity is missing in
the VolAg reports so that we matched these variables from the McCleary master file.55 It
should be noted that the matching implies a loss of some information by reducing the sam-
ple of NGOs that can be included in the estimations. Specifically, all estimations reported
in this section can cover only those NGOs that are listed in both, the VolAg database and
the McCleary master file.56 In other words, there is a trade-off between extending the
period of observation and covering a larger sample of NGOs.
The results for the 1990-2009 period shown in table 4.6 largely confirm the effects ob-
served in the baseline estimations. This applies particularly to our control variables. The
significant findings on Size, Intfrac, and Herfin carry over almost unchanged. The neg-
ative effect of Age on the probability of exit strengthens in columns (3) and (4) of table
54 VolAg stands for voluntary agencies. We combined online VolAg data for the
1990-2008 period available from: http://www.healthmetricsandevaluation.org/ghdx/record/
ihme-formatted-usaid-volag-database-1990-2008 (accessed: August 2012), and the 2011 VolAg re-
port of USAID available from: http://idea.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/volag2011_0.pdf
(accessed: August 2012) on data for the year 2009.
55 This was only possible as Rachel McCleary provided us with the true names of all NGOs in her master
file.
56 Note also that, similar to above, we lose the last two years when identifying the exits.
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Tab. 4.6: Robustness test with the VolAg database (1990-2009 period)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables probit probit probit probit
Size -0.1318*** -0.1213*** -0.2760*** -0.2856***
(0.0132) (0.0136) (0.1005) (0.1010)
Size*2 0.0047 0.0049
(0.0036) (0.0036)
Age -0.1279*** -0.1318*** -0.0932*** -0.0887**
(0.0329) (0.0329) (0.0346) (0.0345)
Fundsh 0.0039 -0.0005 0.0000
(0.0046) (0.0051) (0.0052)
Adminsh 0.0069*** 0.0052** 0.0050*
(0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0026)
Donationsh -0.0006 -0.0006
(0.0012) (0.0013)
Publicsh -0.0017 -0.0018
(0.0013) (0.0013)
Intfrac -0.0054*** -0.0054***
(0.0009) (0.0009)
NGOdensity 0.0090
(0.0062)
Herfin -0.0109***
(0.0033)
Constant 0.4706 0.2200 1.9227** 2.4131***
(0.3032) (0.3161) (0.7649) (0.7921)
Observations 6,422 6,422 6,410 6,410
Reports the coefficients. All estimations include year fixed effects as well as NGO-type fixed effects that
are not shown. Standard errors are clustered at the NGO level. *** (**; *) denote significance at the one
(five; ten) per cent level.
4.6, compared to the corresponding estimations in table 4.4. As concerns our variables
of major interest, the positive effect of Adminsh weakens somewhat in the fully specified
model. Nevertheless, higher administrative cost shares continue to be associated with a
higher probability of exit, at the ten per cent of significance, in line with hypothesis 1.
However, table 4.6 does not support hypothesis 2 as Publicsh loses its significance.
Table 4.7 shows the estimations for the extended period of observation, 1984-2009. These
results in columns (1)-(4) resemble the baseline results even more closely. Most impor-
tantly, as in table 4.4, we again find empirical support for both hypotheses 1 and 2. Ad-
minsh enters significantly positive at least at the ten per cent level, while Publicsh enters
significantly negative at the five per cent level. In the third step, we modify the full specifi-
cation shown in column (5) of table 4.7 by including a dummy variable for each five-year
interval throughout the extended period of observation, instead of the year fixed effects,
and interacting these dummy variables with Adminsh. This modification hardly affects the
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Tab. 4.7: Robustness tests with merged datasets (McCleary + VolAg; 1983-2009 period)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables probit probit probit probit probit
Size -0.1328*** -0.1378*** -0.3414** -0.3559** -0.3483**
(0.0129) (0.0186) (0.1569) (0.1620) (0.1566)
Size*2 0.0063 0.0067 0.0065
(0.0054) (0.0056) (0.0054)
Age -0.1147*** -0.1389*** -0.0880** -0.0776* -0.0678*
(0.0314) (0.0391) (0.0399) (0.0401) (0.0386)
Fundsh -0.0006 -0.0070 -0.0071 -0.0061
(0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0063)
Adminsh 0.0093** 0.0075* 0.0076** 0.0155
(0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0135)
Donationsh -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0010
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Publicsh -0.0043** -0.0045** -0.0044**
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Intfrac -0.0057*** -0.0057*** -0.0056***
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
NGOdensity 0.0086 0.0095*
(0.0055) (0.0048)
Herfin -0.0099*** -0.0098***
(0.0035) (0.0035)
Periode2 0.2302
(0.2740)
Periode3 -0.2078
(0.2757)
Periode4 -0.3507
(0.2807)
Periode5 0.2350
(0.2637)
Periode2*Adminsh -0.0169
(0.0154)
Periode3*Adminsh -0.0008
(0.0153)
Periode4*Adminsh -0.0026
(0.0155)
Periode5*Adminsh -0.0140
(0.0147)
Constant 0.3902 0.3876 2.4891** 3.0709** 2.8457**
(0.3085) (0.4183) (1.2062) (1.2355) (1.2069)
Observations 7,174 5,529 5,526 5,526 5,526
Reports the coefficients. All estimations include year fixed effects as well as NGO-type fixed effects that
are not shown. Standard errors are clustered at the NGO level. *** (**; *) denote significance at the one
(five; ten) per cent level.
coefficients of the other variables, including Publicsh. Recalling that the coefficients on
the interacted variables cannot be interpreted in non-linear models, we calculate the prob-
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ability of an NGO exit depending on Adminsh for each time interval. We would expect
a steeper increase in the exit probability with increasing Adminsh in the most recent time
interval, and a more modest increase in the earlier time intervals, if stricter monitoring,
notably by watchdogs, increasingly exposed inefficient NGOs and alerted public and pri-
vate donors. However, the exit probabilities shown in figure 4.2b do not provide evidence
to this effect. In the most recent time interval (period 5), the exit probability is generally
higher than in some earlier time intervals. But the exit probability hardly increases with
higher values of Adminsh during period 5. The same applies to period 2. A significant in-
crease of the exit probability with higher values of Adminsh is rather observed in periods
3 and 4 (the increase is not significant in period 1).
Taken all three steps together, the surprisingly robust findings suggest that recent de-
velopments with regard to NGO accountability have not rendered obsolete financial and
economic determinants of NGO exit from international activities. Two observations in
section 4.2 provide possible explanations: It appears that self-regulation among US based
NGOs has remained relatively weak, and NGO monitors such as Charity Navigator based
their ratings almost exclusively on financial indicators until recently.
4.4.3 Interaction terms and non-linear effects
The estimations presented so far focused on hypotheses 1 and 2, while we now turn our
attention to hypothesis 3.57 The probit estimations reported in columns (2), (4) and (6) of
table 4.8 account for interactions between Adminsh and public NGO funding. We refer
to Publicsh as our standard measure of public funding in columns (1) and (2), while we
replace Publicsh by a dummy variable set equal to one whenever an NGO receives public
funding, irrespective of its share in total funding, in columns (3) and (4) (PublicD). In
columns (5) and (6), we consider the dummy variable PublicD together with the share
of public funding Publicsh, for those NGOs receiving any public funds. Comparing the
results between columns (1) and (2), columns (3) and (4), and columns (5) and (6), re-
spectively, it can be seen that the extension by the interaction terms hardly affects the
coefficients of our control variables. As concerns the coefficients of the interaction terms,
57 The results shown in this section are based on the full NGO sample and the 1984-2005 period under-
lying our basic probit estimations. However, we replicated the same set of estimations for the extended
period of observation and the reduced number of NGOs listed in both databases (McCleary and VolAg);
detailed results are available on request. Unless noted otherwise, the results are hardly affected by the way
of dealing with the above mentioned trade-off between extending the period of observation and covering a
larger sample of NGOs.
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Tab. 4.8: Probit estimations, including interaction terms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables probit probit probit probit probit probit probit
Size -0.4291** -0.4331** -0.4307** -0.4767*** -0.4225** -0.4695*** -0.4786***
(0.1887) (0.1876) (0.1884) (0.1814) (0.1890) (0.1819) (0.1809)
Size*2 0.0092 0.0093 0.0096 0.0112* 0.0091 0.0108* 0.0104
(0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0064) (0.0066) (0.0064) (0.0063)
Age -0.0605 -0.0598 -0.0524 -0.0471 -0.0551 -0.0520 -0.0619
(0.0444) (0.0445) (0.0453) (0.0459) (0.0453) (0.0459) (0.0444)
Fundsh -0.0081 -0.0079 -0.0071 -0.0058 -0.0080 -0.0070 -0.0078
(0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0074) (0.0073)
Adminsh 0.0107** 0.0095** 0.0110*** -0.0021 0.0107** -0.0024 -0.0089
(0.0042) (0.0048) (0.0042) (0.0060) (0.0042) (0.0060) (0.0272)
Donationsh -0.0009 -0.0009 0.0012 0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0007
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Publicsh -0.0051** -0.0063* -0.0044* -0.0004 -0.0050**
(0.0022) (0.0033) (0.0024) (0.0036) (0.0022)
Publicsh_x_Adminsh 0.0001 -0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0002)
PublicD -0.1603* -0.4786*** -0.0788 -0.4892***
(0.0952) (0.1392) (0.1012) (0.1579)
PublicD_x_Adminsh 0.0245*** 0.0326***
(0.0081) (0.0094)
Size_x_Adminsh 0.0015
(0.0020)
Intfrac -0.0055*** -0.0056*** -0.0062*** -0.0064*** -0.0056*** -0.0057*** -0.0055***
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012)
NGOdensity 0.0062 0.0062 0.0062 0.0055 0.0063 0.0056 0.0062
(0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051)
Herfin -0.0097** -0.0096** -0.0097** -0.0097** -0.0097** -0.0099** -0.0098**
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042)
Constant 3.0703** 3.1066** 2.9059** 3.2949** 3.0040** 3.4127** 3.5000**
(1.4118) (1.4037) (1.4037) (1.3515) (1.4151) (1.3589) (1.3694)
Observations 4,316 4,316 4,316 4,316 4,316 4,316 4,316
Reports the coefficients; for marginal effects, see the text. All estimations include year fixed effects as well
as NGO-type fixed effects that are not shown. Standard errors are clustered at the NGO level. *** (**; *)
denote significance at the one (five; ten) per cent level.
we noted already that their significance cannot be interpreted in non-linear models (Ai and
Norton, 2003). Instead, we portray the exit probability depending on Adminsh for Pub-
licD=0 and PublicD=1 in figure 4.3a, and – for those NGOs receiving any public funds –
the marginal effect of Adminsh conditional on Publicsh in figure 4.3b.58 Taking the evi-
dence in both figures together points to fairly complex non-linear effects of administrative
expenditures on the probability of exit. While we found before that the exit probability
increases with higher administrative expenditures, figure 4.3a suggests that this only ap-
plies to the sub-sample with public funding (PublicD=1). In contrast, the exit probability
is essentially the same across the whole spectrum of Adminsh for the sub-sample without
any public funding (PublicD=0). However, the effect of Adminsh not only depends on
whether or not NGOs rely on public funds, but also on the relative importance of public
58 Figure 4.3a is based on column (4) of table 4.8; figure 4.3b is based on column (6) of table 4.8.
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Fig. 4.3: Non-linear effects, part I
funding, as reflected in Publicsh, for those NGOs receiving any public funds. According
to figure 4.3b, the marginal effect of Adminsh on the exit probability declines with higher
values of Publicsh, but remains significantly positive for all values of Publicsh of up to 55
per cent. The effect loses significance beyond this threshold, i.e., for about 18 per cent of
all observations.59 The non-linearities revealed in figures 4.3a and 4.3b may be explained
as follows. It can reasonably be assumed that mainly the official financiers engage in mon-
itoring of NGOs.60 Moreover, purely financial criteria of NGO behavior tend to play a
larger role when it comes to ‘upward accountability’ of NGOs to state authorities (section
4.2). Inefficiency is thus more likely to be exposed in case of NGOs with public funding,
and official financiers may put pressure on NGOs with larger administrative overhead to
exit international development. However, the fairly weak USAID requirement for NGOs
not to spend more than 40 per cent of total expenses on ‘supporting services’ may explain
the modest increase of the exit probability with higher shares of administrative costs. Fur-
thermore, the budget constraints of NGOs are increasingly relaxed with higher values of
Publicsh, which could explain the declining marginal effects of Adminsh in figure 4.3b. In
other words, the impact of softer budget constraints becomes more and more important,
relative to the impact of official monitoring. An additional explanation of why official
monitoring does not appear to be effective beyond the threshold of Publicsh in figure 4.3b
could be that both Adminsh and Publicsh are relatively high when NGOs just entered in-
59 The threshold in figure 4.3b is lower when the estimates are based on the extended period of observa-
tion, 1984-2009.
60 Nunnenkamp and Öhler (2012b) show that private donors hardly make use of publicly available infor-
mation on the administrative efficiency of NGOs when deciding on donations.
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Fig. 4.4: Non-linear effects, part II
ternational development activities. While program activities as well as alternative sources
of financing have still to be developed, official financiers may provide feed money – in-
stead of insisting on administratively efficient operations immediately after entry already.
Another explanation might be that Publicsh exceeds the threshold for some fairly large
NGOs in the sample. Similar to the “too big to fail”-argument in banking and finance,
the threat of official financiers to enforce the exit of large and inefficient NGOs from
international development activities may lack credibility.
The marginal effect of Adminsh conditional on Size in figure 4.4a, derived from the es-
timation in column (7) of table 4.8, fits into this pattern. As can be seen, the effect of
Adminsh on the exit probability is significantly positive over the broad middle range of
the size distribution. However, the effect loses significance at both ends of the size distri-
bution. At the lower end, NGOs may not only be relatively small but also relatively new
and inexperienced in international development. They may incur relatively high admin-
istrative costs during the initial phase of developing program activities. Probably, they
await additional information indicating whether they are likely to grow and become more
efficient before they decide on exit.61 At the opposite end, the largest NGOs may be
tempted to avoid exit especially when private as well as official donors tolerate adminis-
trative inefficiency.
Table 4.9 addresses non-linearities with regard to age and experience more systemati-
61 However, the relatively small number of NGOs at the lower end of the size distribution may also be
partially responsible for the insignificant marginal effect.
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cally. Once again, the standard regressors (replicated in column 1) are hardly affected
when considering different age groups in column (2) or splines in column (3). In column
(2), the youngest NGO group represents the reference category.62 Relative to the other
age groups, the exit probability proves to be significantly higher (at the one per cent level)
for the second group (3-5 years). In column (3) we replace the age group dummies with
natural cubic splines as suggested by Beck et al. (1998). In this way we additionally cap-
ture non-linearities within intervals of the age distribution.63 The graphical representation
in figure 4.4b indicates that the exit probability decreases with age and experience after an
initial peak at the lower end of the age distribution.64 This closely resembles the results
from the estimation with the different age groups. Hence, it is no longer surprising that
Age proves to be insignificant when entered in linear form (column 1). The estimations
reported in columns (4), (5) and (6) of table 4.9 point to strongly non-linear effects of
the NGOs’ administrative overhead on the probability of exit. In column (4), we exclude
NGOs belonging to the lowest quintiles in terms of administrative costs and fundraising.65
In this way, we may check whether it is only beyond a certain threshold that administrative
costs are regarded by private donors and official financiers to be excessive and thus likely
to increase the NGOs’ exit probabilities. The results are very similar to those reported
for the base-run in column (5) of table 4.4.66 In other words, the results for the reduced
sample underscore that exits are more likely for less efficient NGOs. However, we do
not find evidence suggesting that the effect of Adminsh or Fundsh on the probability of
exit is stronger for NGOs with ‘unproductive’ expenditures exceeding an indispensable
minimum.
In columns (5) and (6), we classify all observations into five equally large sub-groups
with increasing values of Adminsh, instead of using the continuous definition of Adminsh.
The lowest quintile represents the reference category, and a dummy variable is set equal
62 The five age groups are defined as follows: less or equal than 2 years, 3-5 years, 6-10 years, 11-20
years, and more than 20 years.
63 We define five age intervals, divided by four so-called knots. The knots are located at the percentiles
recommended in Harrell Jr. (2001, p. 23), i.e. the percentiles 5, 35, 65 and 95. The five age intervals
translate into three spline parameters, the first of which represents the age of NGOs. From the estimates
of these splines we can recover the non-linear effects of age on the exit probability. In principle, these
non-linearities could also be captured by using a complete set of age dummies. However, we prefer splines,
since we are losing less degrees of freedom and since the resulting representation of the non-linear effect of
age on the exit probability is smooth.
64 However, the initial peak disappears when the estimation is based on the extended period of observa-
tion.
65 In unreported additional estimations, we excluded the lowest quintile with respect to either Adminsh or
Fundsh. Results were very similar.
66 However, they are not robust to extending the period of observation.
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Tab. 4.9: Probit estimations, non-linear effects (administrative-cost quintiles, age group dummies
and splines)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Probit probit probit probit probit probit
Size -0.4291** -0.4774** -0.4630** -0.5634** -0.4216** -0.4392**
(0.1887) (0.1928) (0.1965) (0.2466) (0.1785) (0.1863)
Size*2 0.0092 0.0109 0.0104 0.0135 0.0088 0.0094
(0.0066) (0.0067) (0.0069) (0.0086) (0.0062) (0.0065)
Fundsh -0.0081 -0.0080 -0.0076 -0.0100 -0.0072 -0.0080
(0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0074) (0.0091) (0.0074) (0.0075)
Adminsh 0.0107** 0.0111*** 0.0114*** 0.0109**
(0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0042) (0.0053)
Adminsh dummies
lower quintile -0.0179 0.0043
(0.1348) (0.1369)
middle quintile 0.0859 0.1097
(0.1306) (0.1326)
upper quintile 0.0374 0.0656
(0.1287) (0.1299)
highest quintile 0.2377* 0.2667**
(0.1299) (0.1307)
Donationsh -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0011
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0018)
Publicsh -0.0051** -0.0053** -0.0050** -0.0061** -0.0052** -0.0053**
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0022)
Intfrac -0.0055*** -0.0053*** -0.0053*** -0.0068*** -0.0056*** -0.0056***
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0012)
NGOdensity 0.0062 0.0061 0.0063 0.0041 0.0062
(0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0061) (0.0051)
Herfin -0.0097** -0.0088** -0.0092** -0.0110** -0.0095**
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0042)
Age -0.0605 -0.0746 -0.0699 -0.0597
(0.0444) (0.0532) (0.0442) (0.0445)
Age_group_2 0.3089***
(0.1110)
Age_group_3 0.0040
(0.1243)
Age_group_4 -0.0427
(0.1297)
Age_group_5 -0.1438
(0.1781)
Spline_1 0.0554
(0.0393)
Spline_2 -2.4162*
(1.2373)
Spline_3 3.7756**
(1.9048)
Constant 3.0703** 3.1949** 3.0655** 4.5108** 2.6644** 3.2147**
(1.4118) (1.4363) (1.4575) (1.8538) (1.3519) (1.3893)
Observations 4,316 4,316 4,316 2,960 4,316 4,316
Reports the coefficients; for marginal effects, see the text. All estimations include year fixed effects as well
as NGO-type fixed effects that are not shown. Standard errors are clustered at the NGO level. *** (**; *)
denote significance at the one (five; ten) per cent level. Lowest quintile represents the reference category
for Adminsh dummies.
to one for each of the remaining four quintiles. Surprisingly, three out of four dummy
variables prove to be insignificant at conventional levels. Adminsh offers additional infor-
mation beyond the traditional proxies of size and age only for the highest quintile with
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particularly large administrative overhead.67 The fact that administrative overheads are
not associated with higher exit risks for the lower quintiles may reflect that headquarter
services are needed at moderate levels for NGOs to operate effectively in the field (see
section 4.2).
4.5 Conclusion
The recipients of NGO aid are interested in high and sustained project-related spending on
the ground. Likewise, private donors dislike NGOs spending heavily on administration,
management and fundraising. All the same, private donors do not appear to engage in
effective screening of NGOs when deciding on where to donate (Nunnenkamp and Öhler,
2012b). Official financiers may be better prepared to monitor spending patterns of NGOs.
On the other hand, the non-distribution constraint of NGOs may be weakened if public
funding is readily available. Furthermore, NGO accountability has various dimensions
extending beyond strictly financial and economic aspects, including social expectations
and norms held in the relevant community. Hence, it is far from guaranteed that more
efficient NGOs are more likely to survive in international development than their less
efficient peers.
We employ probit estimations to analyze from an economic point of view which factors
affect the probability of ‘market’ exit for almost 900 US based NGOs with overseas aid ac-
tivities during the 1984-2005 period. To the best of our knowledge, the present study is the
first to provide an empirical assessment of the links between the efficiency and survival of
NGOs in international development. In addition to more traditional proxies of efficiency
such as size and experience, we account for administrative overheads and fundraising as
unproductive expenditures resulting in a higher efficiency price of NGO aid. Our focus
is on the impact of administrative overheads, public funding and the interaction between
these two factors on the survival probability of NGOs We also consider other aspects of
NGO heterogeneity such as the type and field of activity of NGOs. We control for market
characteristics such as the density of NGO operations and the concentration of resources.
Our findings tend to support the notion of the liability of smallness and newness. The ef-
fects of NGO size on the probability of exit are more robust to extensions of the estimation
equation than the effects of their age. Size and age have in common that the effects are
non-linear. For instance, the exit probability decreases considerably when NGOs at the
67 Our standard regressors are robust to this modification, too.
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lower end of the size distribution grow larger, while this effect diminishes and eventually
approaches zero when NGOs move up in the size distribution.
Expenditures for fundraising appear to be unrelated with NGO survival in international
development. In contrast, we find a larger administrative overhead to be positively as-
sociated with NGO exit. However, NGO survival appears to be affected only when ad-
ministrative overheads are particularly large. Public funding reduces the exit probability
of NGOs by relaxing their budget constraints. It cannot necessarily be inferred that pub-
lic funding keeps inefficient NGOs alive. To the contrary, it is only for publicly funded
NGOs that administrative inefficiency is associated with a higher probability of exit. This
finding may be attributed to official monitoring, but this effect weakens with increasing
shares of public funding of NGOs. In other words, the impact of softer budget constraints
becomes more and more important, relative to the impact of official monitoring.
Although we find some indications that the survival of NGOs in international develop-
ment depends on financial efficiency, our analysis raises further questions to be addressed
in future research. From an economic point of view, it deserves attention whether the gov-
ernance and monitoring of NGOs could be improved to ensure the ‘survival of the fittest’.
Arguably, the predominance of private donations – in particular with a large number of
small donors – weakens the incentive for effective monitoring of NGOs in the United
States. At the same time, the monitoring of NGOs by official financiers might be im-
proved. The links between financial efficiency and NGO survival could be strengthened
if official financiers applied stricter rules and intensified the monitoring in line with the
NGOs’ reliance on public funds.
Governance and monitoring problems may be most difficult to overcome in the case of
large, though inefficient NGOs. On the one hand, such NGOs may be tempted to avoid
exit as long as private and official donors tolerate administrative inefficiency. On the
other hand, effective monitoring may suffer from insufficient credibility once NGOs have
grown ‘too big to fail’. In addition, a broader set of unresolved questions refers to the rela-
tion between financial efficiency and non-financial aspects of NGO accountability. More
importantly perhaps, future research shall address the possible conflicts between financial
efficiency and the effectiveness of NGOs in helping resolve poverty-related problems in
the recipient countries.
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4.6 Appendix
Tab. 4.10: Robustness tests: accounting for ‘classification error’
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables probit probit probit probit probit probit
Size -0.3558* -0.3743* -0.6546*** -0.6617*** -0.4692* -0.4671*
(0.2057) (0.2145) (0.2377) (0.2357) (0.2650) (0.2651)
Size*2 0.0072 0.0078 0.0161* 0.0163* 0.0096 0.0095
(0.0072) (0.0075) (0.0085) (0.0084) (0.0097) (0.0097)
Age -0.0534 -0.0417 0.0190 0.0261 0.0084 0.0169
(0.0463) (0.0466) (0.0581) (0.0583) (0.0657) (0.0654)
Fundsh -0.0057 -0.0062 -0.0218** -0.0222** -0.0021 -0.0028
(0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0109) (0.0109)
Adminsh 0.0111** 0.0116** 0.0122** 0.0123** 0.0135** 0.0137**
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0056) (0.0056)
Donationsh -0.0013 -0.0012 0.0037 0.0037 0.0036 0.0036
(0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0029) (0.0029)
Publicsh -0.0052** -0.0052** -0.0010 -0.0011 0.0029 0.0028
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Intfrac -0.0055*** -0.0055*** -0.0060*** -0.0060*** -0.0082*** -0.0081***
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0019)
NGOdensity 0.0095* 0.0069 0.0126
(0.0056) (0.0069) (0.0091)
Herfin -0.0092** -0.0031 -0.0029
(0.0047) (0.0058) (0.0051)
Constant 2.0712 2.6469* 0.6981 0.7043 -0.4770 -0.6338
(1.5390) (1.5862) (1.6820) (1.6243) (1.8704) (1.8830)
Observations 4,253 4,253 3,839 3,839 3,499 3,499
In this table we stepwise exclude NGOs where the exit status could not be verified with certainty based
on additional data sources. We find that our main results also hold in specifications (5) and (6), where the
risk of exit misclassification is small. All estimations include year fixed effects as well as NGO-type fixed
effects that are not shown. Standard errors are clustered at the NGO level. *** (**; *) denote significance
at the one (five; ten) per cent level.
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Tab. 4.11: Probit estimations: sample split, religious vs. secular NGOs
Religious NGOs Secular NGOs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables probit probit probit probit probit probit
Size -0.2573*** -0.5785 -0.6012 -0.1474*** -0.3889* -0.3796*
(0.0413) (0.3826) (0.3827) (0.0267) (0.1992) (0.2014)
Size*2 0.0112 0.0120 0.0086 0.0082
(0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0069) (0.0070)
Age 0.0392 0.0257 0.0263 -0.0969* -0.0960* -0.0845*
(0.0866) (0.0877) (0.0872) (0.0510) (0.0506) (0.0514)
Fundsh -0.0395*** -0.0394*** -0.0395*** 0.0023 0.0012 0.0009
(0.0141) (0.0139) (0.0140) (0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0086)
Adminsh 0.0062 0.0065 0.0070 0.0108** 0.0110** 0.0116**
(0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0049)
Donationsh 0.0068 0.0071* 0.0068 -0.0023 -0.0021 -0.0019
(0.0043) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0020)
Publicsh 0.0021 0.0027 0.0023 -0.0061** -0.0060** -0.0059**
(0.0061) (0.0059) (0.0058) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Intfrac -0.0091*** -0.0089*** -0.0089*** -0.0046*** -0.0046*** -0.0046***
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
NGOdensity 0.0020 0.0101
(0.0071) (0.0088)
Herfin -0.0034 -0.0130***
(0.0063) (0.0047)
Constant 1.5614* 3.8540 4.2336 1.1342** 2.7810* 3.2149**
(0.9469) (2.8182) (2.7296) (0.5562) (1.4626) (1.4928)
Observations 1,169 1,169 1,169 3,029 3,029 3,029
Reports the coefficients; for marginal effects, see the text. All estimations include year fixed effects as well
as NGO-type fixed effects that are not shown. Standard errors are clustered at the NGO level. *** (**; *)
denote significance at the one (five; ten) per cent level.
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Tab. 4.12: Complementary log-log and IV probit models
Variables cloglog IV probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Size -0.2905*** -0.4153 -0.4009 -0.1097*** -0.6427** -0.6819**
(0.0446) (0.3325) (0.3401) (0.0313) (0.3157) (0.3190)
Size*2 0.0030 0.0024 0.0165 0.0177*
(0.0122) (0.0125) (0.0104) (0.0106)
Age -0.2259*** -0.1220 -0.1005 -0.3170*** -0.2418*** -0.2245***
(0.0877) (0.0890) (0.0883) (0.0796) (0.0841) (0.0848)
Fundsh -0.0048 -0.0130 -0.0140 -0.0022 -0.0132 -0.0126
(0.0145) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0110) (0.0125) (0.0126)
Adminsh 0.0216*** 0.0171** 0.0183** 0.0076 0.0034 0.0039
(0.0077) (0.0079) (0.0077) (0.0083) (0.0094) (0.0095)
Donationsh -0.0021 -0.0016 -0.0025 -0.0022
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0033)
Publicsh -0.0104** -0.0103** -0.0064* -0.0065*
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Intfrac -0.0107*** -0.0108*** -0.0061*** -0.0061***
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0019) (0.0020)
NGOdensity 0.0133 0.0133*
(0.0106) (0.0080)
Herfin -0.0202** -0.0112*
(0.0094) (0.0062)
Constant 0.0197 2.2032 2.9893 -2.9786 2.1931 2.5100
(1.2787) (2.5477) (2.5560) (239.2772) (163.5393) (164.5876)
Wald test of 0.6201 0.8196 0.7846
exog. (p-val.)
Observations 4,319 4,316 4,316 2,856 2,852 2,852
Reports the coefficients. All estimations include year fixed effects as well as NGO-type fixed effects that
are not shown. Standard errors are clustered at the NGO level. *** (**; *) denote significance at the one
(five; ten) per cent level. Instruments are the level of Size,Size*2, Fundsh, Adminsh, Donationsh, Publicsh,
and Intfrac, lagged by 2 and 3 periods.
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Tab. 4.13: Definition of variables
Variable Definition
Size Total expenditures of NGOi in year t-1; logged
Size*2 Size squared
Age Number of years since NGOi registered with USAID; alternative measure: number of
years since NGOi’s foundation; logged
Fundsh Expenses for fundraising of NGOi in year t-1; share in total expenditures; if the database
does not report a positive entry for fundraising in a particular year, the observation is
considered to be missing; alternatively, we set fundraising to zero and include these
observations; see text for details
Adminsh Expenses for administration and management of NGOi in year t-1; share in total expen-
ditures
Donationsh Private donations to NGOi in year t-1; share in total revenues
Publicsh Public funding of NGOi in year t-1; share in total revenues; public funding includes funds
from USAID, other US government sources, foreign governments and international or-
ganizations
Intfrac Share of expenditures spent for international development cooperation in total (program-
related) expenditures; note that various NGOs in the sample are active in both overseas
programs and domestic programs within the United States; range from 0 to 100, with
higher values reflecting a higher share of overseas programs in overall program expendi-
ture
NGOdensity Number of NGOs in the sample being active in the same sub-group as NGOi; sub-groups
relate to different religious affiliations in the case of religious NGOs, and to different
fields of activity in the case of secular NGOs; see text for details
Herfin Herfindahl index reflecting the concentration of resources (total revenues) among NGOs
belonging to the same sub-group, as defined above; higher index values reveal more
concentrated resources
Note: the database collected by Rachel McCleary is the source of all variables listed; NGOdensity and
Herfin are based on own calculations
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